Matsubayashi, Nobuo

写真a

Affiliation

Faculty of Science and Technology, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering (Yagami)

Position

Professor

E-mail Address

E-mail address

Related Websites

External Links

Career 【 Display / hide

  • 1996.04
    -
    1999.06

    日本電信電話株式会社

  • 1999.07
    -
    2004.03

    NTTコミュニケーションズ株式会社

  • 2004.04
    -
    2006.03

    東京理科大学理工学部経営工学科 助手

  • 2006.04
    -
    2011.03

    慶應義塾大学理工学部管理工学科 専任講師

  • 2007.10
    -
    2009.09

    慶應義塾大学学生総合センター委員(矢上支部・学生担当)

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Academic Background 【 Display / hide

  • 1994.03

    Keio University, Faculty of Science and Engineering, 管理工学科

    University, Graduated

  • 1996.03

    Keio University, Graduate School, Division of Science and Engineering, 管理工学専攻

    Graduate School, Completed, Master's course

Academic Degrees 【 Display / hide

  • 博士(工学), Keio University, Dissertation, 2004.03

 

Research Areas 【 Display / hide

  • Social systems engineering/Safety system (Social System Engineering/Safety System)

Research Keywords 【 Display / hide

  • ビジネスエコノミクス

  • 応用ゲーム理論

 

Books 【 Display / hide

  • Monopolies: Theory, Effectiveness and Regulation

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO, YANO MANABU, Nova Science Publishers, 2011.10

    Scope: 101-131

  • Game Theory: Strategies, Equilibria, and Theorems

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO, Nova Science Publishers, 2009.03

    Scope: 217-229

Papers 【 Display / hide

  • Dynamic Production and Pricing Decisions in the Presence of the Snob Effect

    SOGO KEITA,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    International Transactions in Operational Research (International Transactions in Operational Research)  28 ( 6 ) 3330 - 3363 2021.11

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  1475-3995

     View Summary

    This study analyzes the production and pricing strategy of a monopoly firm in the presence of the snob effect, whereby consumers value a product more when its availability is lower. Real-world firms often intentionally cause the snob effect by strategically reducing supply quantities or even causing shortages. This observation suggests the existence of a trade-off between utilizing the snob effect and avoiding opportunity costs. We consider a general multiperiod model in which a monopoly firm determines the dynamic paths of price and sales quantity; although consumers are not forward looking, they evaluate past stockouts with a discount factor. We find that the optimal dynamic paths of the price and output level vary depending on the degree of consumer sensitivity to stockouts, the consumer's discount factor on past shortage, and the firm's discount factor on future profit. Nevertheless, the total profit monotonically increases with the degree of consumer sensitivity to stockouts.

  • Game-Theoretic Analysis of Partner Selection Strategies for Market Entry in Global Supply Chains

    NEGORO KAZUHIRO,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review (Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review)  151   102362 2021.07

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  1366-5545

     View Summary

    In this study, we provide a game-theoretic analysis to investigate an entrant firm's partner selection for offering its new product to a market, particularly to a foreign market. The entrant has either a brand advantage or technological superiority over incumbent firms. We analyze the strategic interaction between one entrant and three incumbent firms that include one major firm (or a firm offering a popular product) and two local firms (or firms offering niche products). We explore the impact of such asymmetric demand structures on the entrant's partner selection. Our equilibrium analysis indicates that forming a partnership with a firm that currently has the largest market share because of its superior product is not necessarily optimal for the entrant. When the value offered by the entrant is significantly high, it is more beneficial for the entrant to ally with the major firm, even if that firm currently has a smaller market share than the local firms because of its inferior product. We also demonstrate that when the entrant can add technological superiority to the partner's product, the entrant's optimal partner selection may change non-monotonically in the degree of this superiority. Furthermore, in response to the entrant's optimal partner selection, the relative profitability between incumbent firms can reverse discontinuously and drastically according to the degree of the value offered by the entrant.

