Constructions of Japanese National Identity: Host Views Using a Social Markers of Acceptance Framework

Adam Komisarof
Keio University

Chan-Hoong Leong
Kantar Public Singapore

Travis Lim
National University of Singapore

Correspondence:
Professor Adam Komisarof
Faculty of Letters
Keio University
Email: komisarof.adam@gmail.com

Postal Address until March 30, 2022 (while on sabbatical)
Linton Road
Wolfson College
Oxford OX2 6UD
United Kingdom

Permanent mailing address:
2-13-1-227 Sakurazutsumi
Musashino-shi
Tokyo 180-0021
Japan

Abstract

Social markers of acceptance (SMA) are socially constructed criteria (e.g., language skills, shared genealogy, or adherence to social norms) that receiving society nationals use in deciding whether to view an immigrant as a member of the national ingroup. This study had two objectives: 1. to identify the markers considered important by Japanese to accept immigrants in Japanese society, and 2. to examine the type of intergroup conditions that may shape immigrant inclusion by influencing the degree of emphasis placed on SMA: specifically, perceived immigrant threat, contribution, and social status, as well as intergroup boundary permeability and strength of national identification. Native-born Japanese (n = 2,000) completed an online survey, where two latent factors emerged representing ethnic and civic markers—suggesting that national identity may have changed in the past 25 years, with Japanese developing a distinct civic conceptualization in addition to a previously existing ethnic one. Multiple hierarchical regressions found significant main effects of perceived immigrant threat, contribution, status, and boundary permeability for both civic and ethnic dimensions, as well as interactions between threat x status and threat x permeability. As hypothesized, threat had positive effects on SMA emphasis, and contribution exerted negative effects—indicating more exclusive and inclusive attitudes among Japanese, respectively. Results for national identity were inconsistent, complementing social identity theory for ethnic markers but contradicting it for civic marker importance. Consistent with social identity theory, immigrants perceived as "low status" triggered endorsement of more restrictive civic and ethnic benchmarks; however, contrary to expectations, increased threat under less porous intergroup boundaries predicted more restrictive civic and ethnic marker utilization.

Introduction and Theoretical Framework

With the long-term economic and social effects of the COVID-19 pandemic beginning to reveal themselves, some scholars are proclaiming the end of the era of escalating migration that started after World War II (Gamlen, 2020). According to the International Organization for Migration (2022), in 2020, 3.6% of the global population were migrants, and between 1985 and 2020, the cross-border migrating population increased from 105 million to 281 million. Such developments challenge traditional ingroup boundaries: as demographic profiles of "locals" change in migrants' host societies[1], growing calls can be heard both from migrants and their allies within their receiving countries to make national identity more inclusive. Conversely, with nativist, xenophobic movements having gained influence in many parts of the world, we observe broad-based conflict between those who want national identity and group boundaries to be more flexible and those who demand the preservation (or a return to) an ethnonationalist identity embedded within a monoethnic society.

Social Markers of Acceptance

Social markers of acceptance (SMA) is a framework for theorizing acceptance and acculturation conceived by Leong (2014), based on the premise that to gain acceptance, migrants are expected to adopt certain cultural features considered by members of their receiving society as essential aspects of their national identity. Komisarof et al. (2020) described individual markers as "socially constructed indicators (e.g., adherence to social

[1] We use the term "immigrant" referring to people who have settled and gained citizenship in a new country. "Migrant" is inclusive of both naturalized immigrants and non-naturalized foreign residents such as legal permanent residents, denizens who have the intention to settle in a country, or inhabitants who have no definite plan to leave.

norms; expression of mainstream beliefs, attitudes, or values; and competencies such as language skills), or the perceptual signposts that recipient nationals use in deciding whether a migrant is a part of the host community" (p. 238). These markers constitute benchmarks of social or economic embeddedness (e.g., migrants having host national friends or investing in local businesses, respectively) or cultural competence (e.g., developing the same "common sense" as locals). The markers considered important by receiving society members represent the characteristics they believe to be essential attributes for migrants to be accepted in the host society to the same degree as native-born citizens (rather than being merely tolerated as cultural outsiders). By fulfilling these criteria, migrants inspire trust among locals, feelings of similarity, and reassurance that they are admissible as ingroup members—thus creating a sense of shared membership.

The SMA framework is informed by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which details group membership's importance in establishing and maintaining personal identity, as well as people's use of ingroup prototypes in accentuating differences between themselves and outgroups, enabling them to feel positive ingroup distinctiveness. Individual markers comprise the constructed characteristics of the ingroup, the composite of which are used as a categorization system between group insiders and outsiders to create a shared identity in the same symbolic community. These markers may or may not align with legal definitions of who is a citizen, but many of them are grounded in the shared daily experiences of ordinary citizens. However, markers are not necessarily adhered to by all members of the receiving nation; what is critical is that people *believe* that those traits are possessed by others in their national ingroup—or at least they "should" be—and consequently use them to decide who gains and maintains ingroup status. When more markers are endorsed—or greater emphasis placed upon them—it becomes harder for immigrants to be accepted in the receiving society. Moreover, if host nationals think the markers are not just important but also difficult to attain, an increasingly rigid boundary is constructed, whereas if the markers are thought to be important but achievable, then intergroup boundaries are considered comparatively porous (Komisarof & Leong, 2020).

Benefits of SMA Research

Clarifying the prevalent SMA in any society helps to define national identity and highlight the criteria for ingroup boundary construction and perpetuation. Markers may be utilized to exclude immigrants—particularly for ascribed identities (e.g., only people born in the host nation or who have a specific genealogy can become group members) or when markers are expected in quantities so numerous that they become almost unrealizable. However, once the predominant markers are clarified, the boundaries they construct may be challenged. Therefore, this study, with its focus on Japan, will not merely identify markers and the symbolic boundaries that they create, normalize, and maintain, but its findings can be used to contest and reframe those boundaries once the markers valued among the Japanese public are evident. Moreover, immigrants who grasp these criteria can utilize such understanding to gain acceptance, thus diversifying the host national ingroup and normalizing immigrants as members of the receiving society. Ultimately, if national identity grows more expansive, so may notions of citizenship and who can receive the social, political, and economic benefits and rights concomitant with such naturalized legal status.

Not only does SMA research help to identify which criteria are utilized in intergroup boundary construction, but it also shows how the perceived importance of markers, and along with it, the flexibility of the host society members' national ingroup boundary, can change—influenced by variables including the destination society members' perceptions of immigrant threats, contributions, and social status, as well as their degree of economic optimism, strength of family ties, and national pride (Jassi & Safdar, 2021; Komisarof et al., 2020; Leong, 2014;

Leong et al., 2020). Accordingly, this study has two objectives: 1. to identify the SMA considered important by Japanese people to accept immigrants in Japanese society, and 2. to measure the impact of perceived immigrant threat, contribution, relative social status, intergroup permeability, and strength of national identity on marker emphasis, thus illuminating the contextual conditions that influence the choices of which markers Japanese deem important.

Japanese Demography, Attitudes Toward Migrants, and Immigration Policy

While the populations of most Western nations consist of between 10% and 30% foreign-born members (Akaliyski et al., 2021), Japan's total of naturalized immigrants and foreign residents is far smaller. Between 1952 and 2021, over 585,000 people obtained Japanese citizenship (Japanese Ministry of Justice, 2022a), and approximately 2.76 million non-Japanese now reside in Japan—an all-time high (Japanese Ministry of Justice, 2022b), giving this composite group over 3 million members, or about 2.7% of the population. Thus, those who do not necessarily fit traditional ethnicity-based notions of who is Japanese is larger than ever before and growing.

