Matsubayashi, Nobuo

写真a

Affiliation

Faculty of Science and Technology, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering (Yagami)

Position

Professor

Related Websites

External Links
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Career 【 Display / hide 】

  • 1996.04
    -
    1999.06

    日本電信電話株式会社

  • 1999.07
    -
    2004.03

    NTTコミュニケーションズ株式会社

  • 2004.04
    -
    2006.03

    東京理科大学理工学部経営工学科　助手

  • 2006.04
    -
    2011.03

    慶應義塾大学理工学部管理工学科　専任講師

  • 2007.10
    -
    2009.09

    慶應義塾大学学生総合センター委員（矢上支部・学生担当）

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Academic Background 【 Display / hide 】

  • 1994.03

    Keio University, Faculty of Science and Engineering, 管理工学科

    University, Graduated

  • 1996.03

    Keio University, Graduate School, Division of Science and Engineering, 管理工学専攻

    Graduate School, Completed, Master's course

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Academic Degrees 【 Display / hide 】

  • 博士（工学）, Keio University, Dissertation, 2004.03

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Research Areas 【 Display / hide 】

  • Social Infrastructure (Civil Engineering, Architecture, Disaster Prevention) / Social systems engineering (Social System Engineering/Safety System)

  • Social Infrastructure (Civil Engineering, Architecture, Disaster Prevention) / Safety engineering (Social System Engineering/Safety System)

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Research Keywords 【 Display / hide 】

  • ビジネスエコノミクス

  • 応用ゲーム理論

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Books 【 Display / hide 】

  • Monopolies: Theory, Effectiveness and Regulation

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO, YANO MANABU, Nova Science Publishers, 2011.10

    Scope: 101-131

  • Game Theory: Strategies, Equilibria, and Theorems

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO, Nova Science Publishers, 2009.03

    Scope: 217-229

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Papers 【 Display / hide 】

  • Entry decisions for vertically differentiated markets with brand spillovers

    MIRE KEITA,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    European Journal of Operational Research (European Journal of Operational Research)  314 ( 2 ) 565 - 578 2024.04

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Corresponding author, Accepted,  ISSN  0377-2217

    　View Summary

    When a branded firm offers a new product at a quality level different from that of its existing product(s), some bias is often present as consumers are affected by the quality of the existing product(s) when evaluating the quality of the new one(s). Consequently, this product offering creates a forward spillover effect and, in turn, might even impact consumers' utility from the existing product, referred to as the reciprocal spillover effect. Given the potential for such brand spillovers, how should a branded firm enter a new market with a vertically differentiated product? We analytically investigate a branded firm's choice of quality and the profitability of entering a new market.

    The results indicate that bilateral spillovers cause the entrant to fail to adjust the quality of its new product, meaning that a new firm providing a high-end existing product entering the market will not be profitable, even in the absence of any fixed entry costs and potential competitors. Nevertheless, we also show that when the new market has a rival firm, the potential presence of severe spillovers works as a commitment device for the entrant's quality positioning, which can reverse the entrant's incentive to enter; in contrast, the entrant's resulting profits can be greater in this case than in the absence of spillovers.

  • Alliance formation between a platform retailer and competing manufacturers in sharing consumer data for product development

    MATSUHISA HIROSHI,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    International Journal of Production Economics (International Journal of Production Economics)  267   109090 2024.01

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Corresponding author, Accepted,  ISSN  09255273

    　View Summary

    This study investigates an alliance formation between competing manufacturers and a monopolistic platform retailer, where consumer data collected by the retailer are available between all the alliance members to utilize for the development of their products. The manufacturers alternatively choose to adopt the direct-to-consumer model, where they collect and utilize own consumer data or sell products without data utilization. They are differentiated from each other in varying degree of substitutability. Under the alliance, the effectiveness of utilizing their rival's consumer data is proportional to the degree of substitutability. By using a game-theoretic approach, we analyze a strategic interaction between two or three manufacturers and the retailer to derive the condition under which the alliance is successfully formed in equilibrium and to discuss the retailer's profitability of the alliance formation.