  • Channel Coordination Between Manufacturers and Competing Retailers with Fairness Concerns

    YOSHIHARA RIKUO,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    European Journal of Operational Research (European Journal of Operational Research)  290 ( 2 ) 546 - 555 2021.04

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  0377-2217

     View Summary

    © 2020 Elsevier B.V. This study provides a game-theoretic analysis for channel coordination of a two-tier supply chain in which retailers have fairness concerns. We explore a setting in which a single manufacturer sells its product to consumers through two competing retailers that are horizontally differentiated at varying levels. We extend the previous literature, which examines only monopolistic supply chains. We show that the channel can be successfully coordinated in equilibrium in that the total channel profit is maximized and the retailers do not incur disutility due to disadvantageous inequality, even if they are not averse to their advantageous inequality. Specifically, only if the retailers are moderately differentiated is a fair channel successfully achieved. In addition, we find that in a market in which a fair channel is coordinated in equilibrium, the retailers necessarily benefit from their fairness concerns. Furthermore, we investigate a situation in which the ideal distribution ratios between the channel members can be endogenously chosen prior to subsequent pricing stages. Interestingly, even if such endogenous choices are allowed for the retailers, a fair channel still can be coordinated in equilibrium. Specifically, the retailers set their ideal ratios in equilibrium at the lowest level in their feasible ranges of successful coordination. However, this results in the prisoner's dilemma, because if they were allowed to collude to set the ratios, the retailers would benefit the most from the highest level in the feasible ranges.

  • Product Repositioning in a Horizontally Differentiated Market

    KISHIHARA HIROKI,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    Review of Industrial Organization (Review of Industrial Organization)  57 ( 3 ) 701 - 718 2020.11

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  0889938X

     View Summary

    © 2019, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature. We study product repositioning between firms with predetermined base positions for their products in existing markets. Based on Hotelling’s linear city model, we attempt to generalize models in past studies by encompassing asymmetric base positions and asymmetric cost-efficiency in repositioning. We find that neither base products nor new products in attractive positions in the market necessarily imply competitive advantage. In particular, a potentially cost-inefficient firm can earn higher profits than does a rival, even though the former firm’s product is in a less attractive position. We also clarify the welfare implications for regulating or encouraging firms’ repositioning activities.

  • The Strategic Effect of Retailers' In-store Advertising Services Under Product Variety Competition

    KOBAYASHI HARUKI,MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    Managerial and Decision Economics (Managerial and Decision Economics)  40 ( 3 ) 232 - 242 2019.04

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  01436570

     View Summary

    © 2019 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. We study a retailer service model of in-store advertising, in which a neutral retailer provides product information to consumers for free but charges manufacturers. Our results show that the retailer's optimal pricing induces the manufacturers to decrease the number of items they offer. Nevertheless, this relaxes the competition between the manufacturers so that they benefit from using the in-store service, unless the cost of communicating with consumers about the between-firm products is lower. Furthermore, the service can be made socially beneficial by reducing the inefficiency resulting from an excessive number of items when manufacturers are not well differentiated.

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Papers, etc., Registered in KOARA 【 Display / hide

Reviews, Commentaries, etc. 【 Display / hide

  • 管理工学科における経済分野の研究と教育

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ 66 ( 3 ) 159 - 163 2021.03

    Introduction and explanation (scientific journal), Single Work

  • ビジネスにおけるゲーム理論的分析への行動経済学的アプローチ

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ 65 ( 5 ) 253 - 259 2020.05

    Introduction and explanation (scientific journal), Single Work

  • 庶務担当から見るJIMAの現状と今後

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO, NISHIOKA HISAMITSU

    経営システム 27 ( 3 ) 156-160 2017.10

    Introduction and explanation (scientific journal), Single Work

  • 稀少品における企業の価格戦略について

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ 61 ( 10 ) 678 - 679 2016.10