In-migration is likely to be a longstanding feature of Japan's demographic landscape, as it faces dual pressures of a greying workforce and a low birth rate: it is the oldest country in the world, with almost 30% of its population being over 65, coupled with one of the world's lowest fertility rates (Liu-Farrer, 2020; Strausz, 2021). Such trends threaten the country's economic well-being, so the government is "importing" foreign labor, as well as increasing Japanese women and elderly participation in the workforce, to combat these conditions.

Japanese attitudes towards foreign workers and naturalized immigrants are ambivalent. On one hand, the shrinking, aging native workforce is forcing Japan to open its borders, with many migrants making deep inroads in society as valued community members (Komisarof, 2011). On the other hand, the migrant population is still small due to government policies that discourage permanent migration—possibly motivated by fear that a large foreign influx will threaten public safety, social harmony, and "the Japanese way of life." Moreover, accounts abound of migrants—even second-generation naturalized immigrants—feeling ostracized in an ethnically exclusive society (Liu-Farrer, 2020; Strausz, 2021).

While the Japanese are often said to maintain an ethno-nationalist immigration policy to help preserve an exclusionary national identity (Liu-Farrer, 2020), the country has accepted a steady stream of foreign nationals over the past 30 years (Japanese Ministry of Justice, 2022b). Rather than reducing the number of migrants (or facing great public pressure to do so) as in many advanced industrialized nations, the non-Japanese population has more than doubled since 1992. More broadly, immigration is rapidly increasing globally to nations like Japan that are thought to define themselves primarily in ethnic terms—yet are not considered traditional migration destinations (Liu-Farrer, 2020). Thus, investigating the types of belonging achieved by immigrants in Japan illustrates how such a society might realize an inclusive, non-ethnically based ingroup identity.

Forms and Critiques of National Identity

There are two broad categories of national identity: *ethnic* and *civic*. The former means the national ingroup is thought to have an immutable, shared ancestral origin—an *ascribed* attribute, whereas the latter is realized by obtaining citizenship, participation in core societal institutions, and an emphasis on common values, ideals, rights, and responsibilities among citizens—i.e., an *achieved* attribute (Pehrson, et al., 2009; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Civic identity is thought to be more inclusive than ethnic, as its criteria are satisfied via voluntary efforts towards realizing acquirable characteristics, and it is based upon assumptions that encourage participation in society and the fulfilment of social contracts, while ethnic

identity is constructed from largely fixed characteristics and often essentialist assumptions about who belongs (Reijerse et al., 2013). Using data from different iterations of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the ethnic-civic distinction has received robust empirical validation in both Asian and Western societies (Jones & Smith, 2001; Kunovich, 2009; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010; Taniguchi, 2021). Studies specifically using the SMA framework also supported the ethnic-civic distinction (Leong et al 2020; Jassi & Safdar, 2021; Komisarof, Leong, & Teng, 2020), though the markers deemed to be ethnic or civic varied across countries—a finding commensurate with other research of social markers of national identity (reviewed in Komisarof & Leong, 2020). As for comparative examinations of SMA in Asian and Western nations, Leong et al. (2020) identified a two-factor structure model supporting an ethnic-civic solution for both plural societies (Singapore, Canada, and Australia) and relatively homogenous ones (Finland and Japan).

The literature is also generally consistent in finding associations between ethnic and civic representations of national identity and various outcomes of importance in intergroup relations (and government policy). Civic representations negatively associate with anti-immigrant, prejudicial attitudes and affect, whereas ethnic concepts correlate positively (Pehrson et al., 2009; Reijerse et al., 2013, 2015; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Wright et al. (2012) noted that in Europe, ethnic concepts of nation associate positively with higher perceived threats from immigration, support for decreasing immigration, and the preference for minorities to assimilate rather than maintain their heritage cultures and traditions.

However, the civic-ethnic distinction has not escaped criticism. Within the same nation-state, a monolithic identity is unlikely: the predominance of civic or ethnic identities may vary according to geographic region, ethnic group, generation, political ideology, or socioeconomic class, to name a few (Devos & Mohamed, 2014; Pehrson, 2019; Phua et al., 2020). Moreover, individuals are not necessarily consistent in employing concepts of national identity, or their associated markers, as they may apply divergent sets of acceptance criteria in concordance with shifting environmental demands, self-interest, or prejudices (Jones & Smith, 2001; Pehrson, 2019; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). For example, Komisarof et al. (2020) found that Japanese college students were biased by purported status—placing greater emphasis upon Japanese proficiency for immigrants perceived as low in status than those seen as high-status. Inconsistent standards have also been observed based upon migrant racial or ethnic appearance, country of origin, and gender (Devos & Mohamed, 2014; Komisarof, 2020; Spencer & Charsley, 2016). Individuals can use iniquitous benchmarks perniciously, but they may also be unaware of these contradictions, utilizing civic concepts in self-reports of their own beliefs while unconsciously employing ethnic ones (Devos & Mohamed, 2014; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014).

SMA-related research has shown mixed support for the civic-ethnic distinction in Japan. Using data from the 1995 ISSP, Tanabe (2001) factor analyzed the ratings for seven social markers' importance in deciding whether or not someone is considered Japanese (e.g., born in Japan, has citizenship, and speaks Japanese). The markers loaded onto the same ethnic factor—not distinct civic and ethnic ones. Tanabe attributed this to an overarching concept of national identity: ethnic Japanese are thought to be born and live in Japan, automatically receive citizenship, and through socialization acquire the other markers in the survey (e.g., learning Japanese). In other words, the acceptance criteria embodied in the markers must all be satisfied at once, with no routes to "becoming" Japanese. Tanabe (2011), using data collected in 2009, noted relatively broad support among Japanese for specific civic markers such as "self-definition as Japanese" and "respect for political institutions and laws" as criteria for determining whether one is "genuinely Japanese"—though no factor analysis was performed to group markers into concepts of civic and ethnic national identities, rendering the results somewhat inconclusive. Komisarof et al. (2020) found three factors among Japanese

university students: two similar to civic identity and one to ethnic. This may be an artifact of their student sample, or it may indicate that Japanese people have developed a distinct civic concept of national identity since 1995. Therefore, the current study attempts to assess national identity among an adult, nationally representative sample (in terms of age and gender) that is more directly comparable with Tanabe (2001).

Integrated Threat Theory

As noted previously, markers may be employed differently according to social context. One theoretical framework that explains such variation is integrated threat theory (also known as intergroup threat theory) (Stefan et al., 2016), which asserts that outgroup prejudice associates positively with threat—both realistic (i.e., outgroup members are perceived as vying with hosts for economic resources such as employment and public services) and symbolic (i.e., outgroup members are seen as potentially destabilizing the ingroup's culture and identity). For the former, immigrants are excluded because of their alleged competition for or draining of limited economic resources, while those associated with the latter are rejected based on their "incompatible" social identities (Esses & Jackson, 2009). Threat perceptions of immigrants among host nationals tend to result in exclusivity by emphasizing more social markers (Leong, 2014) or placing greater importance upon commonly valued markers (Kiely et al., 2001; Komisarof et al., 2020). Reijerse et al. (2015) noted that threat perceptions tend to be high among those with ethnic national identities: they prefer the ingroup to be ethnically homogenous and reject those who do not fit such prototypes, whereas those with civic orientations are less concerned with ingroup homogeneity and less threatened by ethnic and cultural diversity.

