Details of a Researcher

Reviews, Commentaries, etc. - NOMURA Koji

Division display >> ／ All the affair displays 1 - 206 of about 206

”A Perspective Missing from Japan's Nuclear Policy” (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) ( 2175 ) 2026.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Since the Fukushima Daiichi accident, discussions on nuclear policy in Japan have emphasized the importance of “careful explanation” to society. This article argues that the central issue lies not in insufficient communication by frontline operators, but in the absence of a decision-making framework that evaluates safety levels through comparison with other risks and social costs. Referring to a recent survey experiment published in Energy Policy, the article shows that public support for nuclear power is shaped not only by perceptions of radiation risk, but also by comparisons with energy security, decarbonization, and international competitiveness. Drawing on Masao Maruyama’s idea of a “robust subjective spirit,” the article highlights the importance of continual comparative judgment rather than fixed and absolute values. It concludes that treating safety as unquestionable may ultimately weaken the economic and technological foundations necessary to sustain long-term safety itself.

"Quality Adjustment and PPP: A Fundamental Caveat in Productivity Comparisons"

Ho, Mun S., Koji Nomura, and Jon D. Samuels

Productivity Research Notes (Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University) ( 2611 ) 2026.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Joint Work

Productivity Research Notes (PRN Series), No. 2611.
Cross-country productivity comparisons are fundamentally shaped by how national statistical agencies treat quality change in price indices. When quality improvements are incompletely captured, measured inflation is overstated and real output growth understated—with differences accumulating over time. Neither constant PPPs, which extrapolate from a benchmark year using national deflators, nor current PPPs, which incorporate updated international price data, can fully resolve these inconsistencies. Interpreting productivity level comparisons therefore requires careful attention to cross-country differences in price measurement methods.

PRN2611

Access to Document (DOI)

"Importing Bits, Not Watts: AI Infrastructure and Japan’s Electricity Constraint"

Koji Nomura

Productivity Research Notes (Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University) ( 2610 ) 2026.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

Productivity Research Notes (PRN Series), No. 2610.
Artificial intelligence is increasingly discussed as a driver of future productivity growth, yet its expansion also depends on electricity supply and physical infrastructure. This note argues that AI computation can increasingly be traded internationally as digital services, while electricity supply remains geographically constrained. Using Japan as a case study, it examines how electricity costs, transmission limitations, and industrial linkages shape the domestic location of AI-related computation. The note further highlights the uncertainty surrounding future AI-related electricity demand, emphasizing both the evolving electricity productivity of computation and the uncertain long-run sustainability of rapidly expanding digital consumption patterns. These observations suggest that AI competitiveness may increasingly depend on stable, scalable, and economically sustainable electricity systems as much as on advances in computation itself.

PRN2610

Access to Document (DOI)

"Energy Cost Divergence and Industrial Adjustment: Evidence from Germany and Japan"

Koji Nomura and Sho Inaba

Productivity Research Notes (Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University) ( 2609 ) 2026.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Joint Work

Productivity Research Notes (PRN Series), No. 2609.
This note examines how diverging energy cost conditions since the late 2010s have affected industrial activity in advanced economies, with a focus on Germany and Japan. Using high-frequency production indices, it documents a sustained contraction of energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industries and shows that the impact extends beyond directly exposed sectors. While Germany exhibits pronounced spillovers to non-EITE manufacturing, Japan shows more limited propagation, indicating heterogeneous economy-wide adjustment. Decomposition analysis reveals that these declines are broad-based across core sectors but differ in composition and temporal patterns, with closer alignment to energy price fluctuations in Germany and more linear adjustment in Japan. These findings suggest that recent changes reflect structural adjustment and production reallocation, with important implications for interpreting aggregate productivity dynamics.

PRN2609

Access to Document (DOI)

"Product Tax Measurement, GDP Revision, and Productivity: Evidence from Fiji"

Koji Nomura

Productivity Research Notes (Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University) ( 2608 ) 2026.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

Productivity Research Notes (PRN Series), No. 2608.
This note examines the implications of Fiji’s 2019 national accounts rebasing for the measurement of value added and productivity. While GDP at market prices was revised downward, a larger decline in net taxes on products led to an upward revision in GDP at basic prices. With compensation of employees largely unchanged, the adjustment increases the measured capital income share. As productivity measurement relies on value added and its income components, such revisions affect growth accounting results. In Fiji, where labor input has grown faster than capital, the revision tends to reinforce the recent improvement in measured total factor productivity (TFP), although part of this may reflect demand-side factors. These findings highlight the importance of accurate tax measurement in national accounts.

PRN2608

Access to Document (DOI)

"Revisiting India’s Growth Pattern: GDP Rebasing and the Decline in Consumption Share"

Koji Nomura and Mun S. Ho

Productivity Research Notes (Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University) ( 2607 ) 2026.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Joint Work

Productivity Research Notes (PRN Series), No. 2607.

This note examines the implications of India’s 2022–23 GDP rebasing for the composition of final demand and income. The revision leads to a substantial downward adjustment in household consumption and a corresponding increase in the investment share, suggesting that India’s growth has been less consumption-driven and more investment-oriented than previously indicated. The analysis highlights that these changes primarily reflect improvements in measurement—particularly the integration of supply–use tables and reduced reliance on residual balancing—rather than shifts in underlying economic behavior. On the income side, the reallocation within capital income and the decline in value added imply changes in measured income shares, with potential implications for growth accounting and the interpretation of productivity dynamics.

PRN2607

Access to Document (DOI)

"Mismeasuring Productivity in Resource-Rich Economies: Evidence from Saudi Arabia"

Koji Nomura and Sho Inaba

Productivity Research Notes (Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University) ( 2606 ) 2026.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Joint Work

Productivity Research Notes (PRN Series), No. 2606.

This note shows that standard productivity measures can misrepresent economic performance in resource-rich economies when natural resource capital is omitted from growth accounting. Using evidence from Saudi Arabia, it demonstrates that mineral and energy resources (MER), particularly oil, are a dominant component of capital and materially affect measured capital services. When MER is excluded, TFP exhibits a pronounced decline from the late 2000s; incorporating MER instead stabilizes the TFP path and shifts its level upward, indicating that part of the observed decline reflects unmeasured resource depletion rather than true productivity losses. These results point to a structural measurement bias in conventional productivity analysis and underscore the need to integrate natural resource capital for consistent cross-country comparisons.

PRN2606

Access to Document (DOI)

"Can you believe the price?" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2026.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Income Concepts and Productivity: Separating Production from Asset Revaluation and Its Implications for TFP"

Koji Nomura

Productivity Research Notes (Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University) ( 2605 ) 2026.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

Productivity Research Notes (PRN Series), No. 2605.
This note examines how alternative definitions of income and production—particularly the treatment of asset revaluation—affect the interpretation of TFP. Drawing on the framework of Diewert and Fox (2024), it emphasizes that SNA-based and Hicksian income concepts define distinct accounting objects rather than alternative measures of the same construct. It shows that including or excluding asset revaluation shifts the boundary between production and income, thereby changing the economic content of TFP. Removing revaluation effects from production reduces the influence of asset price fluctuations on capital input prices and yields a more stable indicator of production efficiency. The note underscores the need for conceptual alignment in cross-country and intertemporal productivity comparisons, particularly in economies with large asset shares such as land.

PRN2605

Access to Document (DOI)

"Measuring Labor Share in Economies without COE: A Bottom-Up Approach in Vietnam"

Koji Nomura

Productivity Research Notes (Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University) ( 2604 ) 2026.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

Productivity Research Notes (PRN Series), No. 2604.
This note develops a bottom-up approach to measuring labor share in economies where compensation of employees (COE) is not available in national accounts, using Vietnam as a case study. By integrating micro-level data on wages, employment, and hours worked, it constructs consistent time-series estimates of labor compensation and factor income shares. The results show that the derived labor share aligns with available benchmark aggregates while remaining conceptually distinct from mixed income measures. The analysis further demonstrates that uncertainty in labor share measurement translates directly into substantial variation in total factor productivity (TFP) estimates, underscoring the importance of reliable labor compensation data for growth accounting in developing economies.

PRN2604

Access to Document (DOI)

"Beyond Energy Prices: Strait Closure Risk in Asian Supply Chains, with Evidence from Energy Productivity"

Koji Nomura

Productivity Research Notes (Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University) ( 2603 ) 2026.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

Productivity Research Notes (PRN Series), No. 2603.
This note examines the economic implications of a potential Strait of Hormuz closure, emphasizing that the primary risk extends beyond energy price increases to the disruption of Asian supply chains. As global production networks deepen, energy shocks propagate through intermediate goods trade, disrupting downstream manufacturing before price effects become binding. Using cross-country evidence on energy productivity, the note highlights structural differences in vulnerability across Asian economies. It also revisits the role of strategic reserves, arguing that they function as insurance against physical supply disruption rather than as tools for price stabilization. The analysis suggests that policy frameworks may underestimate supply chain transmission risks and over-rely on reserves for managing price pressures.

PRN2603

Access to Document (DOI)

"Can AI Revive Japan's Productivity?: Technology Implementation Scenario to 2040"

Koji Nomura

Productivity Research Notes (Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University) ( 2602 ) 2026.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

Productivity Research Notes (PRN Series), No. 2602.
This note examines the potential impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on Japan’s productivity under a technology implementation scenario to 2040. Using a growth accounting and general equilibrium framework, it evaluates how the diffusion of AI-related technologies across sectors—together with complementary investment, institutional reform, and stable electricity supply—affects total factor productivity (TFP) and economic growth. The results suggest that productivity gains arise from the combined implementation of multiple technologies rather than a single innovation, with manufacturing playing a central role in driving economy-wide efficiency improvements.