    We show that participation in the alliance has a direct effect of sharing their rivals' consumer data and an indirect effect of mitigating price competition between the manufacturers due to the ``free-riding'' effect of data sharing. Despite these merits, the alliance may not be formed in equilibrium. When the two manufacturers are differentiated to some extent or the three manufacturers are symmetrically differentiated, the alliance is successfully formed. Otherwise, it is never formed in equilibrium. We show that the retailer benefits the most from the alliance with two intermediately differentiated manufacturers and that an increase in the number of manufacturers participating in the alliance does not necessarily improve the retailer's profitability.

  • Dynamic Production and Pricing Decisions in the Presence of the Snob Effect

    SOGO KEITA,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    International Transactions in Operational Research (International Transactions in Operational Research)  28 ( 6 ) 3330 - 3363 2021.11

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  1475-3995

    　View Summary

    This study analyzes the production and pricing strategy of a monopoly firm in the presence of the snob effect, whereby consumers value a product more when its availability is lower. Real-world firms often intentionally cause the snob effect by strategically reducing supply quantities or even causing shortages. This observation suggests the existence of a trade-off between utilizing the snob effect and avoiding opportunity costs. We consider a general multiperiod model in which a monopoly firm determines the dynamic paths of price and sales quantity; although consumers are not forward looking, they evaluate past stockouts with a discount factor. We find that the optimal dynamic paths of the price and output level vary depending on the degree of consumer sensitivity to stockouts, the consumer's discount factor on past shortage, and the firm's discount factor on future profit. Nevertheless, the total profit monotonically increases with the degree of consumer sensitivity to stockouts.

  • Game-Theoretic Analysis of Partner Selection Strategies for Market Entry in Global Supply Chains

    NEGORO KAZUHIRO,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review (Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review)  151   102362 2021.07

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  1366-5545

    　View Summary

    In this study, we provide a game-theoretic analysis to investigate an entrant firm's partner selection for offering its new product to a market, particularly to a foreign market. The entrant has either a brand advantage or technological superiority over incumbent firms. We analyze the strategic interaction between one entrant and three incumbent firms that include one major firm (or a firm offering a popular product) and two local firms (or firms offering niche products). We explore the impact of such asymmetric demand structures on the entrant's partner selection. Our equilibrium analysis indicates that forming a partnership with a firm that currently has the largest market share because of its superior product is not necessarily optimal for the entrant. When the value offered by the entrant is significantly high, it is more beneficial for the entrant to ally with the major firm, even if that firm currently has a smaller market share than the local firms because of its inferior product. We also demonstrate that when the entrant can add technological superiority to the partner's product, the entrant's optimal partner selection may change non-monotonically in the degree of this superiority. Furthermore, in response to the entrant's optimal partner selection, the relative profitability between incumbent firms can reverse discontinuously and drastically according to the degree of the value offered by the entrant.

  • Channel Coordination Between Manufacturers and Competing Retailers with Fairness Concerns

    YOSHIHARA RIKUO,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    European Journal of Operational Research (European Journal of Operational Research)  290 ( 2 ) 546 - 555 2021.04

