Details of a Researcher - Matsubayashi, Nobuo

Matsubayashi, Nobuo

写真a

Affiliation: Faculty of Science and Technology, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering （Yagami）

Position: Professor

Related Websites

http://lab.ae.keio.ac.jp/~matsubayashi_lab/profile-e.htm

External Links

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Career 【 Display / hide 】

1996.04

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1999.06

日本電信電話株式会社
1999.07

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2004.03

NTTコミュニケーションズ株式会社
2004.04

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2006.03

東京理科大学理工学部経営工学科　助手
2006.04

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2011.03

慶應義塾大学理工学部管理工学科　専任講師
2007.10

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2009.09

慶應義塾大学学生総合センター委員（矢上支部・学生担当）

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Academic Background 【 Display / hide 】

1994.03

Keio University, Faculty of Science and Engineering, 管理工学科

University, Graduated
1996.03

Keio University, Graduate School, Division of Science and Engineering, 管理工学専攻

Graduate School, Completed, Master's course

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Academic Degrees 【 Display / hide 】

博士（工学）, Keio University, Dissertation, 2004.03

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Research Areas 【 Display / hide 】

Social Infrastructure (Civil Engineering, Architecture, Disaster Prevention) / Social systems engineering (Social System Engineering/Safety System)
Social Infrastructure (Civil Engineering, Architecture, Disaster Prevention) / Safety engineering (Social System Engineering/Safety System)

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Research Keywords 【 Display / hide 】

ビジネスエコノミクス
応用ゲーム理論

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Books 【 Display / hide 】

Monopolies: Theory, Effectiveness and Regulation

MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO, YANO MANABU, Nova Science Publishers, 2011.10

Scope: 101-131
Game Theory: Strategies, Equilibria, and Theorems

MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO, Nova Science Publishers, 2009.03

Scope: 217-229

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Papers 【 Display / hide 】

Dynamic Production and Pricing Decisions in the Presence of the Snob Effect

SOGO KEITA,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

International Transactions in Operational Research （International Transactions in Operational Research) 28 （ 6 ） 3330 - 3363 2021.11

Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted, ISSN 1475-3995

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This study analyzes the production and pricing strategy of a monopoly firm in the presence of the snob effect, whereby consumers value a product more when its availability is lower. Real-world firms often intentionally cause the snob effect by strategically reducing supply quantities or even causing shortages. This observation suggests the existence of a trade-off between utilizing the snob effect and avoiding opportunity costs. We consider a general multiperiod model in which a monopoly firm determines the dynamic paths of price and sales quantity; although consumers are not forward looking, they evaluate past stockouts with a discount factor. We find that the optimal dynamic paths of the price and output level vary depending on the degree of consumer sensitivity to stockouts, the consumer's discount factor on past shortage, and the firm's discount factor on future profit. Nevertheless, the total profit monotonically increases with the degree of consumer sensitivity to stockouts.
- Access to Document (DOI)
Game-Theoretic Analysis of Partner Selection Strategies for Market Entry in Global Supply Chains

NEGORO KAZUHIRO,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review （Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review) 151 102362 2021.07

Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted, ISSN 1366-5545

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In this study, we provide a game-theoretic analysis to investigate an entrant firm's partner selection for offering its new product to a market, particularly to a foreign market. The entrant has either a brand advantage or technological superiority over incumbent firms. We analyze the strategic interaction between one entrant and three incumbent firms that include one major firm (or a firm offering a popular product) and two local firms (or firms offering niche products). We explore the impact of such asymmetric demand structures on the entrant's partner selection. Our equilibrium analysis indicates that forming a partnership with a firm that currently has the largest market share because of its superior product is not necessarily optimal for the entrant. When the value offered by the entrant is significantly high, it is more beneficial for the entrant to ally with the major firm, even if that firm currently has a smaller market share than the local firms because of its inferior product. We also demonstrate that when the entrant can add technological superiority to the partner's product, the entrant's optimal partner selection may change non-monotonically in the degree of this superiority. Furthermore, in response to the entrant's optimal partner selection, the relative profitability between incumbent firms can reverse discontinuously and drastically according to the degree of the value offered by the entrant.
- Access to Document (DOI)
Channel Coordination Between Manufacturers and Competing Retailers with Fairness Concerns

YOSHIHARA RIKUO,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

European Journal of Operational Research （European Journal of Operational Research) 290 （ 2 ） 546 - 555 2021.04

Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted, ISSN 0377-2217

　View Summary

© 2020 Elsevier B.V. This study provides a game-theoretic analysis for channel coordination of a two-tier supply chain in which retailers have fairness concerns. We explore a setting in which a single manufacturer sells its product to consumers through two competing retailers that are horizontally differentiated at varying levels. We extend the previous literature, which examines only monopolistic supply chains. We show that the channel can be successfully coordinated in equilibrium in that the total channel profit is maximized and the retailers do not incur disutility due to disadvantageous inequality, even if they are not averse to their advantageous inequality. Specifically, only if the retailers are moderately differentiated is a fair channel successfully achieved. In addition, we find that in a market in which a fair channel is coordinated in equilibrium, the retailers necessarily benefit from their fairness concerns. Furthermore, we investigate a situation in which the ideal distribution ratios between the channel members can be endogenously chosen prior to subsequent pricing stages. Interestingly, even if such endogenous choices are allowed for the retailers, a fair channel still can be coordinated in equilibrium. Specifically, the retailers set their ideal ratios in equilibrium at the lowest level in their feasible ranges of successful coordination. However, this results in the prisoner's dilemma, because if they were allowed to collude to set the ratios, the retailers would benefit the most from the highest level in the feasible ranges.
- Access to Document (DOI)
Product Repositioning in a Horizontally Differentiated Market