PRN2602

Access to Document (DOI)

"Reshaping Asia’s Economic Landscape: PPP Revisions and Level Comparisons"

Koji Nomura and Mun S. Ho

Productivity Research Notes (Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University) ( 2601 ) 2026.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Joint Work

PRN2601

Access to Document (DOI)

”Can Artificial Intelligence Become the Modern Atlatl?” (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) ( 2167 ) 2026.02

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

The atlatl, a spear-throwing device used during the North American Archaic period, not only increased projectile velocity, range, and accuracy compared with hand-thrown spears, but experimental evidence also suggests that it statistically reduced differences in physical strength between men and women, allowing a wider range of individuals to participate in hunting activities. In the twenty-first century, could artificial intelligence become a modern atlatl that similarly narrows capability gaps? The Industrial Revolution, the electrification revolution, and the information revolution may once again converge through technological advances such as AI, potentially producing structural transformations on an unprecedented scale. At the SBI Institute for Financial Economics, the authors have developed a high-resolution general equilibrium model (BIP) and conducted scenario analyses of the Japanese economy in 2040, exploring the possibility of nominal GDP approaching one quadrillion yen. Technological innovation driven by AI is often discussed in connection with concerns about job losses and widening income inequality. However, scenario analyses using the BIP model suggest that even under accelerated innovation scenarios, large-scale employment declines in manufacturing and finance can be macroscopically absorbed through job creation in other sectors accompanying faster economic growth. Technological innovation raises the productivity of older workers and women, and even as working hours decline, hourly wage rates rise faster than the average, expanding total labor income. In terms of distribution, the results differ from the conventional narrative of skill-biased technological change: broad wage increases, including among blue-collar workers, lead to a declining share of low-income groups. AI-driven technological innovation therefore has the potential to reshape social structures as a modern atlatl. The equalizing effects attributed to the ancient atlatl did not arise automatically; they functioned only when appropriate social conditions existed. Whether AI can serve as a modern atlatl likewise depends heavily on the development of social and institutional capital. In scenarios of innovative growth for the Japanese economy, increases in value added appear primarily in the service sector, yet the core growth mechanism remains rooted in manufacturing. The effective realization of technological innovation requires the revitalization of production networks centered on manufacturing. Data centers—essential for meeting the expanding demand for information services that support this ecosystem—depend fundamentally on affordable and stable electricity supply. In economies where electricity prices are volatile and supply margins are limited, AI investment tends to amplify intersectoral distortions, preventing the expected economy-wide productivity gains from emerging. Current decarbonization policies move in the opposite direction. Institutional frameworks such as the GX-ETS, introduced without sufficient international coordination, increase uncertainty regarding both electricity prices and supply, severely undermining investment predictability for industry and data centers. In energy-intensive manufacturing sectors, subsidies are directed toward technological development with uncertain demand prospects while production activities are simultaneously incentivized to relocate overseas. Technological innovation cannot take root without the necessary social and economic conditions. A failure of energy policy, therefore, is effectively equivalent to depriving society of AI as the modern atlatl.

"Conciseness and accuracy" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2026.02

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Value of Nuclear Power Undermined by Decarbonization Policy"

Koji Nomura

Journal of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan: ATOMOΣ (Atomic Energy Society of Japan) 68 ( 2 ) 62 - 63 2026.02

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (scientific journal), Single Work

The Takaichi administration has so far maintained the conventional policy approach of pursuing both stable energy supply and decarbonization simultaneously, utilizing the GX budget framework. However, this strategy carries a substantial risk of producing outcomes that run counter to the administration’s stated objective of achieving a “strong economy.”

For decarbonization policies to be compatible with a strong economic foundation, two conditions are necessary: internationally harmonized allocation of emission burdens and substantial cost reductions in decarbonization technologies. At present, neither condition is satisfied. As a result, carbon leakage has accelerated the hollowing out of domestic industry, and production in energy-intensive industries in both Japan and Germany has fallen by roughly 20 percent compared with 2018 levels.

Moreover, decarbonization policies have begun to distort the electricity system itself. The consumer surplus historically generated by nuclear power is increasingly diverted to subsidize renewable energy integration, thereby eroding the very value that nuclear power originally provided—reliable and low-cost electricity supply.

Given these developments, it is necessary to apply the precautionary principle to the significant and potentially irreversible risks associated with continuing the current GX policy trajectory. A strategic shift away from existing decarbonization policies should therefore be considered.

"Japan at Its Cultural Edges" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2025.12

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Sound Skepticism" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2025.11

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

”A Shift Away from Current Decarbonization Policies Essential to Sanae's Economic Agenda” (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) ( 2159 ) 2025.11

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

The Japan-U.S. summit between Prime Minister Takaichi and President Trump produced a joint fact sheet on bilateral investment that outlined a framework for cooperation on nuclear energy development and energy infrastructure investment. As Japan works to align its energy policy with the U.S. administration's energy dominance agenda, a broader shift away from decarbonization policy may follow. Such a shift would not only serve to deepen the Japan-U.S. alliance but could also lay the foundation for realizing Sanaenomics, Prime Minister Takaichi's economic growth-oriented agenda. The area Prime Minister Takaichi placed greatest emphasis on was the expanded utilization of nuclear power, with a notable feature being her commitment to not only new construction and capacity additions but also the early commercialization of next-generation advanced reactors and fusion energy. Going forward, however, two points warrant careful attention in advancing nuclear energy. The first is that promoting nuclear power is no longer compatible with decarbonization policy. Under current policy, the push for nuclear has been justified by its value as a low-carbon power source, but nuclear energy's far greater value lies in its capacity for stable supply. In Europe, where ideals were pursued ahead of any internationally coordinated framework for equitably sharing the burden, and in Japan, which followed suit, the hollowing-out of energy-intensive industries has become strikingly pronounced over just the past few years. Once such industries relocate abroad, they do not return easily. The continuation of decarbonization policy is also diminishing the value of nuclear power itself, by driving away the very industrial consumers that depend on stable supply. Nuclear energy only makes sense atop a strong industrial base, and halting the erosion of that base must be treated as an urgent priority in any effort to revive a robust economy.
The second point is the need to once again separate technology development support from energy policy proper. Supporting research and development is a legitimate role of government, but the success of those efforts should not be baked into energy policy as a given, given its profound impact on the real economy. Even if fusion energy comes online decades from now, the electricity price achievable even under the most optimistic scenario — where all currently envisioned technologies succeed — is expected to be roughly on par with existing nuclear plants. We are not heading toward a world where electricity prices approach zero. Prime Minister Takaichi stated her strong opposition to "covering Japan's beautiful landscape with foreign-made solar panels" and called for a thorough "housecleaning" of renewable energy subsidy schemes. Alongside this, she indicated support for the development and deployment of perovskite solar cells, but the dilemma remains: even if domestically produced, expensive panels would ultimately expand the burden on electricity consumers. The primary factor behind defeat in competition with China is neither labor costs nor managerial efficiency — it is the highly predictable demand artificially created by policy. Chinese companies can sustain a game of chicken until private-sector competitors from democratic nations are forced to withdraw, then "wait for their moment" to recover losses after rivals exit the market. It is the decarbonization policies of advanced economies that have sustained the viability of business models that disregard the cost of capital. The U.S. policy shift will dissolve this artificially engineered predictability and return demand to consumer sovereignty. Calls for domestic production while maintaining decarbonization policy will amount to nothing more than castles in the air.

"The Impact of Surging Electricity Prices"

Koji Nomura

『月刊エネルギーフォーラム』 (エネルギーフォーラム社) ( 10月 ) 2025.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Distorted Market" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2025.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

”The U.S. CO₂ Endangerment Finding Reconsidered and Implications for Japan’s Energy Policy” (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) ( 2153 ) 2025.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has begun moving to rescind the Endangerment Finding (EF), which has classified CO2 as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act. A framework that has defined CO2 as an air pollutant for 16 years since its establishment under the Obama administration is now having its scientific foundations directly challenged under the second Trump administration. EPA Administrator Zeldin emphasized that eliminating the EF would remove what he called a "hidden tax burden" exceeding one trillion dollars on businesses and households. U.S. electricity generation relied on coal-fired power for nearly half its supply in the late 2000s, but that share has since fallen to roughly 16%. This decline reflects the enhanced competitiveness of natural gas driven by the shale gas revolution, the expansion of renewables, and constraints on new coal plant construction imposed by the EF. The decline in power generation demand — which had accounted for 90% of U.S. coal consumption — has substantially depressed domestic coal prices. Transportation bottlenecks from inland producing regions to coastal export terminals have prevented that coal from being redirected to export markets, causing it to accumulate domestically and widening the gap between domestic and international prices. Should the rescission of the EF invalidate the conditions previously required for the construction and operation of coal-fired power plants, coal could become cost-competitive with gas-fired generation and may even hold an advantage in certain regions. As demand expands from data centers — whose growth is already accelerating — and from manufacturing reshoring to the United States, coal-fired power could be reassessed as a viable option. Japan has conditioned the continued operation of coal-fired plants on high efficiency standards and the implementation of CCS, hydrogen co-firing, and ammonia co-firing, as it seeks to reconcile its international commitments under the Paris Agreement with domestic energy policy. Price differentials relative to hydrogen and other alternatives are expected to be subsidized for a certain period, but it remains unclear who will bear that cost — and most citizens are likely unaware of the cost increases promised to arrive in two years. The effective electricity price gap between Japan and the United States currently stands at approximately 2:1, widening to 2.2:1 across total final energy consumption (FEC). If Japan maintains its current policies and imposes additional burdens on coal-consuming industries, while the United States eliminates CO2 compliance costs for coal-fired generation and coal's share of power generation recovers by five percentage points, the price gap would exceed 2.3:1 for electricity and 2.8:1 for FEC. Under such pricing conditions, industrial hollowing-out in Japan would become increasingly difficult to avoid. The Japanese government has positioned the "3E+S" framework as the foundation of its energy policy, yet has placed excessive weight on CO2 emissions reduction while giving insufficient consideration to economic viability. The narrative that "failure to decarbonize will lead to a loss of competitiveness" is widely repeated, but the gap with reality is substantial. Openly debating and executing a policy shift — as the United States is doing — would entail significant political costs in Japan. Nevertheless, at a minimum, suspending current regulations on coal-fired power would represent a rational course of action. With the consumer price index rising more than 3% year-on-year, deferring decarbonization could be expected to deliver a suppressive effect of roughly one percentage point on inflation over the medium to long term.