Japanese threat perceptions of immigrants appear to be both realistic (particularly in terms of safety) and symbolic. In four nationwide surveys taken by renowned nonpartisan polling organizations between 1995 and 2017, the main reasons for opposing an increase in foreign residents were fear of crime and a breakdown of community moral order (Stockwell, 2020). Lie (2001) and Komisarof (2020) also described concerns that immigrants would dilute Japanese culture, while Strausz (2021) emphasized the belief that broad immigration would lead to rapid, unpredictable, and hence undesirable social change.

Immigrant Contributions

Immigrants may also be perceived by hosts as contributing to the receiving society (Stefan et al., 2016) by bestowing economic benefits (e.g., taking undesirable jobs, working for low salaries, or providing human capital in the form of language knowledge, unique skills, and international connections) or bringing novel, desirable cultural elements (food, clothes, or music) (Tartakovsky & Walsh, 2022). Komisarof (2020) identified both types among Japanese university students: immigrants were thought to mitigate Japan's labor shortage and stimulate the economy with their professional skills, while also being positive change agents as sources of new ideas in society and practices at work. Perceptions of immigrant contributions are thought to decrease the endorsement of SMA (Leong, 2014) because receiving nationals view immigrants as playing constructive societal roles and enriching their lives at least indirectly.

Social Identity Theory

Another theory with important ramifications for how markers may be applied differently according to context is social identity theory (SIT), which posits that people seek belonging in groups that engender a positive social identity, or a favorable self-concept deriving from said group membership (Terry et al., 2006). They are also motivated to differentiate themselves from others by maintaining a sense of distinctiveness through intergroup comparisons that favor their ingroup. Social markers are thought to provide the

criteria for group inclusion (or exclusion) while helping to preserve group distinctiveness and homogeneity.

Greater perceived threat is thought to positively associate with emphasis upon SMA, making group entry more difficult (Komisarof et al., 2020), but moderated by three variables treated by SIT: perceptions of outgroup status, perceptions of intergroup permeability, and the strength of one's national identity. First, individuals generally prefer to maintain social distance from those they see as lower in status than themselves (Zhirkov, 2021), and SIT posits that admitting low-status outgroup members in people's ingroup is viewed as undesirable because it dilutes their sense of positive distinctiveness (Terry et al., 2006). Thus, threat's negative impact upon immigrant acceptance is thought to be exacerbated when host nationals assume that immigrants are comparatively lower in status, resulting in a more stringent set of marker-related criteria for ingroup admission (Komisarof et al., 2020).

Also playing a key role in SIT are perceptions of intergroup boundary permeability, which "reflect the extent to which group members believe that the intergroup boundaries are open and, in principle, the extent to which the social boundaries that separate their own group from another group can be crossed" (Terry et al., 2006, p. 251). SIT predicts that perceived threats posed by outgroup members are magnified if the boundaries between groups are seen as porous, particularly when such groups are considered lower in status (Terry et al., 2006), as the ingroup's distinctness and potential to give members a positive self-concept are diminished if those of "low status" are admitted. Hence, more permeable intergroup boundaries are thought to result in greater importance placed on markers as a means of fortifying that boundary and maintaining ingroup distinctiveness.

Strength of national identity is the third moderator of interest in this study. This construct can be measured through different approaches. For instance, in Cameron (2004), national identity comprised three latent factors: cognitive centrality (importance to one's self-definition as a group member), ingroup affect (quality of the feelings associated with one's group membership), and ingroup ties (the extent to which someone feels they belong to that group). SIT predicts that people who identify closely with a group are motivated to preserve its homogeneity and distinctiveness (Reijerse et al., 2015) and more likely to demonstrate ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility (Taniguchi, 2021), so presumably, those with a strong national identity would emphasize the importance of social markers to maintain the status quo and stringently protect their ingroup boundary from immigrants. The variable of national identity strength is important not only for its potential effects on SMA importance, but also for its conceptual closeness to SMA. Namely, markers reflect the *content* of people's national identity: these are the characteristics that define their ingroup prototypes and are utilized in decisions about whether or not to accept immigrants to their ingroup. Using Cameron's framework (whose instrument we employed), national identity measures the extent that being Japanese is important to people as well as the extent they feel emotionally bonded to the group and a sense of belonging within it. Therefore, the variables of marker importance (reflecting the emphasis upon the criteria used for admitting immigrants) and national identity (i.e., the psychological prominence and relevance of being Japanese) are distinct.

Perceived status, intergroup boundary permeability, and strength of national identity are not only impactful concepts in SIT but also projected to moderate relationships between threat or contribution and marker choices due to their roles in Japanese group formation, maintenance, and social relationships. Ingroup membership and national identity—as well as the permeability of such groups—are central to Japanese self-concepts, and along with interpersonal social status comparisons, impact how Japanese people relate to both fellow ethnic co-nationals as well as non-Japanese (Befu, 2001; Komisarof, 2011; Lie, 2001).

Hypotheses

The variables and their predicted relationships are depicted in Figure 1. We offer the following hypotheses:

H1. Increases in perceived immigrant threat will be associated with greater importance placed on markers, i.e., less inclusive acceptance criteria.

H2. Increases in perceived immigrant contributions will be associated with less importance placed on markers, i.e., more inclusive acceptance criteria.

H3. Perceived threat and intergroup permeability will jointly influence marker endorsement (2-way interaction) such that greater threat will be increasingly associated with stronger marker importance when intergroup boundaries are permeable.

H4. Perceived contribution and intergroup permeability will jointly influence marker endorsement (2-way interaction) such that greater contribution will be increasingly associated with weaker marker importance when intergroup boundaries are not permeable.

H5. Perceived threat and social status will jointly influence marker endorsement (2-way interaction) such that greater threat will be increasingly associated with stronger marker importance when immigrants are thought to be lower in status.

H6. Perceived contribution and social status will jointly influence marker endorsement (2-way interaction) such that greater contribution will be increasingly associated with weaker marker importance when immigrants are thought to be higher in status.

H7. Perceived threat and national identity will jointly influence marker endorsement (2-way interaction) such that greater threat will be associated with higher marker importance as respondents' national identity grows stronger.

H8. Perceived contribution and national identity will jointly influence marker endorsement (2-way interaction) such that greater contribution will be associated with lower marker importance as respondents' national identity grows weaker.

Figure 1

Methods

Participants

A nationally representative sample (in terms of age group and gender) of 2,000 individuals was recruited nationwide in January 2021 from an online panel hosted by Rakuten Insight in Japan. Participants were screened using previously collected demographic data and fulfilled the following criteria: (i) Japanese citizen since birth (dual nationals included), (ii) currently living in Japan, and (iii) at least 20 years old. Our supplementary materials include further details about our sampling methods and a table summarizing the sample's demographic characteristics.

Measures

Participants responded in Japanese to the questionnaire described below, as well as demographic questions about gender, age, residence (rural or urban), education (university

graduate or not), and income level. The descriptive statistics, psychometric properties, and bivariate correlations of the variables measured are in Table 1.

Table 1

Social Markers of Acceptance

The items were adapted from Komisarof et al. (2020). Participants rated the importance and ease of acquisition of 25 SMA on a 7-point Likert scale. Importance scores identified the characteristics considered necessary for immigrants to be accepted and viewed in Japanese society like native-born Japanese, whereas ease scores reflected the perceived feasibility of immigrants acquiring those characteristics. SMA examples included "parents or ancestors are Japanese" and "able to speak conversational Japanese." Ratings for both marker importance and ease of acquisition allowed us to more thoroughly gauge the role each marker plays in the stringency of Japanese ingroup boundaries than measuring importance alone, as perceptions that a marker is almost impossible to acquire form a formidable barrier to belonging that is qualitatively different from markers being emphasized as important.