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  0377-2217

    　View Summary

    © 2020 Elsevier B.V. This study provides a game-theoretic analysis for channel coordination of a two-tier supply chain in which retailers have fairness concerns. We explore a setting in which a single manufacturer sells its product to consumers through two competing retailers that are horizontally differentiated at varying levels. We extend the previous literature, which examines only monopolistic supply chains. We show that the channel can be successfully coordinated in equilibrium in that the total channel profit is maximized and the retailers do not incur disutility due to disadvantageous inequality, even if they are not averse to their advantageous inequality. Specifically, only if the retailers are moderately differentiated is a fair channel successfully achieved. In addition, we find that in a market in which a fair channel is coordinated in equilibrium, the retailers necessarily benefit from their fairness concerns. Furthermore, we investigate a situation in which the ideal distribution ratios between the channel members can be endogenously chosen prior to subsequent pricing stages. Interestingly, even if such endogenous choices are allowed for the retailers, a fair channel still can be coordinated in equilibrium. Specifically, the retailers set their ideal ratios in equilibrium at the lowest level in their feasible ranges of successful coordination. However, this results in the prisoner's dilemma, because if they were allowed to collude to set the ratios, the retailers would benefit the most from the highest level in the feasible ranges.

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Papers, etc., Registered in KOARA 【 Display / hide 】

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Reviews, Commentaries, etc. 【 Display / hide 】

  • ビジネスにおける意思決定のゲーム理論分析

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ 69 ( 4 ) 211 - 218 2024.04

    Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (scientific journal), Single Work

  • 特集にあたって（特集「エンジニアリングのためのゲーム理論」）

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ 69 ( 4 ) 180 - 180 2024.04

    Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (scientific journal), Single Work

  • 管理工学科における経済分野の研究と教育

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ 66 ( 3 ) 159 - 163 2021.03

    Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (scientific journal), Single Work

  • ビジネスにおけるゲーム理論的分析への行動経済学的アプローチ

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ 65 ( 5 ) 253 - 259 2020.05

    Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (scientific journal), Single Work

  • 庶務担当から見るJIMAの現状と今後

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO, NISHIOKA HISAMITSU

    経営システム 27 ( 3 ) 156-160 2017.10

    Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (scientific journal), Single Work

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Presentations 【 Display / hide 】

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Research Projects of Competitive Funds, etc. 【 Display / hide 】

  • 行動経済学の知見に基づくプラットフォームを介したサプライチェーンに関する理論研究

    2022.04
    -
    2025.03

    MEXT,JSPS, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), Principal investigator

  • 行動経済学の知見に基づくサプライチェーン上の戦略的意思決定に関する理論的研究

    2019.04
    -
    2022.03

    MEXT,JSPS, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), Principal investigator

  • 戦略的カスタマイゼーションのための意思決定モデルの開発とその解析

    2017.04
    -
    2018.03

    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal investigator

  • 戦略的カスタマイゼーションのための意思決定モデルの開発とその解析

    2016.04
    -
    2017.03

    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal investigator

  • 戦略的カスタマイゼーションのための意思決定モデルの開発とその解析

    2015.04
    -
    2016.03

    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal investigator

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Awards 【 Display / hide 】

  • 日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会　フェロー

    2024.03

    Type of Award： Other

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Courses Taught 【 Display / hide 】

  • SEMINAR IN INDUSTRIAL AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

    2024

  • OPEN SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT: LECTURE AND LABORATORIES

    2024

  • LABORATORIES IN INDUSTRIAL AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (6)

    2024

  • INDEPENDENT STUDY ON SCIENCE FOR OPEN AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS

    2024

  • GRADUATE RESEARCH ON SCIENCE FOR OPEN AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS 2

    2024

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Memberships in Academic Societies 【 Display / hide 】

  • 日本経営工学会, 

    2013.07
    -
    Present

  • 日本経営工学会, 

    2013.05
    -
    Present

  • 日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会, 

    2013.04
    -
    Present

  • 日本経営工学会, 

    2012.11
    -
    2013.05

  • 経営情報学会, 

    2012.04
    -
    2013.03

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Committee Experiences 【 Display / hide 】

  • 2024.02

    関東支部2023年度学生論文発表会開催校代表, 日本経営工学会

  • 2023.06
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    Present

    関東支部運営委員, 日本経営工学会

  • 2023.05
    -
    Present

    Editor, 日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会

  • 2021.05
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    Present

    代議員, 日本経営工学会

  • 2021.04
    -
    2023.04

    監事, 日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会

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