"Asia–Japan Growth Co-Creation: Challenges of Productivity Enhancement and Institutional Responsiveness" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

SBI-FERI Report (SBI Financial and Economic Research Institute) 2025.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work, Lead author

Since the early 21st century, Asian economies have sustained high growth, while Japan has remained in a prolonged low-growth phase. This report discusses long-term productivity improvements across Asia and the institutional vulnerabilities revealed during the pandemic. For South and Southeast Asian economies with high growth potential, building institutional foundations will be essential to make use of the demographic dividend over the next 15–25 years. The expanding income effect presents Japan with a valuable opportunity for renewed growth. Growth co-creation will be achieved not through abstract frameworks, but through strengthened institutional responsiveness.

"Independent Energy Strategy by Non-Governmental Experts, 6th Edition" (in Japanese)

Taishi Sugiyama, Koji Nomura, Yoshioaki Oka, Tomohiko Okano, Koko Kato, Naoki Tatsumi, Hiroshi Tanaka, Naoki Toda, Haruhisa Nakazawa, Tsuruhiko Nambu, Koji Hirai, Satoshi Matsuda, Hitoshi Yakushiin, Ryuzo Yamamoto, Masami Kojima, Tetsuo Sawada, Yoshihiro Muronaka, Masayuki Yamaguchi, and Tadashi Watanabe

2025.09

Internal/External technical report, pre-print, etc., Joint Work

"Productivity Dynamics in the Maldives, 1970–2023: Evidence from SAARC and Fiji Comparisons"

Koji Nomura

(United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) 2025.08

Lecture material (seminar, tutorial, course, lecture, etc.), Single Work

This study examines productivity dynamics in the Maldives from 1970 to 2023 in comparison with SAARC countries and Fiji. Strong TFP growth in the late 1980s was followed by investment-led growth with negative TFP in the 1990s–2000s. Since the 2010s, TFP growth has stagnated near zero, while labor quality has ceased to improve. Despite relatively high per capita GDP, the Maldives shows weak labor productivity performance—above Afghanistan but below Nepal and Pakistan. The economy remains highly vulnerable to external shocks such as the 2005 tsunami, the 2009 global financial crisis, and the 2020 pandemic.

"Exit and Voice" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2025.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

［時評・ウェーブ］「離脱と発言」（野村浩二）
（電気新聞２０２５年８月１５日付・全文転載・出所：日本電気協会新聞部）

　今年６月、日本製鉄はＵＳスチールの買収を完了させた。歴史的な円安・ドル高の環境下、米国内で総額４兆円近い投資と雇用の維持創出を約束し、米政府には拒否権のある黄金株を付与した。日本国内では、「鉄鋼生産拡大はありえない」という橋本英二会長の判断のもと、脱炭素政策を掲げる政府の支援により水素還元製鉄の実証を進め、電炉や自前のＬＮＧ火力発電所を増設するという。トランプ関税の交渉カードを結果的に与えられた石破茂首相は「これから先の日米関係のモデルケースになる」と礼賛した。
　日本では脱炭素化と生産縮小を甘受し、（少なくともトランプ政権下では）脱炭素化が求められない米国では高炉の近代化に自らの時価総額を超えて投資する判断の合理性をどう評価すべきだろう。
　アルバート・Ｏ・ハーシュマンはその古典的名著『離脱・発言・忠誠』において、衰退への応答を分析した。組織に対する不満や国家による誤った政策などへの基本的な反応として、離脱と発言が区分される。離脱（エグジット）とは、不満を抱く組織の構成員が離れたり、企業が海外へと拠点を移転させたりすることである。そして発言（ボイス）とは、構成員や企業が内部から変革を求めて声を上げ、影響を及ぼそうとすることである。
　まず重要な前提は、競争によって効率的な資源配分が実現されるという経済学的な論理の核には、離脱が位置づけられていることである。消費者は品質に満足しなければ別の商品に切り替え、業績の低下した企業は退出を迫られる。市場メカニズムの機能は、離脱に全面的に依存している。
　だが離脱では問題が解決せず、むしろ悪化するケースもある。発言によって改善が可能である（取り返しのつく）場合でも、安易に離脱が選択されれば、発言は駆逐され内部の問題は表面化しない。誤りを正す機会は失われ、非効率性が放置される。
　ハーシュマンはそれを是正する機能として、忠誠という概念を導入した。忠誠（ロイヤリティ）とは、自らの所属する共同体には誤りを正す価値があるとした信念のもと、関与し続ける意志である。それは離脱を抑え発言を促し、衰退を食い止める。とくに自らの発言が効果的だと期待できる大企業には、忠誠に基づく発言が期待される。政府には、真に負担を見通す力などないからである。
　鉄鋼業は脱炭素政策の現実性の欠如を最も熟知する。だが近年の応答は、文字通りの離脱に加え、はるかに高価な水素への値差補填や、グリーン鉄への消費者負担を求める発言であった。こうした発言は、国内の高コスト構造を生じ自らの内需を縮小させ、離脱とともに国内ＣＯ２排出を減少させて脱炭素化の演出に寄与する。離脱と発言はともに日本という共同体の状況を悪化させている。
　ＥＶ熱に偏った政府やマスコミに追従しなかったトヨタの全方位戦略は、ハーシュマン的に制度を健全化させうる最適な応答と評価されよう。共同体への忠誠に基づき、離脱を抑えつつ発言を続け、今年３月には過去最高の営業収益を記録した。
　巨額投資と技術移転の後、米国政治が法制度・契約・規制を通じて資産や技術の実効的支配権を静かに包み込むときが訪れるかもしれない。自らの共同体への忠誠とは、義理ではなく、実利によって長期的に支えられるものである。

"Independent Energy Strategy by Non-Governmental Experts, 5a Edition" (in Japanese)

Taishi Sugiyama, Koji Nomura, Yoshioaki Oka, Tomohiko Okano, Koko Kato, Naoki Tatsumi, Hiroshi Tanaka, Naoki Toda, Haruhisa Nakazawa, Tsuruhiko Nambu, Koji Hirai, Satoshi Matsuda, Ryuzo Yamamoto, Masami Kojima, Tetsuo Sawada, Yoshihiro Muronaka, Masayuki Yamaguchi, and Tadashi Watanabe

2025.07

Internal/External technical report, pre-print, etc., Joint Work

This plan was formulated by a non-governmental group of researchers and practitioners who share a common concern that Japan's current decarbonization-centric energy policy is structurally undermining the nation's security foundations and economic growth. The Japanese government's 7th Strategic Energy Plan, adopted by cabinet decision on February 18, 2025, along with its next-cycle NDC (targeting ▲60% by FY2035 and ▲73% by FY2040 against FY2013 levels), reaffirms the existing decarbonization trajectory without evidence-based justification. This plan is presented as a comprehensive alternative. It advances "Energy Dominance" — the abundant, stable, and affordable supply of energy — as its guiding principle, and calls for a fundamental reorientation of Japanese energy policy toward security and economic growth.
The most significant addition in the 5th edition is the introduction of two new chapters in the current situation section: "I.6. Decarbonization Is Not a Global Trend" and "I.7. The World Is Returning to Low-Carbon Fossil Fuels." These chapters systematically document the dramatic shift in international conditions, including: the inauguration of the Trump administration in January 2025 and the United States' formal re-withdrawal from the Paris Agreement; the de facto repeal of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and a sweeping rollback of fossil fuel development regulations; the UK Conservative Party's declaration of a blank-slate review of its 2050 net-zero target; the rise of the AfD as Germany's second-largest party, reflecting voter backlash against energy cost increases driven by decarbonization policy; and China's continued expansion of coal-fired power capacity. These developments are juxtaposed against Japan's decision to press ahead with GX legislation (amended in May 2025), disregarding international trends.
The proposal retains its eleven-point policy framework: restoring electricity prices to pre-earthquake levels (¥14/kWh for industry; ¥21/kWh for households); raising nuclear power's share to 50% at the earliest opportunity through restarts, life extensions, and new construction; ensuring that CO₂ regulations do not impede the stable use of fossil fuels; halting the large-scale deployment of solar power; avoiding the obstruction of automotive industry growth through premature EV mandates; prioritizing cost reduction over accelerated deployment of fossil-fuel alternatives; abolishing excessive energy-efficiency regulations; returning the electricity sector to a vertically integrated structure; strengthening energy stockpiling and infrastructure defense; eliminating CO₂ aggregate targets and sectoral allocation; and withdrawing from the Paris Agreement in favor of a Japan-U.S.-led "Energy Dominance Agreement." EV-related data has been updated to reflect the latest figures, including Toyota's sales of approximately 10.27 million vehicles in FY2024 (April 2024–March 2025). The nuclear chapter (Section II.2) has been substantially expanded with new discussion of scientific assessment of low-dose radiation risk, the role of emergency scientific advisory groups, uranium resource sustainability, and the knowledge-base function of research institutions.
The electricity system reform sections (Section II.8) — analyzing the structural mechanism by which vertical unbundling leads to chronic underinvestment — are carried forward from the third edition. On the international framework, with U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement now a realized fact under the Trump administration, the proposal's call for Japan to follow suit and co-lead a new "Energy Dominance Agreement" is advanced with a strengthened empirical foundation.