Immigrant Threat

Perceived threat was measured using 15 items on a 7-point Likert scale adapted from Leong (2014). Items were reverse scored where necessary and then averaged to form a composite score for the construct[2], such that higher scores indicate greater perceived threat. Examples of items include: "Having more immigrants will make our country less cohesive" and "Job opportunities will be reduced for native-born Japanese if we have more immigrants."

Immigrant Contribution

Perceived contribution was assessed using five items on a 7-point Likert scale from Leong (2014). Items were averaged to form the construct's composite score with higher ratings indicating greater perceived contribution. Examples are: "Immigrants contribute to Japan's development as much as natives do" and "The benefits of having immigrants in Japan are obvious."

National Identity

National identity was gauged using 12 items on a 7-point Likert scale from Cameron (2004). After adjusting for reverse scores, all items were averaged to form the composite score, with higher scores indicating stronger national identity. Examples include: "I feel strong ties to other Japanese people" and "Overall, being Japanese has very little to do with how I feel about myself" (reverse scored).

Immigrant Group Status

Perceived group status of immigrants was measured using three items on a 7-point Likert scale to tap the same domains as Fiske et al. (2002) and Komisarof et al. (2020): social, economic, and educational status, with higher scores indicating greater overall group status. Items are: "Compared to most people in Japan, immigrants as a group are generally lower/higher in social status" and "Compared to most people in Japan, immigrants as a group are generally lower/higher in educational status.

---

[2] This scale measures both realistic and symbolic threat. However, due to their high correlation ($r = .842$, $p < .001$), the items were aggregated into a single scale to avoid multicollinearity.

Intergroup Permeability

Intergroup permeability was assessed using seven items on a 7-point Likert scale adapted from Armenta et al. (2017). After adjusting for reverse scores, all items were averaged to form the composite score, with higher scores indicating greater intergroup permeability. Examples include: "Immigrants to Japan can be regarded as Japanese if they want to be" and "Japanese and immigrants to Japan are worlds apart" (reverse scored).

Results

Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses

Adopting a split sample method, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted on one-half of the dataset to identify the factor structure of the SMA. With a sample size of 2000 participants, the dataset satisfied the recommendation that there should be at least 10 participants for every item tested (Everitt, 1975). The dataset also satisfied the additional statistical assumptions for an EFA (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = .94, Bartlett's Test for Sphericity, $\chi^2(300) = 18626.90$, $p < .001$). The EFA was conducted using principal axis factoring with oblique rotation. The final two-factor solution was selected based on a scree plot.

The first factor, *civic markers*, had an eigenvalue of 10.28 and accounted for 29% of the variance in the dataset, whereas the second factor, *ethnic markers*, had an eigenvalue of 3.63 and accounted for 24% of the variance. These two factors had a correlation of $r = .34$. Table 2 shows the factor loadings of the two-factor solution.

Table 2

The first factor was named *civic markers* and the second *ethnic markers* for two reasons. First, civic markers are expected to be perceived as more easily acquired than ethnic markers, which an independent-samples *t*-test confirmed when civic markers ($M = 4.33$, $SD = 0.93$) were compared to ethnic ones ($M = 3.53$, $SD = 0.91$, $t(3996.50) = 27.50$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.87$). Second, ethnic markers are thought to correlate to a greater extent with threat perceptions, which a correlation analysis confirmed: ethnic markers' correlation ($r = .29$, $p < .001$) was indeed larger than that of civic ones ($r = .28$, $p < .001$).

In examining the two-factor solution, items that loaded poorly (i.e., factor loading < .40) or showed poor face validity were removed from the solution. As such, the first factor (civic markers) contained 13 items while the second (ethnic markers) comprised eight items. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was then conducted on the other half of the dataset to verify the factor structure identified by the EFA. The results indicated acceptable model fit: $\chi^2(106) = 691.38$, $p < .001$, CFI = .961, TLI = .923, RMSEA = .074, SRMR = .058.

Hierarchical Regressions

Three-step hierarchical regressions were conducted for both civic and ethnic markers. Demographic variables were entered in Step 1, the independent variables (i.e., threat, contribution, national identity, status, and permeability) in Step 2, and two-way interactions in Step 3. Independent variables were grand mean centered prior to conducting the hierarchical regressions. Replicating Komisarof et al.'s (2020) method, latent factor items were weighted by their ease of acquisition to control for the varying difficulty in acquiring the SMA. The items in each latent factor were summed up to provide an aggregated measure of the factor score by using the formula: $\sum_{i}^{no\ of\ factor\ items} [xi/\ yi]$ in which:

- *xi* measures the importance of marker *i* with a rating of 1 (not at all important) to 7 (very important);

- *yi* measures the difficulty of acquiring marker *i*, using a rating of 1 (almost impossible) to 7 (very easy).

In doing so, each latent factor's loading produces a more nuanced perspective on immigrant acceptance in Japan; for example, if two markers are thought to be important, with one considered easy to achieve and the other almost impossible, the latter forms a greater barrier to immigrant acceptance, as it is more difficult to satisfy.

Civic Markers

The overall model was significant, $F(16, 1983) = 18.60$, $p < 001$, with main effects of threat, contribution, status, and permeability, as well as interaction effects of threat x identity, threat x status, and threat x permeability (see Table 3). The combined R^2 was 0.131. No effects on civic markers were found for any of the demographic variables tested (i.e., education level, income, residence, gender, and age). As the largest Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) < 1.77, there was no evidence of multicollinearity.

Table 3

The main effects of threat and contribution indicate that civic markers were more strongly endorsed when perceived immigrant threats were high, and when immigrants were thought to contribute less to Japanese society ($B = 0.10$, $p < .001$, and $B = -0.04$, $p < .001$, respectively). Thus, H1 and H2 were supported. To interpret the interaction effect of threat x permeability, a simple slopes analysis was conducted (see Figure 2) at different levels of permeability (i.e., -1 SD, mean, +1 SD). In general, civic markers were emphasized more when immigrants were perceived to be a greater threat, although the rate of increase varied as a function of intergroup permeability, with the highest rate of increase observed when intergroup permeability was low (low permeability: $B = 0.12$, $p < .01$; mean permeability: $B = 0.10$, $p < .01$; high permeability: $B = 0.07$, $p < .01$). This finding contradicts H3.

Figure 2

Similarly, for threat x status (i.e., H4), a simple slopes analysis conducted (see Figure 3) at different levels of status (i.e., -1 SD, mean, +1 SD) revealed that civic markers were emphasized more when immigrants were perceived as more threatening, with the highest rate of increase observed when status was low (low status: $B = 0.13$, $p < .01$; equal status: $B = 0.10$, $p < .01$; high status: $B = 0.07$, $p < .01$), supporting H5.

Figure 3

Finally, for threat x identity, a simple slopes analysis conducted (see Figure 4) at different levels of status (i.e., -1 SD, mean, +1 SD) revealed that civic markers were emphasized more as threat grew, with the greatest rate of increase observed when national identity was low (weak identity: $B = 0.13$, $p < .01$; mean identity: $B = 0.10$, $p < .01$; strong identity: $B = 0.07$, $p < .01$)—contradicting H7. There was no evidence validating H6 or H8.

