Matsubayashi, Nobuo

写真a

Affiliation

Faculty of Science and Technology, Department of Administration Engineering (Yagami)

Position

Professor

E-mail Address

E-mail address

Related Websites

External Links

Career 【 Display / hide

  • 1996.04
    -
    1999.06

    日本電信電話株式会社

  • 1999.07
    -
    2004.03

    NTTコミュニケーションズ株式会社

  • 2004.04
    -
    2006.03

    東京理科大学理工学部経営工学科 助手

  • 2006.04
    -
    2011.03

    慶應義塾大学理工学部管理工学科 専任講師

  • 2007.10
    -
    2009.09

    慶應義塾大学学生総合センター委員(矢上支部・学生担当)

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Academic Background 【 Display / hide

  • 1994.03

    Keio University, Faculty of Science and Engineering, 管理工学科

    University, Graduated

  • 1996.03

    Keio University, Graduate School, Division of Science and Engineering, 管理工学専攻

    Graduate School, Completed, Master's course

Academic Degrees 【 Display / hide

  • 博士(工学), Keio University, Dissertation, 2004.03

 

Research Areas 【 Display / hide

  • Social systems engineering/Safety system (Social System Engineering/Safety System)

Research Keywords 【 Display / hide

  • ビジネスエコノミクス

  • 応用ゲーム理論

 

Books 【 Display / hide

  • Monopolies: Theory, Effectiveness and Regulation

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO, YANO MANABU, Nova Science Publishers, 2011.10

    Scope: 101-131

  • Game Theory: Strategies, Equilibria, and Theorems

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO, Nova Science Publishers, 2009.03

    Scope: 217-229

Papers 【 Display / hide

  • Channel Coordination Between Manufacturers and Competing Retailers with Fairness Concerns

    YOSHIHARA RIKUO,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    European Journal of Operational Research forthcoming 2020

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  0377-2217

  • The Strategic Effect of Retailers' In-store Advertising Services Under Product Variety Competition

    KOBAYASHI HARUKI,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    Managerial and Decision Economics 40 ( 3 ) 232 - 242 2019.04

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  01436570

     View Summary

    © 2019 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. We study a retailer service model of in-store advertising, in which a neutral retailer provides product information to consumers for free but charges manufacturers. Our results show that the retailer's optimal pricing induces the manufacturers to decrease the number of items they offer. Nevertheless, this relaxes the competition between the manufacturers so that they benefit from using the in-store service, unless the cost of communicating with consumers about the between-firm products is lower. Furthermore, the service can be made socially beneficial by reducing the inefficiency resulting from an excessive number of items when manufacturers are not well differentiated.

  • Product Repositioning in a Horizontally Differentiated Market

    KISHIHARA HIROKI,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    Review of Industrial Organization (Review of Industrial Organization)   2019

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  0889938X

     View Summary

    © 2019, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature. We study product repositioning between firms with predetermined base positions for their products in existing markets. Based on Hotelling’s linear city model, we attempt to generalize models in past studies by encompassing asymmetric base positions and asymmetric cost-efficiency in repositioning. We find that neither base products nor new products in attractive positions in the market necessarily imply competitive advantage. In particular, a potentially cost-inefficient firm can earn higher profits than does a rival, even though the former firm’s product is in a less attractive position. We also clarify the welfare implications for regulating or encouraging firms’ repositioning activities.

  • Stability Analysis of Horizontal Mergers in a Market with Asymmetric Substitutability

    TAKEDA KOHEI, HOSOE TOYOKI, WATANABE TAKAYUKI,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    Mathematical Social Sciences 96   73 - 84 2018.11

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  01654896

     View Summary

    © 2018 Elsevier B.V. This study analyzes the stability of horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly market. Although many researchers have addressed this issue, most previous studies assume symmetric firms in terms of demand and cost structures due to analytical tractability. We attempt to find a stable merger in a general [Formula presented]-firm oligopoly in which we allow for asymmetric substitutability between firms. To ensure analytical tractability, we follow the related literature and employ a simple core allocation for a monopoly merger as a stability concept. We analyze several typical markets with asymmetric substitutability and show that although [Formula presented]-core is always nonempty in every setting that we examine, the [Formula presented]-core is very likely to be empty—it is always empty in a market with three or more symmetric firms. Nevertheless, we present an example of a market with a nonempty [Formula presented]-core, regardless of the number of firms in a market. The market has at most two symmetric firms in terms of substitutability (e.g., a linear city). Furthermore, substitutability is so low across the market that each firm competes with only two neighboring firms. Therefore, contrary to the conventional view suggested in previous studies, we show that a monopoly merger can be stable in a Cournot oligopoly market, even if there are many firms in the market.