"What is Realistic?" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2025.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Independent Energy Strategy by Non-Governmental Experts, 5th Edition" (in Japanese)

Taishi Sugiyama, Koji Nomura, Yoshioaki Oka, Tomohiko Okano, Koko Kato, Naoki Tatsumi, Hiroshi Tanaka, Naoki Toda, Haruhisa Nakazawa, Tsuruhiko Nambu, Koji Hirai, Satoshi Matsuda, Ryuzo Yamamoto, Masami Kojima, Tetsuo Sawada, Yoshihiro Muronaka, Masayuki Yamaguchi, and Tadashi Watanabe

2025.06

Internal/External technical report, pre-print, etc., Joint Work

"Hashino and Kamaishi: Memories and Revival of Manufacturing" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Column (Research Institute of Capital Formation, Development Bank of Japan) 2025.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

"Decarbonization’s Mirage: Rethinking Corporate Priorities in a Shifting World" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Diamond Online (Diamond Inc.) 2025.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Open Secret" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2025.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Why Japan Must Make a Energy Policy Shift from Ideals to Reality" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Diamond Online (Diamond Inc.) 2025.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

”Another Environmental Regulatory Reform in the U.S. - Revision of TSCA to Balance Industrial Competitiveness” (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) ( 2143 ) 2025.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

While the energy dominance strategy has drawn considerable attention following the launch of the second Trump administration, another wave of environmental regulatory reform is also underway: a review of the operational framework governing the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), the law that regulates chemical substances. The TSCA revision demonstrates the United States' remarkable capacity for self-correction in addressing the universal challenge of reconciling global industrial competitiveness with the maintenance of public trust in safety. The U.S. chemical industry is a driver of innovation, with direct exports alone accounting for 10% of total goods exports. In 2016, under the Obama administration, TSCA underwent a major overhaul. The original law, enacted in 1976, did not require comprehensive risk assessments for existing chemical substances, and the revision reflected a recognition that this had allowed many chemical products to circulate in the market without adequate safety verification. The most significant achievement of the reform was mandating that the EPA conduct risk assessments for both new and existing chemicals, thereby closing the regulatory gaps that had previously existed. However, implementation problems became apparent after the revision. TSCA requires the EPA to complete reviews of new chemical substances within 90 days, yet cases of non-compliance have proliferated. According to the latest report from the American Chemistry Council (ACC), 95% of the 436 new chemical substances currently under review have exceeded the 90-day limit, and 68% have already been pending for more than a year. The ACC warns that the normalization of review delays has accelerated the offshoring of chemical development and production to overseas locations, making the risk of shrinking domestic investment and employment increasingly tangible. When chemical substances produced in countries with less stringent regulations are incorporated into finished goods and imported into the United States, only articles containing specific substances of high concern are subject to regulation. No practical or effective mechanism has been established to prevent this regulatory leakage. The dynamic in which environmental regulations lacking international harmonization disadvantage domestic production while failing to prevent flight abroad mirrors the situation seen with carbon pricing and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Industry is not simply calling for deregulation. The ACC has explicitly endorsed the TSCA reform and is asking for a review process that combines safety assurance with greater transparency and predictability. EPA Administrator Zeldin indicated in March that he was considering measures to accelerate and streamline the review process. An ACC survey found that 65% of Americans agree that modernizing regulations would promote domestic chemical manufacturing, while 74% agree that it is possible to craft practical policies that protect the environment and public health without sacrificing manufacturing jobs and competitiveness. This capacity for institutional self-correction in the United States holds important lessons for Japan. Japan continues to grapple with how to reconcile safety with economic efficiency and growth in the context of its decarbonization and nuclear energy policies. Prioritizing efficiency alone risks leaving future risk management inadequate, while an exclusive focus on safety could see the cost burden expand without limit, significantly impeding economic growth. Alongside rigorous, science-based risk assessment, the pursuit of an internationally harmonized regulatory framework is indispensable to achieving compatibility with industrial development.

"From Urban Wealth to Rural Growth: Redesigning Capital Gains Taxation for Regional Revitalization" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura and Minoru Masujima

SBI-FERI Report (SBI Financial and Economic Research Institute) 2025.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Joint Work, Lead author

首都圏の不動産価格は高騰し多額の含み益が生じているが、地方との価格差が拡大するなか、現行の譲渡所得税制は地方移住の制度的障壁となっている。本稿では、都市部の居住用不動産を売却して地方へ移住する際、譲渡益の80％を控除する新たな税制の導入を提案する。これにより追加の財政負担を伴うことなく、比較的富裕な層の資産・消費・経験を地方に再配分し、地域における「集積の経済」形成の契機とすべきであると主張する。

"Policy-driven Virtual Currency" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2025.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Thirty Years of Empirical Economics at KEO" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Keio Economic Observatory 60th Anniversary (Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University) 2025.03

Other, Single Work

"The Realities of Sluggish Domestic Demand" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2025.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Roundtable Discussion: The Economy and Society in 2040" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

SBI Research Review (SBI Financial and Economic Research Institute) 7 91 - 98 2025.02

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

”Energy Price Level Index - Crisis Level due to Excessive Carbon Neutral Policy” (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2025.02

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

The draft of Japan's 7th Strategic Energy Plan stated that "economically rational measures should be prioritized in order to suppress as much as possible the cost increases associated with decarbonization." However, the most pressing challenge for the Japanese economy is not to limit the extent of further cost increases driven by decarbonization policy, but to reduce energy prices themselves. The gap between domestic and international energy prices, which has widened considerably in recent years, has reached a critical juncture. Calculating a comprehensive energy price differential requires complex computations that depend on differences in industrial structure and energy consumption patterns across countries. A distinctive feature of the recent period of price surges is that it coincided with a significant depreciation of the yen. Converting yen-denominated energy prices into dollar terms at the depreciated exchange rate makes Japanese prices appear relatively low. For this reason, a comparison using the "Real Price Level Index (Real PLI)" — derived by dividing the energy Price Level Index (PLI) by the macro-level PLI for output — is more informative, as it extracts a more stable trend that is independent of exchange rate fluctuations. According to the Energy Cost Monitoring report published in February 2025, Japan's Real PLI for total final energy consumption in the fourth quarter of 2024 is estimated to have risen to 3.0 times that of the United States. This means the price gap has widened by approximately 30% compared to the 2015–19 pre-COVID average of 2.3 times. Looking at electricity alone, Germany and the United Kingdom stand out as particularly expensive; however, when measured by the Real PLI for total final energy consumption, Germany stands at 2.6 times the U.S. level, while the United Kingdom and China are at 2.5 times and France at 2.4 times — all considerably lower than Japan. The rise in domestic oil refining costs, not only the yen-denominated cost of crude oil imports, is also a significant contributing factor. The second Trump administration in the United States has shifted course toward suppressing domestic energy prices through the pursuit of energy dominance. Should Japan proceed with implementing the 7th Strategic Energy Plan on the foundation of its decarbonization policies, a further widening of the domestic-international price gap would be inevitable. In Germany, the acceleration of decarbonization policy from the latter half of the 2010s onward began to erode domestic production in energy-intensive manufacturing industries, with the phase-out of nuclear power and coal further driving up prices and contributing to industrial hollowing-out. For 2023–24, two consecutive years of negative growth appear all but certain, and continued downward revisions for 2025 remain a strong possibility. What is critical to understand is that narrowing Japan's domestic-international electricity and energy price gap is fundamentally incompatible with the continuation of nearly all decarbonization policies — with the exception of promoting nuclear power. Unless Japan demonstrates a resolute commitment to reducing real energy prices that have expanded to their highest levels in the postwar era, industrial hollowing-out driven by both price and non-price factors will advance steadily. There is no time to delay the transition away from policies that have lost touch with reality.

"Fruits Without Roots" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2025.02

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Provisional Framework of Bhutan Sectoral Integration and Transformation Economic Model"

Koji Nomura

(United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) 2024.12

Internal/External technical report, pre-print, etc., Single Work

This document presents the provisional framework of the Bhutan Sectoral Integration and Transformation Economic Model (ITEM2025), developed through a joint research initiative between the Royal Government of Bhutan's Ministry of Finance and Keio Economic Observatory at Keio University, funded by UNESCAP. ITEM2025 is designed to project Bhutan's economic structure for 2029 — the final year of the 13th Five Year Plan — with two primary policy goals: doubling per capita real GDP and quadrupling the income of the bottom 40% relative to 2022 levels. The model is built upon a highly disaggregated Augmented Input-Output Table (AIOT) encompassing 302 products/industries, 462 labor categories, 46 asset types, and 60 trading partner countries. Policy evaluation proceeds in three stages: Business as Usual baseline, individual assessment of 196 policy scenarios, and comprehensive general equilibrium analysis. The framework integrates detailed income distribution data to track structural transformation and its distributional effects across socio-demographic groups.