Figure 4

Ethnic Markers

The overall model was significant, $F(16, 1983) = 20.13$, $p < 001$, with main effects of education, income, threat, contribution, national identity, status, and permeability, as well as interaction effects of threat x status and threat x permeability (see Table 3). The combined R^2 was 0.140. No effects were found on ethnic markers for the demographic variables of gender, residence, or age. As the largest VIF < 1.77, there was no evidence of multicollinearity.

The main effect of education indicated that ethnic markers were more strongly endorsed by individuals who had at least a college degree ($B = 0.05$, $p = .017$), and the main effect of income revealed that ethnic markers were emphasized more by the poor ($B = -0.01$, $p = .044$). The main effects of threat and contribution showed that ethnic markers were more vigorously endorsed when immigrants were perceived as more threatening and contributing less to Japanese society ($B = 0.09$, $p < 0.001$ and $B = -0.04$, $p = .002$, respectively), supporting H1 and H2. National identity's main effect indicated that ethnic markers received greater support among individuals with a stronger Japanese identity ($B = 0.04$, $p = .010$).

To interpret the interaction effect of threat x permeability, a simple slopes analysis conducted at different levels of permeability (i.e., -1 SD, mean, +1 SD) (Figure 5) revealed that ethnic markers received greater support when immigrants were associated with larger threat, although the rate of increase varied as a function of intergroup permeability, with the highest rate of increase observed when intergroup permeability was low (low permeability: $B = 0.13$, $p < .01$; mean permeability: $B = 0.09$, $p < .01$; high permeability: $B = 0.05$, $p < .01$). As with civic markers, this finding contradicts H3. No evidence supported H4.

Figure 5

A simple slopes analysis was conducted at different levels of status (i.e., -1 SD, mean, +1 SD) to interpret the interaction effect of threat x status (Figure 6). Ethnic markers were more strongly endorsed when immigrants were associated with greater threat, although the rate of increase varied as a function of immigrant status, with the highest rate of increase observed when immigrant status was low (low status: $B = 0.11$, $p < .01$; mean status: $B = 0.09$, $p < .01$; high status: $B = 0.07$, $p < .01$), supporting H5. No evidence corroborated H6, H7, or H8.

Figure 6

Discussion

Two latent factors of SMA in Japan were identified. The first, civic markers, stressed near-native Japanese proficiency (speaking, reading, and writing) to facilitate communication, as immigrants were also expected to develop congenial interpersonal relations with Japanese coworkers, neighbors, and to possess positive attitudes towards Japanese society. Markers of linguistic mastery appear linked to socialization in Japanese society, as immigrants are required to maintain the social order by thinking and behaving in social contexts as do the Japanese (i.e., to have Japanese "common sense") and by observing Japan's laws. This factor also emphasized immigrants' economic contribution to Japan by being a talent in their industry—providing valued skills in the labor market—and earning enough to be economically self-sufficient without burdening public services. Finally, immigrants were expected to live in Japan at least 5 years, thus providing a window during which Japanese participants likely assumed that they could reasonably develop the aforementioned knowledge bases, skills, and achievements.

The second factor, ethnic markers, stipulated that immigrants assimilate to Japanese culture, embrace Japanese religion (Shintoism and/or Buddhism), be ethnically Japanese (or physically resemble one), demonstrate a deep social embeddedness by raising families in Japan, having children who are Japanese citizens, and proving their unwavering commitment to the nation by supporting Japanese products and brands, participating in charity organizations or NGOs, and investing in local businesses. Like civic markers, ethnic ones included an economic component: immigrants should have a college degree and work in a field with a labor shortfall—thus supplementing the dwindling Japanese workforce. The marker of a college education is likely a proxy for being a highly skilled worker, a qualification that is stressed in the long-ruling conservative party's immigration policies (Strausz, 2021).

Unlike Tanabe (2001), our results indicate that Japanese concepts of both civic and ethnic national identity are distinct. Notably, five out of seven markers on the 1995 version of the ISSP utilized by Tanabe also appeared in our survey, with some loading onto our ethnic factor and others onto our civic factor. This suggests that Japanese national identity has changed since 1995, with Japanese developing a distinct civic conceptualization of belonging.

Integrated Threat and Social Identity Theories

Threat and contribution demonstrated main effects for both civic and ethnic markers, thus supporting integrated threat theory. However, threat's effects were much more complex, interacting with status and intergroup boundary permeability for both civic and ethnic markers, whereas contribution did not interact with any moderating variables. This suggests that contribution has a broad-based correlation with civic and ethnic markers that is not context dependent. The only other study of SMA using a national representative sample, Leong (2014), yielded similar results in Singapore in that threat had a positive effect on the number of markers endorsed and contribution had a negative one.

Park et al. (2022) noted a possible mechanism through which contribution diminishes expectations for the markers with their finding among Japanese that feelings of security (similar to perceptions of immigrant contributions, or low perceived threat) were associated with multicultural ideologies. Therefore, if Japanese see immigrants as unthreatening and contributing to Japan, they may expect fewer markers because they value the different cultures that immigrants bring and prefer that they maintain them instead of assimilating to ethnic or civic markers. Examination of this potential mechanism is recommended for future research.

Our findings for intergroup boundaries contradicted our hypotheses and SIT, as greater threat and *less* permeable boundaries associated with stronger marker endorsement for both civic and ethnic forms of national identity. Why? Within social identity research, permeability has been conceptualized and operationalized in myriad ways (Terry et al., 2006). Our operationalization and measure represent the potential seen by Japanese for immigrants to cross the intergroup boundary—i.e., by gauging Japanese perceptions of the psychological distance between members of the two groups, as well as inquiring about the possibility of immigrants eventually being viewed as Japanese. Consequently, we measured the degree that subjects emphasize intergroup differences—on one extreme, viewing Japanese and immigrants as vastly dissimilar and the chasm between them unbridgeable, and on the other, thinking the two groups are alike and share a flexible, porous boundary. High intergroup boundary permeability in our case can be interpreted as a stance that immigrants are not so different from Japanese and hence unthreatening, thus obviating the need to use markers to bolster the intergroup boundary; therefore, markers are *deemphasized* to be more accepting. However, when threat is felt to be high, so is the psychological distance for Japanese toward immigrants. Due to this perceived dissimilarity, Japanese people emphasize the markers more stringently and exclusively. Since we cannot prove causality, it is unclear whether perceived similarity assuages threat or whether decreased sense of threat gives people a greater feeling of similarity,

but it is clear that threat and intergroup boundary permeability (that is operationalized as a sense of psychological distance) are close bedfellows and meaningfully considered in conjunction with each other.

Perceived immigrant status was found to interact with threat for both civic and ethnic markers such that greater threat and lower immigrant social status jointly determined stronger marker endorsement. Such findings are consistent with SIT, as markers were more stringently applied towards immigrants perceived as low status than high. This complements Komisarof et al.'s (2020) previous marker-related research in Japan, which found similar effects, as well as a large body of literature (reviewed in Komisarof & Leong, 2016) describing varied treatment of migrants in Japan based on differences in race, ethnicity, and national background and where groups are relegated status in a hierarchy of "valued" and "devalued" migrants (Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001). Immigrants considered to be high status are usually Caucasian and originate from Western nations with advanced industrialized economies. They gain privileges based on their social positions as honored guests (Komisarof, 2009)—i.e., markers tend to be less strictly applied to them as they are granted greater license to behave as they would in their home countries. Devalued groups are typically non-Caucasians, coming from countries with developing economies (primarily in Asia) and are in contrast largely expected to conform to Japanese markers (Lie, 2001). Thus, the path to acceptance for devalued immigrants is more challenging than for those conferred high status, as both civic and ethnic markers are more strongly emphasized as benchmarks for acceptance.