  • Sequential Product Positioning in the Presence of an Asymmetric Network Externality Intensity

    SAITO RYOICHI,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    Managerial and Decision Economics 39 ( 3 ) 320 - 334 2018.04

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  01436570

     View Summary

    Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. In this study, we analyze the sequential decisions on product positioning of two firms in the presence of network externalities. One commonly accepted phenomena in a market where a network externality arises is the first-mover advantage, in which the first entrant into a market can earn a higher profit than later entrants. However, in some recent online services markets, we see that the second mover earns a higher profit than the first mover. This occurs because the second mover strengthens its variety of available functions and services markedly, thereby facilitating consumers' work and communication with its main product, which we call network externality intensity. Based on this observation, we analyze sequential positioning in Hotelling's framework by incorporating an asymmetric network externality intensity between firms. We show that unlike the results of previous related studies, both first- and second-mover advantages can appear in the equilibrium depending on the relationship of the network externality intensity between firms; further, they do not change monotonically with the level of network externality intensity.

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Papers, etc., Registered in KOARA 【 Display / hide

Reviews, Commentaries, etc. 【 Display / hide

  • ビジネスにおけるゲーム理論的分析への行動経済学的アプローチ

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ 65 ( 5 ) 253 - 259 2020.05

    Introduction and explanation (scientific journal), Single Work

  • 庶務担当から見るJIMAの現状と今後

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO, NISHIOKA HISAMITSU

    経営システム 27 ( 3 ) 156-160 2017.10

    Introduction and explanation (scientific journal), Single Work

  • 稀少品における企業の価格戦略について

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ 61 ( 10 ) 678 - 679 2016.10

    Introduction and explanation (scientific journal), Single Work

  • ビジネスとゲーム理論

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ 60 ( 6 ) 316-322 2015.06

    Introduction and explanation (scientific journal), Single Work

  • サプライチェーンにおける提携形成への協力ゲーム論的アプローチ

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ 60 ( 5 ) 274 - 280 2015.05

    Introduction and explanation (scientific journal), Single Work

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Presentations 【 Display / hide

  • Channel Coordination Between Manufacturers and Competing Retailers with Fairness Concerns

    YOSHIHARA RIKUO, MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会2020年春季研究発表会, 2020.03, Oral Presentation(general)

  • Partner Selection Strategies for Market Entry: Should an Entrant Firm Form an Alliance with a Major Firm, or with a Local Firm?

    #NEGORO KAZUHIRO, MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO(/)-#HR

    The 2019 INFORMS Annual Meeting (Washington State Convention Center & Sheraton Seattle Hotel, USA) , 2019.10, Oral Presentation(general)

  • アンバサダー・マーケティングの戦略的効果に関するゲーム理論的分析

    KOZUKA SAYO, MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会2019年秋季研究発表会, 2019.09, Oral Presentation(general)

  • ネットワーク構造下における企業間提携のδ安定性

    TAKEGAWA YUICHIRO, MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会2019年秋季研究発表会, 2019.09, Oral Presentation(general)

  • 競争下での消費者との共創イベントのデザインに関するゲーム理論的分析

    AOKI RYUJI, MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    日本経営工学会2019年秋季大会 (タワーホール船堀) , 2019.09, Oral Presentation(general), 日本経営工学会

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Research Projects of Competitive Funds, etc. 【 Display / hide

  • 行動経済学の知見に基づくサプライチェーン上の戦略的意思決定に関する理論的研究

    2019.04
    -
    2022.03

    MEXT,JSPS, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, 松林 伸生, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), Principal Investigator

  • 戦略的カスタマイゼーションのための意思決定モデルの開発とその解析

    2017.04
    -
    2018.03

    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal Investigator

  • 戦略的カスタマイゼーションのための意思決定モデルの開発とその解析

    2016.04
    -
    2017.03

    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal Investigator

  • 戦略的カスタマイゼーションのための意思決定モデルの開発とその解析

    2015.04
    -
    2016.03

    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal Investigator

  • サプライチェーン・ネットワークにおける戦略的提携のためのモデル開発とその解析

    2014.04
    -
    2015.03

    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal Investigator

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Courses Taught 【 Display / hide

  • SEMINAR IN ADMINISTRATION ENGINEERING

    2020

  • PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMICS

    2020

  • MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

    2020

  • LABORATORIES IN ADMINISTRATION ENGINEERING (6)

    2020

  • INDEPENDENT STUDY ON SCIENCE FOR OPEN AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS

    2020

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Memberships in Academic Societies 【 Display / hide

  • 日本経営工学会, 

    2013.07
    -
    Present
  • 日本経営工学会, 

    2013.05
    -
    Present
  • 日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会, 

    2013.04
    -
    Present
  • 日本経営工学会, 

    2012.11
    -
    2013.05
  • 経営情報学会, 

    2012.04
    -
    2013.03

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Committee Experiences 【 Display / hide

  • 2019.06
    -
    Present

    「経営システム」誌編集委員会委員, 日本経営工学会

  • 2017.07
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    2019.05

    庶務委員会委員, 日本経営工学会

  • 2015.07
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    2016.03

    2016年春季研究発表会・実行副委員長, 日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会

  • 2013.07
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    2019.05

    論文誌エリアエディター, 日本経営工学会

  • 2013.05
    -
    2017.05

    庶務担当理事, 日本経営工学会

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