"Ghosts of Pseudoscience" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2024.12

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Energy and Economy: Bridging Engineering Solutions and Social Issues" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

AICE Seminar Series (The Research association of Automotive Internal Combustion Engines) 2024.11

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"The Light and Shadow of Empiricism" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2024.11

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

”Japan and Germany's “Subsidy-Drenched” Policies - The Japanese Media's Obedience to Government-Private Sector Policy Coordination” (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2024.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

I was struck by the appearance in the Nikkei Shimbun this past September of an article titled "Decarbonization: Action Over Argument." A posture that demands action while dismissing the need for economic reasoning is not the role one should expect of the media. Decarbonization technologies remain expensive, and as long as no institutional framework exists to ensure that major nations compete on a level playing field in bearing the costs of emissions reduction, "action over argument" risks inflicting serious damage on the economy and society. The risks are already materializing. Energy-intensive industries in Japan and Germany have experienced a rapid production decline of as much as 20% in the years since their post-pandemic recovery. China, by contrast, has expanded production by more than 20%. It is the divergence in competitive conditions driven by differing energy policies across nations, and the gap between domestic and international energy prices, that has brought about the decline of Japan and Germany and the rise of China — a dynamic that has in fact led to an increase in global CO2 emissions. While the expansion of profits in Japan's steel industry owes much to the external windfall of a historically weak yen, Japanese companies have tended to underestimate that good fortune, and with little sense of urgency, are pressing ahead with decarbonization policies. The concept of the "wicked problem," first categorized half a century ago, describes challenges for which it is extraordinarily difficult to approach a solution, and where a remedy believed to be correct may prove counterproductive. Contemporary decarbonization is a textbook example. When confronting problems of this nature, the media and researchers must grasp how policies are reshaping the economic and social landscape, and must never stop questioning the legitimacy of the policy instruments being employed. Professor Takenori Inoki once observed that Japan's media had long been inclined to "avoid analyzing and debating highly sophisticated and complex issues," and presciently warned that this tendency "becomes particularly problematic when internationally contested disputes arise." In the author's experience, the media have moved beyond merely avoiding analytical debate on the complex issue of decarbonization to actively avoiding engagement with its underlying economic logic altogether. Clemens Fuest, chief economist at Germany's Die Welt, has argued that the spiral of interventions by Federal Economy Minister Habeck has done nothing to produce a "green economic miracle" and has continued to weaken the German economy. He criticized a system in which, rather than the most innovative companies being recognized in the marketplace, it is those with the most effective lobbying that win subsidies and support — warning that such a path would send "Germany plummeting into an industrial museum." Japan's steel industry, too, while well aware of the difficulties of decarbonization, appears to have increasingly engaged in activity that closely resembles sophisticated lobbying. The government, for its part, dispenses large subsidies while staging the appearance of on-track domestic emissions reductions and a successful green transformation — indefinitely shelving industrial hollowing-out as a perennial concern to be revisited later. This collective shortsightedness — in which government and industry move in lockstep while the media offers uncritical acquiescence — will delay the necessary course correction and allow long-term economic damage to compound to an enormous scale.

"Coal-fueled Stove" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2024.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Improving Energy Productivity”, Approaches to the Realities (Part I) (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

PwC Dialogue Column 2024.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

具体的な数値を伴ったデータが“エビデンス”として示されると、示された側は、それを疑うことなしに受け入れがちです。しかし、その内容や、一緒に伝えられた解釈は本当に“正しい”ものなのでしょうか。ゲストにお招きした慶應義塾大学産業研究所所長の野村浩二教授は、「“エビデンス”を健全に疑う」姿勢が大切だと指摘します。専門分野の1つである「エネルギー生産性の改善をどう捉えるか」というテーマの対談を通じて、その作法の一端を披露していただきました。聞き手はPwCコンサルティングの片岡剛士チーフエコノミスト、モデレーターはPwCコンサルティングのシニアエコノミスト伊藤篤が務めました。

Improving Energy Productivity”, Approaches to the Realities (Part II) (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

PwC Dialogue Column 2024.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

「エネルギー生産性の改善をどう捉えるか」をテーマに、慶應義塾大学産業研究所所長の野村浩二教授をゲストに迎えた対談の後編です。前編で野村教授は、規制などを通じた過度な省エネを推進すると、国内の産業空洞化を招く可能性に言及し、それが既に起こり始めていると指摘しました。後半では、鉄鋼業で実際に起きている現象をベースに、経済成長とエネルギー改善の在り方について、より視野を広げて考えます。また、政府の統計について深い知見を有する野村教授に、政策立案の潮流となっているEBPM（エビデンス・ベースト・ポリシー・メイキング＝証拠に基づく政策立案）の導入に伴い、統計作成の現場で起きている変化についても伺いました。

" 'Kodama' and 'Nozomi' " (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2024.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Japanese-German Decline in Energy-Intensive Industries and Chinese Expansion" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

(International Environment and Economy Institute) 2024.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

”China's "New Three" Overproduction: Will Big Government Industrial Policy Collapse?” (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2024.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

The world is watching closely as China's economic growth slows. The growth rate shown in official statistics reflects only a modest deceleration of roughly one percentage point annually compared to the pre-pandemic period, but the inventory adjustment in the real estate market is considerably more severe. Revenue from land-use rights sales, which had underpinned approximately 40% of local government income, has declined amid the slump in the property market, placing mounting pressure on public finances. Secondhand housing prices fell more than 10% between mid-2021 and end-2023, and the success or failure of the government's efforts to stem the bleeding is being closely watched. To compensate for weak domestic demand with external demand, the Chinese economy has launched into aggressive price competition, sharply cutting export prices. China's greatest hopes are pinned on what are called the "New Three" — solar cells, lithium-ion batteries, and electric vehicles — which by end-2023 had grown to account for nearly half the export value of the old "Big Three" (home appliances, furniture, and apparel). When excessive price competition rooted in China's overcapacity began to take hold, it was government-created demand in advanced economies — driven by deliberate policy choices — that came to the rescue of Chinese producers. Back in 2012, Japan's Feed-in Tariff (FIT) law played that role. At the time, proponents of renewable energy promotion in Japan argued that the policy would nurture domestic industry and drive down prices; instead, the domestic content rate collapsed and import prices rose by roughly 20%. This served as a lifeline for Chinese manufacturers, with losses incurred through fierce price competition later recouped after competitors withdrew from the market. The Netherlands also became a savior by rapidly expanding its solar power share to 14% by 2022, but that feast came to an end by late 2023, and solar cell export values have since fallen to half their peak. Tokyo is reportedly set to introduce mandatory residential solar panel installation from next fiscal year, but with human rights concerns surrounding Chinese production now attracting international scrutiny, a savior may not appear again. Since the pandemic, China has rapidly expanded exports of lithium-ion batteries and electric vehicles. In May of this year, the Biden administration announced a 100% tariff on EVs imported from China, and in June the European Commission indicated it would impose additional tariffs of 17.4–38.1% on top of the standard 10% automotive tariff. For Chinese companies that had been pressing hard on the accelerator over the past few years, this sudden braking by the West will come as a severe blow. If the world tolerates the costs of protectionism for some time, it is China whose growth model faces collapse. What sustained China's remarkable rise over the past quarter century as the world's factory was the pursuit, in Europe and Japan, of an apparent decoupling of economic growth from CO2 emissions. This approach in fact led to an increase in global CO2 emissions, yet decarbonization policies accelerated without reflection, continuously placing green demand before Chinese government and enterprises. Should what had seemed a highly predictable opportunity prove to be a mirage, excess assets in manufacturing — on top of those in real estate — would become pronounced, and the growth model that has defined the past twenty-five years would suffer devastating damage.