Findings for national identity were inconsistent. National identity did not demonstrate any interaction effects as hypothesized, but its positive impact on ethnic marker importance was consistent with SIT. However, since weak national identity amplified threat's positive effect on civic marker importance, the results here contradicted SIT, but are instead consistent with Berry's multicultural hypothesis, where having a secure national heritage identity is considered crucial to buffer against the perception of cultural erosion associated with influxes of immigrants who are perceived as ethnoculturally distinct from the mainstream community (i.e., precipitating tolerance and inclusion). Nonetheless, the link between national identity and outgroup acceptance remains empirically inconclusive, as national identity has been found to have both inclusive and exclusive associations with immigrant outgroup attitudes (Berry, et al., 2021; Gieling, et al., 2014). This area of research, in particular using SMA as a benchmark of inclusion and adaptation, requires exploration in future studies.

Demographic Covariates

In addition to the effects predicted in our model, we found main effects for education and income level upon ethnic markers. More ethnic markers were endorsed by Japanese who had a university (or higher) degree than those without one—in direct opposition to Kunovich (2009), which examined 31 countries (including Japan) and determined that higher educational qualifications associated with a stronger commitment to civic than ethnic forms of national identity. The current study however is consistent with Leong (2014), where higher education was associated with greater importance placed upon aggregated markers, ostensibly because of more critical perspectives on social issues such as immigration. The current study did not collect data that allows us to discern why such subjects emphasized ethnic markers; speculatively, Leong's (2014) reasoning could apply in Japan, too, though it is also plausible that some forms of tertiary education makes Japanese less accepting of immigrants by emphasizing an ethnic concept of national identity.

Additionally, ethnic markers were more strongly endorsed by the poor, echoing Kunovich's (2009) finding that higher household income correlates with a lower commitment to ethnic national identity. Why? It is well-documented that the Japanese government uses low-cost migrant labor (i.e., non-Japanese with time-limited visas) from countries with

developing economies to fill jobs viewed by most Japanese as dirty, demanding, and dangerous (Debnar, 2016). Japanese with lower household earnings may fear losing work to these migrants who are often paid sub-minimum wages (Liu-Farrer, 2020; Strausz, 2021). Consequently, low-income Japanese may insist upon ethnic markers as a means of job protection—insisting their work should be for Japanese nationals while simultaneously excluding most immigrants from becoming Japanese by emphasizing ethnic markers.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

The results of this study are correlational; therefore, causal relationships cannot be established. Also, since our survey required only self-reports, there is no guarantee that social desirability did not bias responses. As our survey did not differentiate between implicit and explicit concepts of national identity and their associated markers, we recommend that future SMA research utilize experimental methods to tap into the exclusionary, unconscious (i.e., implicit) assumptions that may influence everyday behaviors more than self-reported, explicit beliefs.

Finally, we did not specify immigrant subgroups in our survey (e.g., different countries of origin, genders, or racial appearances). Our focus upon perceptions of immigrants as a composite group did not enable us to examine how marker importance, and the variable-driven mechanisms that affect it, may vary by subgroup. Stereotypes about such subgroups may influence perceptions of immigrant threat, contribution, and status—in turn influencing SMA emphasis, so future studies can investigate the relationship between stereotypes and these other variables of interest.

Despite such limitations, this paper makes important contributions to the nascent literature about SMA and the more developed body of research regarding national identity. First, we have evidence that Japanese national identity has changed in the past 25 years, with Japanese developing a distinct civic conceptualization in addition to their ethnic form of belonging. Also, this work complements Leong et al.'s (2020) in identifying the markers commonly used to construct ethnic and civic forms of national identity in various countries; however, ours is the only such study to utilize a national representative sample. Finally, we assessed how markers associate with the variables central to SIT and integrated threat theories, thus clarifying the contextual nature of boundary construction in Japan—findings that can now be tested with representative samples in other nations.

Conclusion

Our study shows that the application of SMA in constructing social boundaries is a dynamic, fluid process. As such, acceptance criteria are neither monolithic nor fixed—instead, they depend on subjective beliefs and intergroup context. When immigrants understand the civic markers emphasized by Japanese and why they are considered important, if they choose, they can work towards satisfying them. Not only can this increase those immigrants who feel a sense of belonging, but in doing so, immigrant belonging may become normalized in Japanese society for receiving nationals and migrants alike.

Our findings also serve as a source of potential awareness among Japanese—both in terms of which markers they would like to retain for the positive everyday functioning of civil society (which can be a constructive use of markers and reason for expecting them), but also in terms of realizing which markers are exclusionary and inhibit immigrants from belonging. If accepted, immigrants can potentially enrich Japanese society with their diversity and supplement Japan's aging, shrinking workforce; accordingly, Japanese could jettison certain markers, soften their emphasis, or recast ascriptive markers in ways that make them achievable. For example, rather than expecting immigrants to have Japanese ancestry (an ethnic, ascriptive

marker), they can instead focus upon immigrants comporting themselves in daily life in ways that promote the smooth functioning of civic society—i.e., developing a sense of "Japanese common sense" (an achievable civic marker). Similar transformations could be initiated to make civic markers more easily attainable: by deemphasizing near-native Japanese literacy skills and focusing instead upon functional oral language proficiency that enables immigrants to communicate sufficiently in interactions at work and in community life, language skills can be reconceived as a more accessible benchmark. Japanese might also engage in majority group acculturation (Kunst et al., 2021)—i.e., acculturating to migrants on individual and societal levels, and eventually conceiving the mainstream as multicultural rather than monocultural (as Canadians have in Jassi & Safdar, 2021, and Singaporeans in Leong, 2014). Such mutual efforts and openness can help to make Japanese society more accepting—an exigent need in a country where demographic imperatives require greater migration to avert a looming economic crisis.

References

Akaliyski, P., Welzel, C., Bond, M. H., & Minkov, M. (2021). On "Nationology: The gravitational field of national culture. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 52*(8-9), 771-793. doi:10.1177/00220221211044780

Armenta, B. M., Stroebe, K., Scheibe, S., Van Yperen, N. W., Stegeman, A., & Postmes, T. (2017). Permeability of group boundaries: Development of the concept and a scale. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43*(3), 418–433. doi:10.1177/0146167216688202

Befu, H. (2001). *Hegemony of homogeneity.* Trans Pacific Press.

Berry, J. W., Lepshokova, Z., MIRIPS Collaboration, Grigoryev, D., Annis, R. C., Au, A. K., ... & Ziaian, T. (2022). How shall we all live together? Meta-analytical review of the mutual intercultural relations in plural societies project. Applied Psychology, 71(3), 1014-1041. doi:10.1111/apps.12332

Cameron, J. E. (2004). A three-factor model of social identity. *Self and Identity, 3*(3), 239–262. doi:10.1080/13576500444000047

Debnar, M. (2016). *Migration, Whiteness, and cosmopolitanism*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Devos, T., & Mohamed, H. (2014). Shades of American identity: Implicit relations between ethnic and national identities. *Social and Personal Psychology Compass, 8*(12), 739-754. doi:10.1111/spc3.12149

Esses, V. M., & Jackson, L. M. (2009). Applying the unified instrumental model of group conflict to understanding ethnic conflict and violence: The case of Sudan. In V. M. Esses, & R. A. Vernon (Eds.), *Explaining the breakdown of ethnic relations: Why neighbors kill* (pp. 223–243). Blackwell Publishing.