    Introduction and explanation (scientific journal), Single Work

  • ビジネスとゲーム理論

    MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ 60 ( 6 ) 316-322 2015.06

    Introduction and explanation (scientific journal), Single Work

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Presentations 【 Display / hide

  • Direct-to-consumer Firm’s Competitive Strategy Against a Dominant Retailer: Opening an Experiential Physical Store vs. Specializing in an Online Store

    #TAKEDA MASANOBU, MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO(/)-#HR

    The 2021 INFORMS Annual Meeting (the Anaheim Convention Center & Anaheim Marriott in Anaheim, California, USA(オンライン参加)) , 2021.10, Oral Presentation(general)

  • Game-theoretic Analysis of Alliance Between Platforms and Competing Manufacturers in Sharing Consumer Data for Product Developments

    #MATSUHISA HIROSHI, MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO(/)-#HR

    The 2021 INFORMS Annual Meeting (the Anaheim Convention Center & Anaheim Marriott in Anaheim, California, USA(オンライン参加)) , 2021.10, Oral Presentation(general)

  • 大手小売企業のオムニチャネル戦略に対抗するためのD2C企業の出店戦略に関するゲーム理論的分析

    TAKEDA MASANOBU, MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会2021年秋季研究発表会 (オンライン) , 2021.09, Oral Presentation(general)

  • D2C企業の出店戦略に関するゲーム理論的分析 ~『体験型』店舗出店 vs オンライン店舗特化~

    TAKEDA MASANOBU, MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    日本経営工学会2021年春季大会 (オンライン) , 2021.05, Oral Presentation(general), 日本経営工学会

  • プラットフォームを通じた消費者データの活用と製品開発に関するゲーム理論的分析

    MATSUHISA HIROSHI, MATSUBAYASHI NOBUO

    日本経営工学会2021年春季大会 (オンライン) , 2021.05, Oral Presentation(general), 日本経営工学会

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Research Projects of Competitive Funds, etc. 【 Display / hide

  • 行動経済学の知見に基づくサプライチェーン上の戦略的意思決定に関する理論的研究

    2019.04
    -
    2022.03

    MEXT,JSPS, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, 松林 伸生, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), Principal Investigator

  • 戦略的カスタマイゼーションのための意思決定モデルの開発とその解析

    2017.04
    -
    2018.03

    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal Investigator

  • 戦略的カスタマイゼーションのための意思決定モデルの開発とその解析

    2016.04
    -
    2017.03

    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal Investigator

  • 戦略的カスタマイゼーションのための意思決定モデルの開発とその解析

    2015.04
    -
    2016.03

    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal Investigator

  • サプライチェーン・ネットワークにおける戦略的提携のためのモデル開発とその解析

    2014.04
    -
    2015.03

    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal Investigator

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Courses Taught 【 Display / hide

  • SEMINAR IN ADMINISTRATION ENGINEERING

    2021

  • PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMICS

    2021

  • MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

    2021

  • LABORATORIES IN ADMINISTRATION ENGINEERING (6)

    2021

  • INDEPENDENT STUDY ON SCIENCE FOR OPEN AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS

    2021

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Memberships in Academic Societies 【 Display / hide

  • 日本経営工学会, 

    2013.07
    -
    Present
  • 日本経営工学会, 

    2013.05
    -
    Present
  • 日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会, 

    2013.04
    -
    Present
  • 日本経営工学会, 

    2012.11
    -
    2013.05
  • 経営情報学会, 

    2012.04
    -
    2013.03

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Committee Experiences 【 Display / hide

  • 2021.05
    -
    Present

    代議員, 日本経営工学会

  • 2021.04
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    Present

    監事, 日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会

  • 2020.09
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    2021.05

    代議員推薦委員会委員, 日本経営工学会

  • 2019.06
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    2021.05

    「経営システム」誌編集委員会委員, 日本経営工学会

  • 2017.07
    -
    2019.05

    庶務委員会委員, 日本経営工学会

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