"Quiet Industrial Decline" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2024.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"GX (Green Transformation) and the Japanese Economy in 2040" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

SBI-FERI Report (SBI Financial and Economic Research Institute) 2024.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

"Independent Energy Strategy by Non-Governmental Experts (4th Edition)" (in Japanese)

Taishi Sugiyama, Koji Nomura, Yoshioaki Oka, Tomohiko Okano, Koko Kato, Naoki Toda, Haruhisa Nakazawa, Tsuruhiko Nambu, Koji Hirai, Satoshi Matsuda, Ryuzo Yamamoto, Masami Kojima, Tetsuo Sawada, Hiroshi Tanaka, Yoshihiro Muronaka, Masayuki Yamaguchi, and Tadashi Watanabe

2024.06

Internal/External technical report, pre-print, etc., Joint Work

This policy proposal was formulated by a non-governmental group of researchers and practitioners who share a common concern that Japan's current decarbonization-centric energy policy is structurally undermining the nation's security foundations and economic growth. As 2024 marks the year in which Japan's 7th Strategic Energy Plan is to be formulated, the proposal warns that the government's drive to further intensify decarbonization under the banner of GX (Green Transformation) — without evidence-based justification — risks compounding existing policy failures. Advancing "Energy Dominance," defined as the abundant, stable, and affordable supply of energy, as its guiding principle, this non-governmental proposal offers a comprehensive alternative to the official planning process.
The fourth edition incorporates updated figures and expanded analysis reflecting the latest domestic and international developments as of May–June 2024. On the international EV policy front, the edition details the plateauing of EV sales in North American and European markets, the wave of production adjustments by major Western automakers, survey data showing that 85% of global consumers still prefer internal combustion engine vehicles, and the surging worldwide demand for hybrid vehicles in which Japan holds a decisive competitive advantage. On the domestic energy cost front, updated statistics illustrate that the cumulative burden of renewable energy surcharges and GX-related levies on households and industry remains at elevated levels in 2024, with no meaningful relief in sight.
The proposal is organized around eleven policy recommendations. First, electricity prices should be restored to pre-Great East Japan Earthquake levels (¥14/kWh for industry; ¥21/kWh for households), accompanied by the abolition or reduction of energy taxes and surcharges. Second, nuclear power's share of total generation should be raised to 50% at the earliest opportunity through restarts, life extensions, and new construction. Third, the stable use of fossil fuels must not be impeded by CO₂ regulations. Fourth, the large-scale deployment of solar power — beset by human rights concerns, poor economics, and disaster safety risks — should be halted immediately. Fifth, the premature promotion of EVs, which threatens Japan's automotive industry as a pillar of the national economy, should not be adopted as policy. Items six through ten call for prioritizing cost reduction over accelerated deployment of fossil-fuel alternatives, abolishing excessive energy-efficiency regulations, returning the electricity sector to a vertically integrated structure, reinforcing energy stockpiling and infrastructure defense, and eliminating CO₂ aggregate emission targets and sector-level allocation.
The electricity system reform sections introduced in the third edition (Section II.8), including "II.8.1. Pre-Earthquake Electric Power System Reform" and "II.8.2. Post-Earthquake Electric Power System Reform," are further developed with reference to the latest statistical evidence, deepening the analysis of how vertical unbundling has eliminated long-term supply obligations and structurally suppressed investment. On the international front, the proposal advocates withdrawal from the Paris Agreement — judged to be deadlocked by unachievable targets and a North-South divide — and calls for the establishment of a Japan-U.S.-led "Energy Dominance Agreement." By maintaining the stable utilization of fossil fuels free from binding aggregate emissions constraints, the proposal argues that Japan can avert industrial hollowing-out and pursue the fundamental policy transformation necessary to rebuild a resilient and prosperous national economy.

"Growing Adoption Rates of ICT Have Counterbalanced the Productivity Slowdown in Advanced Economies"

Mun S. Ho, Koji Nomura, and Jon D. Samuels

VoxEU 2024.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Joint Work

This column by Ho, Nomura, and Samuels examines the industry-level sources of economic growth in the US and Japan from 1955 to 2019 using detailed growth accounting. Two key findings emerge. First, the slowdown in TFP growth within the computer sector — which includes semiconductors and communications equipment — accounts for a substantial portion of the aggregate productivity deceleration in both countries since the mid-2000s, despite the sector representing less than 2.3% of total value added. Second, and more novel, productivity gains in ICT reduce the cost of ICT capital across all industries that adopt it. This "cost-of-capital" effect has grown steadily since the mid-1990s, partially offsetting the direct productivity slowdown. As ICT adoption spreads far more widely than ICT production, the aggregate economic gains from diffusion may already outpace standard measured contributions of ICT to productivity growth.

"How to Evaluate Industry Competitiveness?" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2024.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"The Seventh Basic Energy Plan by non-governmental volunteers (3rd-a Edition)" (in Japanese)

Taishi Sugiyama, Koji Nomura, Yoshioaki Oka, Tomohiko Okano, Koko Kato, Naoki Toda, Haruhisa Nakazawa, Tsuruhiko Nambu, Koji Hirai, Ryuzo Yamamoto, Masami Kojima, Tetsuo Sawada, Hiroshi Tanaka, Yoshihiro Muronaka, Masayuki Yamaguchi, and Tadashi Watanabe

2024.05

Internal/External technical report, pre-print, etc., Joint Work

"Recommendation for Non-Division of Labor" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2024.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

”GX Strategy Treading on Thin Ice” (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2024.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

The Green Recovery, heralded as the path to economic revival from the pandemic, has yielded hollow results. Energy consumption that fell during lockdowns recovered to pre-pandemic levels within roughly a year in the United States and South Korea, and in China it returned to its prior growth trajectory within just a few months. Energy transition is a long-term process requiring structural transformation of the economy, and it was entirely foreseeable that demanding unnecessary pain during a period of severe recovery would prove untenable. On the path toward energy transition, no country can sustain policies that cause energy prices to surge or undermine stable supply through the cost increases and regulations that the transition entails. The concern is significant precisely because energy transition is not underpinned by genuine "real demand." Even where some private companies seek to identify growth opportunities, every one of those opportunities depends on "government-created demand" manufactured by policy. With EVs, as that policy support has faded, what is emerging is the considerably leaner reality of actual underlying demand. Beyond the difficulty of realizing policies unsupported by real demand, the coherence between ends and means must also be interrogated. Under the current international framework — the Paris Agreement — which leaves enormous variation across countries, the efforts of advanced economies are more likely than not to prove counterproductive for global emissions reduction. Carbon leakage, whereby production simply shifts to China, India, and ASEAN nations with lower reduction targets, causing global emissions to increase rather than fall, is not a theoretical possibility but a robust empirical reality observed across the quarter century since the Kyoto conference. Japan's GX (Green Transformation) is a several-fold inflation of the fantasy of achieving green growth through a 25% emissions reduction that was once promoted under the Democratic Party administration — the largest policy folly in postwar Japanese economic history, constructed without technological or economic evidence. Policymakers have been absorbed in mapping a path toward energy transition through cost-minimization modeling, yet the shape of the "minimized" cost increases is never actually shown, and what is offered is pseudo-evidence that averts its gaze from the very feasibility of the exercise. The question that truly needs to be asked is not how to minimize costs subject to emissions constraints while holding output constant, but rather how the constraint of transition itself affects production. Over the past thirty years, the Japanese economy has fallen far behind the U.S. economy in terms of economic efficiency. To follow the United States even in turns when it is pursuing inefficient resource allocation would be nothing short of negligence. In the author's view, the further pursuit of inefficient policies in Germany and Japan — particularly in energy-intensive industries — is likely to exert a substantial effect in drawing production back to the United States, and this dynamic risks causing the U.S. to overestimate the policy effects of the IRA. Like a silken cord slowly tightening around the throat, the harms of GX are difficult to see. Along that path, close attention should be paid to indicators that can be observed continuously and in near real time and that are comparable across major economies. At the end of March this year, we published an Energy Cost Monitoring (ECM) report providing preliminary estimates of the real energy cost burden across eight countries: Japan, the United States, China, South Korea, Germany, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. Going forward, we intend to build an evidence base that captures both the international disparity in real cost burdens and the latest production trends in energy-intensive industries — which serve as a litmus test for the harmful effects of policy.

"The Seventh Basic Energy Plan by non-governmental volunteers (3rd Edition)" (in Japanese)

2024.04

Internal/External technical report, pre-print, etc., Joint Work

"The Seventh Basic Energy Plan by non-governmental volunteers (2nd Edition)" (in Japanese)

Taishi Sugiyama, Koji Nomura, Yoshioaki Oka, Tomohiko Okano, Koko Kato, Haruhisa Nakazawa, Tsuruhiko Nambu, Koji Hirai, Ryuzo Yamamoto, Masami Kojima, Hiroshi Tanaka, Yoshihiro Muronaka, Masayuki Yamaguchi, and Tadashi Watanabe

2024.04

Internal/External technical report, pre-print, etc., Joint Work

"Energy-Intensive Industries Must not be Driven out of the Country" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

(International Environment and Economy Institute) 2024.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Decarbonization and Carbon Taxes" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2024.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"The Seventh Basic Energy Plan by non-governmental volunteers (1st Edition)" (in Japanese)

Taishi Sugiyama, Koji Nomura, Yoshioaki Oka, Tomohiko Okano, Koko Kato, Haruhisa Nakazawa, Tsuruhiko Nambu, Hiroshi Tanaka, and Masayuki Yamaguchi

2024.02

Internal/External technical report, pre-print, etc., Joint Work

"Old Man of India" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2024.01

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

”A Quarter Century of Sluggish Electricity Demand of Japan's Economy” (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2024.01