Everitt, B. S. (1975). Multivariate analysis: The need for data, and other problems. *British Journal of Psychiatry, 126*(3), 237–240. doi:10.1192/bjp.126.3.237

Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82*(6), 878–902. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.878

Gamlen, A. (2020). Migration and mobility after the 2020 pandemic: The end of an age? IOM UN Migration.

Gieling, M., Thijs, J., & Verkuyten, M. (2014). Dutch adolescents' tolerance of Muslim immigrants: the role of assimilation ideology, intergroup contact, and national identification. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *44*(3), 155–165.

International Organization for Migration. (2022). Retrieved May 19, 2022, from https://www.iom.int/data-and-research

Japanese Ministry of Justice. (2022a). *Houmushou: Kika kyoka shinseishasuu, kika kyokashasuu*

oyobi kikafukyokashasuu no suii [Ministry of Justice: Number of applicants for naturalization including shifts in numbers of applicants accepted and rejected]. Retrieved August 23, 2022, from https://www.moj.go.jp/content/001342633.pdf

Japanese Ministry of Justice. (2022b). *Taizai gaikokujin toukei* [Statistics for foreigners staying in Japan]. Retrieved August 23, 2022, from https://www.e-stat.go.jp/stat-search/files?page=1&layout=datalist&toukei=00250012&tstat=000001018034&cycle=1&year=20210&month=24101212&tclass1=000001060399

Jassi, A., & Safdar, S. (2021). The inclusion of immigrants in Canada: An examination of social markers of acceptance. *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science / Revue canadienne des sciences du comportement, 53*(4), 433–444. doi:10.1037/cbs0000199

Jones, F. L., & Smith, P. (2001). Diversity and commonality in national identities: An exploratory analysis of cross-national patterns. *Journal of Sociology, 37*(1), 45-63. doi:10.1177/144078301128756193

Kiely, R., Bechhofer, F., Stewart, R., & McCrone, D. (2001). The markers and rules of Scottish national identity. *The Sociological Review, 49* (1), 33-55. doi:10.1111/1467-954X.00243

Komisarof, A. (2009). Testing a modified Interactive Acculturation Model in Japan: American-Japanese coworker relations. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 33*(5), 399-418. doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2009.03.00

Komisarof, A. (2011). *On the front lines of forging a global society: Japanese and American coworkers in Japan.* Reitaku University Press.

Komisarof, A. (2020). Global education's outcomes and improvement: The role of social markers of acceptance in constructing Japanese identity and ingroup boundaries. In N. Musha Doerr (Ed.), *The global education effect: New borders and identification practices around "Japan"* (pp. 98-118). Routledge.

Komisarof, A., & Leong, C.-H. (2016). Acculturation in East and Southeast Asia. In J. Berry & D. Sam (Eds.), *The Cambridge handbook of acculturation psychology, 2nd edition* (pp. 248-271). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Komisarof, A., & Leong, C.-H. (2020). Viewing intercultural adaptation and social inclusion through constructs of national identity: An introduction. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 78*, 1-9. doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2020.06.001

Komisarof, A., Leong, C.-H., & Teng, E. (2020). Constructing who can be Japanese: A study of social markers of acceptance in Japan. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 23*(2), 238–250. doi:10.1111/ajsp.12396

Kunovich, R. M. (2009). The sources and consequences of national identification. *American Sociological Review, 74*, 573-593. doi:10.1177/000312240907400404

Kunst, J. R., Lefringhausen, K., Sam, D. L., Berry, J. W., & Dovidio, J. F. (2021). The missing side of acculturation: How majority-group members relate to immigrant and

minority-group members. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 30*(6), 485-494. doi:10.1177/09637214211040771

Leong, C.-H. (2014). Social markers of acculturation: A new research framework on intercultural adaptation. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 38*, 120–132. doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2013.08.006

Leong, C.-H., Komisarof, A., Dandy, J., Jasinskaja-Lahti, I., Safdar, S., Hanke, K., Teng, E. (2020). What does it take to become "one of us"? Redefining ethnic-civic citizenship using markers of everyday nationhood. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 78*, 10–19. doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2020.04.006

Lie, J. (2001). *Multiethnic Japan.* Harvard University Press.

Liu-Farrer, G. (2020). *Immigrant Japan.* Cornell University Press.

Montreuil, A., & Bourhis, R. (2001). Majority acculturation orientations toward "valued" and "devalued" immigrants. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32*(6), 698-719. doi:10.1177/0022022101032006004

Park, J., Berry, J. W., & Joshanloo, M. (2022). Japanese people's attitudes toward acculturation and intercultural relations. *Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology, 16,* 1-15. doi:10.1177/18344909221090996

Pehrson, S. (2019). Argumentative contexts of national identity definition: Getting past the failures of a universal ethnic-civic dichotomy. In G. Gustavsson & D. Miller (Eds.), *Liberal nationalism and its critics: Normative and empirical questions* (pp. 133-152). Oxford University Press.

Pehrson, S., Brown, R., & Zagefka, H. (2009). When does national identification lead to the rejection of immigrants? Cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence for the role of essentialist in-group definitions. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 48*(1), 61-76. doi:10.1348/014466608X288827

Phua, D., Leong, C.-H., & Hong, Y.Y. (2020). Heterogeneity in definition of one's national identity: Example of Singapore using latent class and network analyses. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 78*, 20-32. doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2020.05.010

Reeskens, T., & Hooghe, M. (2010). Beyond the civic-ethnic dichotomy: Investigating the structure of citizenship concepts across thirty-three countries. *Nations and Nationalism, 16*(4), 579–597. doi:10.1111/j.1469-8129.2010.00446.x

Reijerse, A., Van Acker, K., Vanbeselaere, N., Phalet, K., & Duriez, B. (2013). Beyond the ethnic-civic dichotomy: Cultural citizenship as a new way of excluding immigrants. *Political Psychology, 34*(4), 611-630. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00920.x

Reijerse, A., Vanbeselaere, N., Duriez, B., & Fichera, G. (2015). Accepting immigrants as fellow citizens: Citizenship representations in relation to migration policy preferences. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 38*(5), 700-717. doi:10.1080/01419870.2014.916812

Spencer, S., & Charsley, K. (2016). Conceptualising integration: A framework for empirical research, taking marriage migration as a case study. *Comparative Migration Studies, 4*(18). doi:10.1186/s40878-016-0035-x

Stefan, W. G., Ybarra, O, & Rios, K. (2016). Intergroup threat theory. In T. Nelson (Ed.), *Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination* (2nd ed.) (pp. 255-278). Psychology Press.

Stockwell, E. (2020). In principle or in practice? Investigation of Japanese university students' perceptions and attitudes toward multiculturalism in Japan. *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 14*(3):1-20. doi:10.1080/17513057.2020.1772343

Strausz, M. (2021). "This is not an immigration policy": The 2018 immigration reform and the future of immigration and citizenship in Japan. In G. Schubert, F. Plummer, & A. Bayok (Eds.), *Immigration governance in East Asia: Norm diffusion, politics of identity, citizenship* (pp. 258-276). Routledge.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33-47). Brooks/Cole Publishing.

Tanabe, S. (2001). *Nihon no nashonaru aidentiti no gainen kouzou* [Conceptual structure of Japanese national identity]. *Japanese Sociological Review, 52* (3), 398-412. doi:10.4057/jsr.52.398

Tanabe, S. (2011). Nationalism: Its multiplicity and diversity. In S. Tanabe (Ed.), *Japanese perceptions of foreigners* (pp. 11-26). Trans Pacific Press.

