Tamada, Yasunari

写真a

Affiliation

Faculty of Economics (Mita)

Position

Professor

Career 【 Display / hide

  • 1994.04
    -
    1997.03

    慶應義塾大学研究助手(経済学部)

  • 1997.04
    -
    2002.03

    同大学専任講師(経済学部)

  • 2002.04
    -
    2020.03

    同大学准教授(経済学部)

  • 2020.04
    -
    Present

    Professor

  • 2011.04
    -
    2018.03

    国家公務員総合職採用試験専門委員

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Academic Background 【 Display / hide

  • 1988.04
    -
    1992.03

    Keio University, Faculty of Economics

    University, Graduated

  • 1992.04
    -
    1994.03

    Keio University, Graduate School, Division of Economics

    Graduate School, Completed, Master's course

  • 1994.04
    -
    1997.03

    Keio University, Graduate School, Division of Economics

    Graduate School, Withdrawal after completion of doctoral course requirements, Doctoral course

  • 1997.09
    -
    2001.05

    University of Wisconsin-Madison

    Graduate School, Completed, Doctoral course

Academic Degrees 【 Display / hide

  • Doctor of Philosophy, Other, 2002.05

 
 

Books 【 Display / hide

  • 「音楽放送業者の低料金設定による競争者の顧客争奪—有線ブロードネットワークス事件」, 『独禁法審判決の法と経済学: 事例で読み解く日本の競争政策』(岡田洋祐・川濱昇・林秀弥 編),第6章

    TAMADA YASUNARI, 東京大学出版会, 2017.01

  • モバイル産業論

    TAMADA YASUNARI, 東京大学出版会, 2010.03

  • 「リベートと私的独占—インテル事件」, 『独占禁止法の経済学—審判決の事例分析』(岡田洋祐・林秀弥 編),第10章

    玉田康成,垣内晋治, 東京大学出版会, 2009

  • 現代ミクロ経済学-中級コース

    TAMADA YASUNARI, 有斐閣, 2005.03

  • 契約理論の基礎

    TAMADA YASUNARI, 三菱経済研究所, 1999

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Papers 【 Display / hide

  • Disclosure of Contract Clauses and Career Concerns

    Yasunari Tamada

    Economics Bulletin 39 ( 3 ) 1968 - 1978 2019.09

    Research paper (scientific journal), Single Work, Accepted,  ISSN  1545-2921

  • Reputation versus information: The delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns

    Yasunari Tamada, Tsung-Sheng Tsai

    Journal of Public Economic Theory (Journal of Public Economic Theory)  20 ( 3 ) 367 - 389 2018.06

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  10973923

     View Summary

    © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. We analyze the delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns. Both the principal and the agent can be either good or biased; the good players prefer the correct decision, while the biased ones prefer a high action even though it may be wrong. An evaluator who forms the principal's reputation may or may not be able to observe who makes the decision. When the evaluator cannot observe the allocation of authority, the principal shares the credit and blame with the agent. Although delegation can improve the quality of decision making because the agent has better information, it may also hurt the good principal's reputation because the high action may be taken by the biased agent while the blame will be shared when it is wrong. Thus, the good principal has a tendency to keep too much authority to maintain her reputation. By contrast, when the evaluator can observe the allocation of authority, delegation becomes a signaling device for the good type of principal to differentiate herself from the biased one. This results in an excessive allocation of authority toward the agent.

  • Optimal Delegation with Self-Interested Agents and Information Acquisition

    Shungo Omiya, Yasunari Tamada, Tsung-Sheng Tsai

    Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 137   54 - 71 2017.05

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted

  • Delegating the Decision-making Authority to Terminate a Sequential Project

    Yasunari Tamada, Tsung-Sheng Tsai

    Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 99   178-194 2014.03

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted

  • Optimal Organization in a Sequential Investment Problem with the Principal's Cancellation Option

    Yasunari Tamada, Tsung-Sheng Tsai

    International Journal of Industrial Organization 25   631-641 2007

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted

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Papers, etc., Registered in KOARA 【 Display / hide

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Presentations 【 Display / hide

  • Allocation of Decision-Making Authority with Principal's Reputation Concerns

    TAMADA YASUNARI

    Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society (Yonsei University) , 2004.07, Oral Presentation(general), Econometric Society

  • Communication versus Delegation in Long-term Relationships and the Promotion Policy

    TAMADA YASUNARI

    日本経済学会2002年度秋季大会 (広島大学) , 2002.10, Oral Presentation(general)

  • 研究開発投資のインセンティブと垂直的統合

    TAMADA YASUNARI

    日本経済学会1996年度秋季大会 (学習院大学) , 1997.09, Oral Presentation(general)

Research Projects of Competitive Funds, etc. 【 Display / hide

  • Study on the allocation of authority in government organizations, appropriateness of policy making, and coordination between policies

    2020.04
    -
    2023.03

    文部科学省,日本学術振興会, 科学研究費補助金, 玉田康成, Research grant, Principal Investigator

  • 経済ネットワークの構造-リンク形成の費用・効率性と対安定性をめぐって

    2009
    -
    2011

    文部科学省, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, 玉田康成, Research grant, Principal Investigator

  • キャリアや評判に対する経済主体の関心が最適な企業組織に及ぼす影響についての研究

    2007
    -
    2008

    文部科学省, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, 玉田康成, Research grant, Principal Investigator

 

Courses Taught 【 Display / hide

  • TOPICS IN MICROECONOMICS

    2019

  • SEMINAR: MICROECONOMICS

    2019

  • RESEARCH SEMINAR D

    2019

  • RESEARCH SEMINAR C

    2019

  • RESEARCH SEMINAR B

    2019

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