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Last December, Kansai Electric Power announced the cancellation of a planned LNG-fired power plant (rated output: 3.7 million kW) in Wakayama City, booking a special loss of as much as 120 billion yen. This business decision, which cited sluggish demand as one factor, carries a weight that cannot be dismissed simply as a "decarbonization shift." What brought about that demand stagnation, and will it persist into the future? At the root of stagnating electricity demand lies the stagnation of domestic production — driven by declining exports of finished goods and the expanding importation of electricity-intensive intermediate goods. And the change in those underlying conditions is itself a consequence of the energy and environmental policies pursued to date. A negative spiral may be at work. The pursuit of policies focused on the superficial outcome of reducing energy consumption has contributed to the hollowing-out of domestic industry; as businesses adapt, power supply plans are revised downward. This compounds the risk of undermining stable supply, discourages domestic investment, and as the introduction of capital embodying new technologies is delayed, industry steadily loses competitiveness. The search for the causes of demand stagnation also overlaps with the task of evaluating the divergence between past demand forecasts and actual outcomes. In the late 1990s, following the Kyoto Conference (COP3), computable general equilibrium models for energy analysis were used in electricity supply-demand projections. Actual electricity demand during the first commitment period (2008–12) came in slightly above the model estimates, but that relationship reversed in the 2010s. Government projections reverted to bottom-up models, into which ambitious energy-saving targets were continually embedded, yet realized figures fell short of and then declined below forecasts. This suggests that structural changes not captured by the models were at work in the real economy. The structural change that unfolded over the past quarter century and became particularly visible from the early 2010s onward was the offshore migration of electricity-intensive goods production. As opportunities to introduce economically justified energy-saving technologies became increasingly limited, policies demanding emissions reductions with little technological foundation were tightened, and companies were quietly compelled to shift domestic production overseas. It would be a mistake to resign oneself to the inevitability of future electricity demand stagnation in a society with a declining population. The global economy has sustained growth of 2–3%, and while the fall of wages for homogeneous labor to half U.S. levels reflects a failure of Japanese economic policy, it also means Japan has accumulated considerable untapped growth potential. Japan should pursue the revival of its manufacturing sector and an expansion of exports while sustaining a weak yen environment; affordable and stable electricity supply is the foundation for doing so. There are also numerous technology-driven sources of demand growth, including digitalization and the spread of generative AI. With decarbonization as a goal sharpened in isolation — without adequate technological foundations or effective international institutional design in place — economies that have moved ahead with low-carbonization have stagnated, while economies outside that effort have expanded and global emissions have risen. This failure has been repeated. The Japanese government congratulates itself on keeping emissions reductions toward carbon neutrality on track as a policy achievement, but it is nothing more than the byproduct of Japan having recorded the weakest economic growth among advanced economies.

"1,000 Trillion Yen in Credit" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2023.12

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

[Commentary / Wave] “¥1,000 Trillion of Implicit Credit to Electricity”
(English translation of an article published in The Denki Shimbun, December 12, 2023)

Professor Tsuruhiko Nambu, an economist who has studied public utilities for over half a century, emphasizes the role of electricity as a platform on which transactions take place. By simply accessing an outlet, users can obtain services anytime and anywhere. Capital goods and durable consumption goods that rely on electricity are purchased under the implicit assumption that this platform is continuously available and reliable.

In inter-firm transactions, it is common for there to be a time lag between delivery and payment. Such transactions inherently involve the risk of non-payment. The provision of goods and services can therefore be interpreted as an extension of credit to the counterparty. Bank lending is, of course, another form of credit. By the same logic, the acquisition of electricity-dependent assets can be viewed as an implicit extension of credit to electricity providers.

If money loses credibility, it is sold off, depreciates, and demand shifts toward real assets such as gold or real estate. If the electricity platform loses credibility, firms will seek cheaper and more stable alternatives—relocating production abroad or substituting imports for electricity-intensive goods. Firms unable to do so will be forced into costly self-provision, such as on-site generation or battery storage. The resulting loss of production opportunities and misallocation of resources would inevitably lead to prolonged economic stagnation.

Many assets accumulated today would become entirely inoperable without electricity, while others would suffer partial dysfunction. Infrastructure such as highways and ports would also face operational constraints. Inventory assets, including refrigerated raw materials and products, would lose their value. Dependence on electricity is not limited to tangible assets; it is even more pronounced in intangible assets, which have expanded rapidly over the past quarter century.

Although it is neither practical nor feasible to directly measure the scale of credit extended to electricity through surveys or experiments, one can approximate its magnitude using highly disaggregated capital stock statistics. Based on the author’s capital database, which distinguishes over 170 asset categories, the present value of assets held under the assumption of reliable electricity supply amounts to approximately ¥1,000 trillion.

In other words, the Japanese economy currently embodies roughly ¥1,000 trillion of implicit credit to electricity. In manufacturing, which accounts for 23% of this total, around 80% of fixed asset value (excluding land) depends on the availability of electricity. In services, the corresponding figure is 67%. Household-owned assets represent 12% of the total electricity-related credit, with 35% of their value reliant on electricity. Even in non-industrial infrastructure, around 30% would suffer some degree of functional impairment in the absence of electricity.

Historically, the management of this implicit credit has been entrusted to private utilities under a cost-of-service regulatory framework. Ongoing liberalization policies have sought to unbundle the values traditionally delivered as a package—such as reliability and decarbonization—and to create separate “markets” for each. Emerging distortions have been addressed in an ad hoc manner. Given the enormous scale of implicit credit, however, private operators may exploit institutional gaps to earn profits exceeding socially appropriate levels. The fundamental role of electricity as a public utility is once again being called into question.

Government policies are also constraining asset utilization through stricter energy efficiency regulations. While new products may benefit from technological improvements, opportunities for efficiency gains in existing assets are limited. If policies—such as energy-saving mandates or renewable energy requirements lacking sufficient technological grounding—effectively restrict the operation of existing assets, the risks embedded in this vast stock of implicit credit will materialize. Policies that undermine ¥1,000 trillion of implicit credit are eroding investment demand and weakening the engine of productivity growth in the Japanese economy.

"Early modern metalwork" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2023.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

”Increased Risks to Energy Security due to Restrained Electricity Price Increases” (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2023.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Japan has been unable to chart an exit strategy from its price subsidies on fuel and electricity. While the original rationale of cushioning against sudden price shocks is already fading, criticism is mounting that prolonged subsidies are distorting the price mechanism. According to estimates by the authors' ECM, total consumer spending even after subsidies is projected to increase by as much as 11 trillion yen from pre-COVID 2019 levels, and when indirect burdens are included, the total increase reaches 16 trillion yen compared to before the pandemic. The global push for net-zero policy is keeping the underlying trend of energy prices elevated. Singapore's per capita GDP exceeded 80,000 dollars last year, reaching 2.4 times that of Japan. To summarize Singapore's approach to low-carbon transition: it has achieved decarbonization by shifting its power mix heavily toward natural gas, without suppressing domestic investment by energy-intensive manufacturing industries and without inducing excessive energy conservation. In 2000, roughly 80% of its electricity generation relied on oil-fired power; over the following twenty years, it raised its dependence on gas-fired generation to 95%. The key difference from Japan lies in the fact that Singapore Power (SP), the state-owned utility, has not been compelled to suppress cost pass-through. Despite average import prices last year being 2.1 times the 2019 level — a more severe hit than Japan experienced at 1.7 times — SP Group recorded revenues of approximately 700 billion yen (in yen terms) last year. The surge in fuel prices was passed through to electricity prices in full. A second difference is that the government has made a forthright public case for the rationality of cost pass-through and the importance of setting electricity prices correctly. Government support was limited to low- and middle-income households, with a monthly rebate of just under 10,000 yen provided to offset utility bill increases. What matters more than temporarily suppressing consumer prices is maintaining stable supply and preserving the financial resilience needed for the long-term journey to net zero. Korea Electric Power recorded a substantial loss again in the second quarter of this year, marking nine consecutive quarters of losses. Japanese utilities have also begun passing through costs, albeit with a lag, but were forced to absorb large losses in the previous fiscal year. Through the assessment of regulated tariffs and government intervention in capacity markets, utilities have found it increasingly difficult to earn legitimate returns commensurate with their costs, and there are voices saying that investment in domestic thermal power generation is no longer viable. But this is not a problem of input prices — it is a distortion caused by the suppression of output prices. Healthy cost pass-through is what encourages investment and is itself a source of the demand that has driven global fossil fuel prices higher. The inability to undertake reinvestment in high-efficiency thermal power generation in Japan is not an inevitable consequence of decarbonization or liberalization — it is the result of government intervention to suppress prices. Keeping electricity prices in check should be a cornerstone of achieving the optimal energy mix, but if that goal is papered over in the short term through price subsidies, underinvestment becomes inevitable. This raises the risk to stable supply and erodes the private sector's financial capacity to pursue the energy transition. The sustainability of global net-zero policy is not assured either. The role of the private sector — which is capable of responding flexibly to changes in the market environment and advances in technology — must not be constrained.

"24-month price escalation" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2023.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Roots of income generation" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2023.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

”German Companies are Moving Production Abroad" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2023.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

The surge in energy prices in 2021–22 left deep scars on the global economy. In response to the energy security risks that materialized, major economies are exploring divergent paths of adaptation. While some countries have shifted toward expanding the use of nuclear power, Germany — having already phased out nuclear — is seeking a way forward through further promotion of renewables and energy efficiency. Companies, meanwhile, are being compelled to reassess their global production configurations as they watch closely the policy directions of various countries toward net zero. Germany, under the banner of "Efficiency First," has introduced further energy-saving measures through its Buildings Energy Act. Heating systems newly installed from January 2024 onward are required to operate on at least 65% renewable energy, and existing fossil fuel-based heating systems are to be banned from operation by 2045. These heavy-handed policies have caused various disruptions in the market, and forecasts that unretrofitted properties could lose value have already begun to manifest as downward pressure on housing prices. Vonovia, Germany's largest real estate company, has placed climate protection as its top priority, yet was compelled to sell 560 million euros worth of properties to U.S. investors at a 7% discount in order to raise funds. In the heat pump market, where substantial demand growth had been expected, reports emerged that Germany's Viessmann sold its heat pump division to U.S.-based Carrier Global — prompting widespread concern that history may repeat itself, as it did with solar panels. Major German chemical companies such as BASF are planning to cut thousands of domestic jobs while shifting investment abroad, as future energy supplies at prices comparable to what was once paid for Russian pipeline gas can no longer be anticipated. The retreat from domestic production is not confined to multinational corporations. A survey by the Federation of German Industries (BDI) found that 16% of responding companies have already taken concrete steps to relocate part of their production and employment outside Germany, with a further 30% having plans to do so. The German government is considering substantial price subsidies to suppress industrial electricity prices, but the more fundamental problem lies in the incompatibility with climate policy, which is driving up the cost of CO2 emissions. The harms of imposing disproportionate burdens on specific segments — such as energy efficiency measures and renewables — beyond internationally harmonized carbon price levels are intensifying. There is also an inherent dilemma: the maintenance and expansion of government-created demand, which has enhanced market predictability, has simultaneously increased the probability of success for China's state-led manufacturing model, further disadvantaging the competitive position of private-sector firms within Germany. The result has not been a triumph of climate policy, but rather a powerful driver of increasing global fossil fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. The failure of carbon leakage that has persisted for a quarter century appears poised to repeat itself. Industrial production data for April of this year shows Germany still mired in prolonged stagnation, running 2.4% below its 2015 level. Japan's stagnation is even more severe, at minus 4.4%. While the attractiveness of domestic production has grown amid de-risking from China and tolerance for a weaker yen, Japanese companies are quietly proceeding with their own adaptation — scaling back domestic production of electricity-intensive goods. What Germany and Japan share is a widening divergence between corporate growth opportunities and macroeconomic growth. If the broader macroeconomy is damaged, the long-term economic burden of net zero will not be accepted.

