Ohta, Yasuhiro

写真a

Affiliation

Graduate School of Business Administration (Hiyoshi)

Position

Professor

E-mail Address

E-mail address

Related Websites

External Links

Career 【 Display / hide

  • 2002.08
    -
    2003.01

    Lecturer of Accounting, School of Administrative Studies, Joseph E. Atkinson Faculty of Liberal and Professional Studies, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

  • 2003.02
    -
    2005.08

    Assistant Professor of Accounting, School of Administrative Studies, Joseph E. Atkinson Faculty of Liberal and Professional Studies, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

  • 2005.09
    -
    2011.03

    Associate Professor of Accounting, Graduate School of Business Administration, Keio University, Yokohama, Japan

  • 2011.04
    -
    Present

    Professor of Accounting, Graduate School of Business Administration, Keio University, Yokohama, Japan

Academic Background 【 Display / hide

  • 1992.03

    Keio University, Faculty of Economics

    University, Graduated

  • 1997.03

    The University of Tokyo, Graduate School, Division of Economics, Corporation and Market Studies

    Graduate School, Withdrawal after completion of doctoral course requirements, Doctoral course

  • 2002.11

    State University of New York at Buffalo, School of Management, Management

    United States of America, Graduate School, Completed, Doctoral course

Academic Degrees 【 Display / hide

  • Ph.D. (Management), State University of New York at Buffalo, Coursework, 2002.11

  • Master of Economics, The University of Tokyo, Coursework, 1994.03

 

Research Areas 【 Display / hide

  • Accounting

Research Keywords 【 Display / hide

  • Strategic auditing, Performance evaluation, Valuation

Research Themes 【 Display / hide

  • Analytical Research on Corporate Governance and Disclosure, 

     

 

Books 【 Display / hide

Papers 【 Display / hide

  • The Role of Audit Evidence in a Strategic Audit

    OHTA YASUHIRO

    Journal of Accounting and Public Policy (Elsevier)  28 ( 1 ) 58-67 2009.01

    Research paper (scientific journal), Single Work, Accepted

     View Summary

    This study examines how audit risk (the probability of false acceptance) and its components change when the auditor obtains audit evidence in an acceptance sampling model. Inherent risk and audit risk increase with audit evidence if the auditee has a sufficiently strong incentive for committing fraud. Detection risk always increases when audit evidence is introduced. If the auditor has a sufficiently strong incentive for avoiding false rejection, audit risk also increases with audit evidence. The analysis indicates that requiring auditors to obtain information is not effective in preventing material misstatements in at least some instances.

  • On the Conditions under which Audit Risk Increases with Information

    Yasuhiro Ohta

    European Accounting Review (European Accounting Association)  17 ( 2 )  2008.07

    Research paper (scientific journal), Single Work, Accepted

     View Summary

    It has been reported in the literature on strategic auditing that audit risk (the probability of audit failure) may increase when the auditor obtains information, whereas conditions for such cases have not been identified as yet. This paper provides simple models to analyze the general tendencies of exogenous parameters for such cases. The analysis shows that audit risk increases with more information if the auditee has a sufficiently strong incentive to commit fraud. If the auditee is penalized by auditor rejection even when he does not commit fraud, the detection risk increases with more information. In this case, if the auditor has a sufficiently strong incentive to avoid false rejection, audit risk increases with more information.

  • 財務会計の理論と実証

    OHTA YASUHIRO, ATSUSHI SHIIBA, JUMPEI NISHITANI

    William R. Scott, "Financial Accounting Theory" (中央経済社)   2008.06

    Research paper (other science council materials etc.), Joint Work, Except for reviews

  • The Fairness Opinion Puzzle: Board Incentives, Information Asymmetry, and Bidding Strategy

    Yasuhiro Ohta and Kenton K. Yee

    Journal of Legal Studies (University of Chicago Press)  37 ( 1 ) 229-279 2008.01

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted

     View Summary

    Why do 60% of target boards voluntarily solicit and pay for seemingly worthless 'Texas-wide' fairness opinions while 40% of their peers do not? Our new insight is that target boards speak to more than one shareholder generation through fairness opinions. We model fairness opinions as a cheap-talk game between a board of directors and public shareholders. In the core game, a board issues a fairness opinion to communicate with two shareholder generations: existing shareholders voting on the proposed sale of their shares, and potential after-market buyers who would buy if the present transaction fails. The game yields two distinct equilibria: one where the board issues no fairness opinions and one where Texas-wide fairness opinions emerge as equilibrium messages. The core game assumes that: (i) shareholders know the status of the board's private incentive; (ii) the proposed buyer sets a fixed bid equal to the ex ante expected value of the firm; and (iii) shareholders have no information about the target that the board does not have. We relax each of these three assumptions and prove that the conclusions drawn from the core game continue to hold. We conclude that three factors determine the width of fairness opinions: the board's private incentives; information asymmetry between the board and shareholders; and transactions costs incurred by after-market buyers if the current bid fails.

  • 自己資本利益率の計算方法について(3)

    OHTA YASUHIRO

    企業会計 (中央経済社)  59 ( 9 ) 1324-1325 2007.09

    Research paper (scientific journal), Single Work, Except for reviews

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Papers, etc., Registered in KOARA 【 Display / hide

Presentations 【 Display / hide

  • Limited Auditor Liability and Audit Quality in Different Legal Regimes

    OHTA YASUHIRO

    2009 Korean Accounting Association Annual Meeting at Mungyeong, South Korea, June 18, 2009. (Mungyeong, South Korea) , 2009.06, Oral Presentation(guest/special), Korean Accounting Association

  • Interpretability of Empirical Valuation Models in the Value Relevance Literature

    OHTA YASUHIRO

    33rd Canadian Academic Accounting Association Conference (Montreal, Quebec, Canada) , 2009.06, Oral Presentation(general), Canadian Academic Accounting Association

  • 会計研究の危機と日本の会計学界

    OHTA YASUHIRO

    第3回 2009年現代ディスクロージャー研究カンファレンス (名古屋国際センター) , 2009.05, Oral Presentation(general), ディスクロージャー研究学会

  • Interpretability of Empirical Valuation Models in the Value Relevance Literature

    OHTA YASUHIRO

    32nd Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association (Tampere, Finland) , 2009.05, Oral Presentation(general), European Accounting Association

  • The Role of Audit Evidence in a Strategic Audit

    OHTA YASUHIRO

    9th Asian Academic Accounting Association Conference (Dubai, U.A.E.) , 2008.11, Oral Presentation(general), Asian Academic Accounting Association

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Research Projects of Competitive Funds, etc. 【 Display / hide

  • 防衛装備品調達におけるインセンティブ契約と原価監査

    2019.04
    -
    2024.03

    MEXT,JSPS, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, 太田 康広, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), Principal Investigator

  • 企業価値評価の理論的基礎の探求

    2016.04
    -
    2019.03

    MEXT,JSPS, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, 太田 康広, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), Principal Investigator

 

Courses Taught 【 Display / hide

  • SEMINAR IN ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

    2021

  • RESEARCH SEMINAR IN ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

    2021

  • INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH C (EMBA)

    2021

  • INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH B (EMBA)

    2021

  • INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH A (EMBA)

    2021

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