Tamada, Yasunari

写真a

Affiliation

Faculty of Economics (Mita)

Position

Professor
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Career 【 Display / hide 】

  • 1994.04
    -
    1997.03

    慶應義塾大学研究助手(経済学部)

  • 1997.04
    -
    2002.03

    同大学専任講師(経済学部)

  • 2002.04
    -
    2020.03

    同大学准教授(経済学部)

  • 2020.04
    -
    Present

    Professor

  • 2011.04
    -
    2018.03

    国家公務員総合職採用試験専門委員

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Academic Background 【 Display / hide 】

  • 1988.04
    -
    1992.03

    Keio University, Faculty of Economics

    University, Graduated

  • 1992.04
    -
    1994.03

    Keio University, Graduate School, Division of Economics

    Graduate School, Completed, Master's course

  • 1994.04
    -
    1997.03

    Keio University, Graduate School, Division of Economics

    Graduate School, Withdrawal after completion of doctoral course requirements, Doctoral course

  • 1997.09
    -
    2001.05

    University of Wisconsin-Madison

    Graduate School, Completed, Doctoral course

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Academic Degrees 【 Display / hide 】

  • Doctor of Philosophy, Other, 2002.05

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Books 【 Display / hide 】

  • 情報とインセンティブの経済学

    石田 潤一郎，玉田 康成, 有斐閣, 2020.07

  • クルーグマン　マクロ経済学（第２版）共訳

    ポール・クルーグマン，ロビン・ウェルス, 東洋経済新報社, 2019

  • クルーグマン　ミクロ経済学（第２版）共訳

    ポール・クルーグマン，ロビン・ウェルス, 東洋経済新報社, 2017

  • モバイル産業論

    TAMADA YASUNARI, 東京大学出版会, 2010.03

  • 現代ミクロ経済学-中級コース

    TAMADA YASUNARI, 有斐閣, 2005.03

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Papers 【 Display / hide 】

  • Mediating Internal Competition for Resources

    Suraj Prasad, Yasunari Tamada

    Journal of Industrial Economics 72 ( 1 ) 157 - 192 2024

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted

  • Disclosure of Contract Clauses and Career Concerns

    Yasunari Tamada

    Economics Bulletin (Economics Bulletin)  39 ( 3 ) 1968 - 1978 2019.09

    Research paper (scientific journal), Single Work, Accepted,  ISSN  1545-2921

    　View Summary

    © 2020, Economics Bulletin. In this study, we analyze a simple moral hazard model in which a risk-neutral agent has career concerns and is protected by limited liability. The agent cares about both career concerns and explicit incentives given by the principal. We consider the following two cases: (i) when the explicit contract is unobservable for the labor market, and (ii) when the principal discloses contract. If the explicit compensation contract is unobservable, the labor market needs to update its belief regarding the agent type on the basis of the realized outcome and the inference of the agent's effort choice. However, if the principal discloses contract clauses, the labor market knows how much effort is planned to be induced. The principal, then, can influence the market's belief through the observable contract. By disclosing contract clauses, the principal can induce a higher level of effort from the agent because she can control career concern incentives directly as well as monetary incentives.

  • Reputation versus information: The delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns

    Yasunari Tamada, Tsung-Sheng Tsai

    Journal of Public Economic Theory (Journal of Public Economic Theory)  20 ( 3 ) 367 - 389 2018.06

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  10973923

    　View Summary

    © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. We analyze the delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns. Both the principal and the agent can be either good or biased; the good players prefer the correct decision, while the biased ones prefer a high action even though it may be wrong. An evaluator who forms the principal's reputation may or may not be able to observe who makes the decision. When the evaluator cannot observe the allocation of authority, the principal shares the credit and blame with the agent. Although delegation can improve the quality of decision making because the agent has better information, it may also hurt the good principal's reputation because the high action may be taken by the biased agent while the blame will be shared when it is wrong. Thus, the good principal has a tendency to keep too much authority to maintain her reputation. By contrast, when the evaluator can observe the allocation of authority, delegation becomes a signaling device for the good type of principal to differentiate herself from the biased one. This results in an excessive allocation of authority toward the agent.

  • Optimal Delegation with Self-Interested Agents and Information Acquisition

    Shungo Omiya, Yasunari Tamada, Tsung-Sheng Tsai

    Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 137   54 - 71 2017.05

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted

  • Delegating the Decision-making Authority to Terminate a Sequential Project

    Yasunari Tamada, Tsung-Sheng Tsai

    Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 99   178-194 2014.03

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted

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Papers, etc., Registered in KOARA 【 Display / hide 】

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Presentations 【 Display / hide 】

  • Allocation of Decision-Making Authority with Principal's Reputation Concerns

    TAMADA YASUNARI

    Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society (Yonsei University) , 

    2004.07
    , 

    Oral presentation (general), Econometric Society

  • Communication versus Delegation in Long-term Relationships and the Promotion Policy

    TAMADA YASUNARI

    日本経済学会2002年度秋季大会 (広島大学) , 

    2002.10
    , 

    Oral presentation (general)

  • 研究開発投資のインセンティブと垂直的統合

    TAMADA YASUNARI

    日本経済学会1996年度秋季大会 (学習院大学) , 

    1997.09
    , 

    Oral presentation (general)

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Research Projects of Competitive Funds, etc. 【 Display / hide 】

  • Study on the allocation of authority in government organizations, appropriateness of policy making, and coordination between policies

    2020.04
    -
    2023.03

    文部科学省，日本学術振興会, 科学研究費補助金, Research grant, Principal investigator

  • 経済ネットワークの構造-リンク形成の費用・効率性と対安定性をめぐって

    2009
    -
    2011

    文部科学省, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal investigator

  • キャリアや評判に対する経済主体の関心が最適な企業組織に及ぼす影響についての研究

    2007
    -
    2008

    文部科学省, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Research grant, Principal investigator

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Courses Taught 【 Display / hide 】

  • TOPICS IN MICROECONOMICS

    2024

  • SEMINAR: MICROECONOMICS

    2024

  • RESEARCH SEMINAR D

    2024

  • RESEARCH SEMINAR C

    2024

  • RESEARCH SEMINAR B

    2024

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