KISHIHARA HIROKI,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

Review of Industrial Organization （Review of Industrial Organization) 57 （ 3 ） 701 - 718 2020.11

Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted, ISSN 0889938X

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© 2019, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature. We study product repositioning between firms with predetermined base positions for their products in existing markets. Based on Hotelling’s linear city model, we attempt to generalize models in past studies by encompassing asymmetric base positions and asymmetric cost-efficiency in repositioning. We find that neither base products nor new products in attractive positions in the market necessarily imply competitive advantage. In particular, a potentially cost-inefficient firm can earn higher profits than does a rival, even though the former firm’s product is in a less attractive position. We also clarify the welfare implications for regulating or encouraging firms’ repositioning activities.
- Access to Document (DOI)
The Strategic Effect of Retailers' In-store Advertising Services Under Product Variety Competition

KOBAYASHI HARUKI,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

Managerial and Decision Economics （Managerial and Decision Economics) 40 （ 3 ） 232 - 242 2019.04

Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted, ISSN 01436570

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© 2019 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. We study a retailer service model of in-store advertising, in which a neutral retailer provides product information to consumers for free but charges manufacturers. Our results show that the retailer's optimal pricing induces the manufacturers to decrease the number of items they offer. Nevertheless, this relaxes the competition between the manufacturers so that they benefit from using the in-store service, unless the cost of communicating with consumers about the between-firm products is lower. Furthermore, the service can be made socially beneficial by reducing the inefficiency resulting from an excessive number of items when manufacturers are not well differentiated.
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Papers, etc., Registered in KOARA 【 Display / hide 】

Model analysis for product strategy in the presence of irrational consumers

Matsubayashi, Nobuo

学事振興資金研究成果実績報告書（慶應義塾大学) 2018
Development and analysis for decision making models in strategic customization

Matsubayashi, Nobuo

科学研究費補助金研究成果報告書 2017
Development of models for strategic coalition formation in supply chain networks and its analysis

Matsubayashi, Nobuo

科学研究費補助金研究成果報告書 2014
Development of models for strategic decision making in long tail markets and its analysis

Matsubayashi, Nobuo

科学研究費補助金研究成果報告書 2011
Development of engineering methods for network formation problem and analysis of the formation mechanism

MATSUBAYASHI, NOBUO

科学研究費補助金研究成果報告書 2008

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Reviews, Commentaries, etc. 【 Display / hide 】

管理工学科における経済分野の研究と教育

MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

オペレーションズ・リサーチ 66 ( 3 ) 159 - 163 2021.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (scientific journal), Single Work
ビジネスにおけるゲーム理論的分析への行動経済学的アプローチ

MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

オペレーションズ・リサーチ 65 ( 5 ) 253 - 259 2020.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (scientific journal), Single Work
庶務担当から見るJIMAの現状と今後

MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO, NISHIOKA HISAMITSU

経営システム 27 ( 3 ) 156-160 2017.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (scientific journal), Single Work
稀少品における企業の価格戦略について

MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

オペレーションズ・リサーチ 61 ( 10 ) 678 - 679 2016.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (scientific journal), Single Work
ビジネスとゲーム理論

MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

オペレーションズ・リサーチ 60 ( 6 ) 316-322 2015.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (scientific journal), Single Work

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Presentations 【 Display / hide 】

代替関係において互いに対称なグループからなるクールノー寡占市場における全体提携のδ-安定性

SAITO KOTARO, MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会2023年春季研究発表会,

2023.03
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Oral presentation (general)
ブランドスピルオーバーがあるもとでの品質差別化市場への参入戦略

TAJIMA KATSUNARI, MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

日本経営工学会2022年秋季大会 (広島工業大学) ,

2022.11
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Oral presentation (general), 日本経営工学会
ブランドスピルオーバーが存在するもとでの自社ブランドを持つ企業のテナント誘致戦略

GOTO RYOSUKE, MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

日本経営工学会2022年春季大会 (神奈川大学) ,

2022.05
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Oral presentation (general), 日本経営工学会
Direct-to-consumer Firm’s Competitive Strategy Against a Dominant Retailer: Opening an Experiential Physical Store vs. Specializing in an Online Store

#TAKEDA MASANOBU, MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO(/)-#HR

The 2021 INFORMS Annual Meeting (the Anaheim Convention Center & Anaheim Marriott in Anaheim, California, USA（オンライン参加）) ,

2021.10
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Oral presentation (general)
Game-theoretic Analysis of Alliance Between Platforms and Competing Manufacturers in Sharing Consumer Data for Product Developments

#MATSUHISA HIROSHI, MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO(/)-#HR

The 2021 INFORMS Annual Meeting (the Anaheim Convention Center & Anaheim Marriott in Anaheim, California, USA（オンライン参加）) ,

2021.10
,
Oral presentation (general)

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Research Projects of Competitive Funds, etc. 【 Display / hide 】

行動経済学の知見に基づくプラットフォームを介したサプライチェーンに関する理論研究

2022.04

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2025.03

MEXT,JSPS, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), Principal investigator
行動経済学の知見に基づくサプライチェーン上の戦略的意思決定に関する理論的研究

2019.04

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2022.03

MEXT,JSPS, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), Principal investigator
戦略的カスタマイゼーションのための意思決定モデルの開発とその解析

2017.04

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2018.03

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal investigator
戦略的カスタマイゼーションのための意思決定モデルの開発とその解析

2016.04

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2017.03

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal investigator
戦略的カスタマイゼーションのための意思決定モデルの開発とその解析

2015.04

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2016.03

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal investigator