Taniguchi, H. (2021). National identity, cosmopolitanism, and attitudes toward immigrants. *International Sociology, 36*(6), 819-843. doi:10.1177/0268580921994517

Tartakovsky, E., & Walsh, S. D. (2022). Positive and negative social contacts with immigrants from different groups: Investigating the role of group appraisal and opportunity for contact using network analysis. *International Journal of Psychology, 57*(4), 511–523. doi:10.1002/ijop.12831

Terry, D. J., Pelly, R. N., Lalonde, R. N., & Smith, J. R. (2006). Predictors of cultural adjustment: Intergroup status relations and boundary permeability. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 9*(2), 249–264. doi:10.1177/1368430206062080

Wright, M., Citrin, J., & Wand, J. (2012). Alternative measures of American national identity: Implications for the civic-ethnic distinction. *Political Psychology, 33*(4), 469–482. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00885.x

Yogeeswaran, K., & Dasgupta, N. (2014). Conceptions of national identity in a globalized world: Antecedents and consequences. *European Review of Social Psychology, 25*(1), 189-227. doi:10.1080/10463283.2014.972081

Zhirkov, K. (2021). Social dominance orientation and differential affect toward immigrant origin

groups: Evidence from three immigration-receiving countries. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations 85*(1):170-183. doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2021.09.014

Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations, Internal Consistencies, and Bivariate Correlations

Variables	*M*	*SD*	α	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
(1) Threat	3.91	0.99	.93										
(2) Contribution	4.18	0.92	.83	-.28***									
(3) Identity	4.56	0.80	.82	.16***	.03								
(4) Status	3.20	0.99	.86	-.05*	.07***	-.27***							
(5) Permeability	4.30	0.85	.75	-.53***	.23***	.11***	-.06**						
(6) Civic (weighted)	1.17	0.49	.91	.28***	-.16***	.07**	-.16***	-.20***					
(7) Civic (importance)	4.65	1.24	.93	.43***	.08***	.30***	-.09***	-.22***	.51***				
(8) Civic (ease)	4.33	0.93	.92	.17***	.26***	.27***	.04+	-.01	-.39***	.43***			
(9) Ethnic (weighted)	1.04	0.50	.78	.29***	-.16***	.11***	-.10***	-.25***	.63***	.36***	-.17***		
(10) Ethnic (importance)	3.17	1.28	.89	.45***	-.05*	-.04+	.25***	-.41***	.25***	.51***	.20***	.52***	
(11) Ethnic (ease)	3.53	0.91	.83	.25***	.11***	-.06**	.33***	-.21***	-.29***	.18***	.54***	-.33***	.46***

+$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Table 2

Factor Loadings for the Two-Factor Solution

Social markers of acceptance	Factor 1	Factor 2
Able to speak conversational Japanese	**0.89**	-0.08
Embraces a positive attitude to Japanese society	**0.84**	-0.11
Has Japanese "common sense"	**0.80**	-0.02
Gets along well with his or her neighbors	**0.75**	-0.07
Observes Japanese laws	**0.75**	-0.37
Able to read Japanese at a similar level to native Japanese	**0.72**	0.21
Able to write Japanese at a similar level to native Japanese	**0.69**	0.23
Able to speak Japanese at a similar level to native Japanese	**0.67**	0.26
Gets on well with workplace colleagues	**0.67**	0.10
Considered a talent in their industry	**0.59**	0.24
Earns enough income to be economically self-sufficient, or without the need for public assistance	**0.59**	0.10
Behaves like a Japanese	**0.46**	0.35
Has lived in Japan for at least 5 years	**0.45**	0.25
Embraces or has converted to Shinto or Buddhism	-0.15	**0.83**
Supports Japanese products and brands	-0.06	**0.83**
Physically resembles a Japanese	-0.06	**0.79**
Participates in the work of local charity organizations/NGOs	-0.03	**0.77**
Has a college degree	0.11	**0.67**

Social markers of acceptance	Factor 1	Factor 2
Has children who are Japanese citizens	0.21	**0.63**
Invests in or sets up a Japan-based company	0.21	**0.59**
Parents or ancestors are Japanese	0.19	**0.57**
Gives up foreign cultural norms or behavior	0.24	**0.55**
Works in a field where there is a labor shortfall in Japan	0.26	**0.53**
Feels like he or she is Japanese	0.34	0.31
Is gainfully employed	0.27	0.32

Note. Items in bold have a factor loading of > .40.

Table 3

Hierarchical Regressions for Civic and Ethnic Markers

Variables	Civic Markers			Ethnic Markers		
	B	*SE*	ΔR^2	*B*	*SE*	ΔR^2
Step 1			0.004			0.008**
Intercept	1.15***	0.05		1.00***	0.05	
Gender (female)	-0.02	0.02		-0.05+	0.02	
Age	0.00+	0.00		0.00*	0.00	
Geographic area (urban)	-0.00	0.02		0.01	0.02	
Education (degree)	0.04	0.02		0.05+	0.02	
Income	-0.01	0.01		-0.01+	0.01	
Step 2			0.110***			0.116***
Intercept	1.17***	0.05		1.02***	0.05	
Gender (female)	-0.01	0.02		-0.04	0.02	
Age	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	
Geographic area (urban)	-0.01	0.02		0.01	0.02	
Education (degree)	0.04*	0.02		0.05*	0.02	
Income	-0.01+	0.01		-0.01*	0.01	
Threat	0.10***	0.01		0.09***	0.01	
Contribution	-0.04***	0.01		-0.05***	0.01	
Identity	0.00	0.01		0.05**	0.01	

Variables		Civic Markers			Ethnic Markers		
		B	*SE*	ΔR^2	*B*	*SE*	ΔR^2
	Status	-0.07***	0.01		-0.03**	0.01	
	Permeability	-0.05**	0.01		-0.09***	0.02	
Step 3				0.017***			0.016***
	Intercept	1.14***	0.05		0.99***	0.05	
	Gender (female)	-0.00	0.02		-0.03	0.02	
	Age	0.00	0.00		0.00+	0.00	
	Geographic area (urban)	-0.01	0.02		0.01	0.02	
	Education (degree)	0.04+	0.02		0.05*	0.02	
	Income	-0.01+	0.01		-0.01*	0.01	
	Threat	0.10***	0.01		0.09***	0.01	
	Contribution	-0.04***	0.01		-0.04**	0.01	
	Identity	0.00	0.01		0.04**	0.01	
	Status	-0.07***	0.01		-0.02*	0.01	
	Permeability	-0.05***	0.01		-0.09***	0.02	
	Threat × identity	-0.04**	0.01		-0.00	0.01	
	Threat × status	-0.03**	0.01		-0.02*	0.01	
	Threat × permeability	-0.03**	0.01		-0.05***	0.01	
	Contribution × identity	-0.01	0.01		0.02	0.01	
	Contribution × status	0.00	0.01		-0.01+	0.01	

Variables	Civic Markers			Ethnic Markers		
	B	*SE*	ΔR^2	*B*	*SE*	ΔR^2
Contribution × permeability	0.00	0.01		-0.00	0.01	

+$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Figure 1

Research Framework



Figure 2

Simple Slopes Analysis for Civic Markers: Threat × Permeability



Figure 3

Simple Slope Analysis for Civic Markers: Threat x Status



Figure 4

Simple Slope Analysis for Civic Markers: Threat x Identity



Figure 5

Simple Slopes Analysis for Ethnic Markers: Threat × Permeability



Figure 6

Simple Slopes Analysis for Ethnic Markers: Threat × Status