"Diaspora" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2023.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Questioning the question" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2023.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Price Elasticity of Energy Consumption in the Pandemic Period" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2023.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

The roughly two-year surge in energy prices has entered a brief pause, owing to the price shock mitigation measures for electricity and gas (totaling 3.1 trillion yen) scheduled to run for nine months from meter readings in February 2023. However, this has done no more than suppress the immediate direct burden through subsidies, and the future trajectory of prices remains highly uncertain. International spot prices for natural gas fell sharply from their peak in August of last year, but in Japan — where long-term contracts had helped contain the impact of the price surge — import prices continued rising through January of this year. In Europe as well, with China's full demand recovery anticipated, IEA Executive Director Birol has emphasized that "Europe has not yet emerged from the crisis." The subsidy-based mitigation measures have drawn considerable criticism from economists, who argue that they impede the consumption restraint that rising prices would otherwise achieve. However, such faith in the price mechanism rests on an overestimation of the price elasticity of energy consumption. According to the ECM, the comprehensive price of final energy consumption rose by 71% from January 2021 through January of this year, just before the mitigation measures took effect. Over that same period of more than two years, energy consumption barely changed, placing the elasticity close to zero. Even restricting the analysis to the post-2022 period of declining consumption, and applying a generous estimate, the price elasticity comes to no more than 0.24. The experience of the historically unprecedented price surge in recent years would suggest that the price elasticity of energy consumption has indeed been low. Model-based assessments that continue to offer optimistic scenarios in which the energy transition can proceed at low cost invariably embed overestimates of both price elasticity and technological innovation. The trend in energy consumption during this period divides broadly into two phases: an increase in 2021 and a decline thereafter. The first half strongly reflects the recovery from the pandemic, with consumption returning to pre-pandemic levels by end-2021. At the time, Green Recovery was proclaimed with almost no supporting evidence, but the reality was nothing more than a return to the pre-COVID trajectory. While the measured price elasticity is low, its interpretation also warrants care. The first concern is that it fails to capture the negative externalities produced by consumption restraint. Real-world reductions in consumption may be achieved at a non-monetary cost: in areas lacking alternative means of transportation, reduced energy use may constrain how people spend their leisure time, and the increased financial burden may be suppressing spending on education. Over the medium to long term, adverse effects on health, schooling, and employment may follow. The second concern is that price elasticity estimates incorporate the effect of offshoring electricity-intensive production. Carbon neutrality declared without economically viable means of achieving it depends on expectations of future technological breakthroughs and dramatic cost reductions, and companies — while offering nominal expressions of support — are quietly proceeding with the relocation of electricity-intensive production overseas. In Europe, it is reported that even major German chemical companies are positioning themselves to cut domestic employment and shift investment abroad. The focus of attention is shifting away from the price surge itself toward its medium- and long-term consequences.

"Entangled Thread" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2023.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"A Priori Self-respect" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2023.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Loopholes That Cannot be Closed" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2023.02

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Increased Indirect Electricity Imports - A Factor Leading to Prolonged Economic Stagnation" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2023.01

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Japan's electricity demand peaked at 1.20 trillion kWh in fiscal 2007 and has continued to decline, with fiscal 2022 expected to recover to only around 1.02 trillion kWh. Although real GDP expanded by 3.7% over these fifteen years, electricity consumption has fallen — a trend that might appear to reflect the fruits of conservation efforts by households and businesses. Behind that surface, however, the import ratio of electricity has been expanding. Japan, not connected to any international power grid, has zero direct electricity imports. Yet when Japanese companies scale back domestic production of electricity-intensive intermediate and final goods and switch to imported alternatives, this is effectively the same as importing electricity indirectly. While this may be the cheapest way to import electricity, the reaction it produces is a deflationary force that reduces domestic effective demand. According to estimates of the indirect electricity import dependency (EID) based on input-output tables, Japan's EID as a single-country economy stood at 21.8% in 2015. Japan's EID has undergone two major turning points. From the low teens in the 1960s, EID rose to around 20% in the wake of the two oil shocks, before reversing in 1980 and successfully being brought down to 10.3% by 1995. This achievement is thought to owe much to the trust built through the realization of oil substitution via nuclear power and LNG-fired generation and the dramatic reduction in power outage hours — demonstrating that stable supply could be maintained while containing price increases. From 1995, however, EID turned upward again, retreating by 2018 to 22.8%, back to the levels of the late 1970s.
Of the total decline in electricity demand from peak fiscal 2007 to fiscal 2022, the rise in EID over that period — from 19.2% to 22.8% — is estimated to have inflated the apparent reduction in domestic demand by roughly one third. Taking a longer view, if the fiscal 1995 value — the turning point at which EID resumed its upward trend — is held fixed, the hypothetical demand figure for fiscal 2022 would exceed the actual figure by 0.18 trillion kWh. This suggests that even under the current final demand structure of the Japanese economy, 1.20 trillion kWh of electricity demand would have existed had the import dependency ratio been kept at its 1995 level. The factors behind the renewed rise in EID lie on the supply side. By the 1990s, cheaply available energy-saving technologies were already becoming constrained, and concerns that further energy-saving investment would undermine overall production efficiency had grown substantially. Against this backdrop, the strengthening of domestic measures for energy conservation and emissions reduction, the promotion of renewables leading to higher electricity prices and threats to stable supply — the reaction to these policies compelled companies to adapt by shifting production overseas. It is this dynamic that is likely to have driven the sustained rise in EID. The visible stagnation in electricity demand has tended to be interpreted as the inevitable result of economic downturns or the outcome of conservation efforts. The less visible expansion of indirect electricity imports, however, has emboldened the government to deepen its confidence in further regulatory tightening, while simultaneously serving as a powerful and entrenched deflationary force — draining effective demand and driving Japan's prolonged economic stagnation.

"Deflation Behind Inflation" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2022.12

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Accelerating Justice (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2022.11

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Electricity Burden Grows to 6 Trillion JPY in 2022- Need to Curb Costs to Boost Manufacturing" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2022.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

What is the total cost of electricity in Japan today? Distinguishing between the electricity sector as an "industry" and electricity as a "product" has become increasingly difficult due to the diversification of utilities and the expansion of new-entrant suppliers and self-generation, making it harder even for electricity businesses to see clearly the burden being borne by the national economy as a whole. Along the path of long-term energy transition, close attention must be paid to the energy cost burden along that route. If the accelerator is pressed on inefficient decarbonization policy while cost increases remain difficult to see, the high-cost structure that would emerge in a few years' time could become a heavy drag on the Japanese economy. With this problem in mind, the author's research group has been constructing an Energy Cost Monitoring (ECM) framework since April of this year. The latest ECM captures conditions through August of this year. Total electricity consumption in August exceeded the same period of the previous year by 2.2% as recovery from the pandemic continued, but its cost increased by as much as 37%. A simple projection assuming that August price levels persist through December of this year estimates that the total electricity expenditure for calendar year 2022 will be approximately 6 trillion yen higher than the previous year. Total electricity consumption expenditure is expected to reach 24.2 trillion yen, far surpassing the previous peak in the Japanese economy of 19.8 trillion yen recorded in 2014. The pass-through of primary energy price increases caused by the invasion of Ukraine to retail electricity prices has yet to be fully reflected, and the projected year-on-year increase of 6 trillion yen within this year could even be described as a conservative estimate. A similar simple projection suggests that total final energy consumption expenditure for this year is expected to be 13 trillion yen higher than the previous year's figure of 37.4 trillion yen. The enormous surge in cost burden is a global phenomenon, but it also has characteristics specific to Japan. The rise in household consumption prices in the second quarter of 2022 was 6.7% in the United States and 6.6% in Germany, compared to a relatively contained 2.3% in Japan — but this does not signify the success of price-suppressing policies. Over the same period, the GDP deflator showed 7.6% in the United States and 5.9% in Germany, against minus 0.3% in Japan, with deflationary pressure remaining firmly entrenched. Japanese producers are insufficiently passing through cost increases, and even as the world faces the same rise in energy costs, Japan's real burden is becoming proportionally greater. At the same time, Japan's prolonged deflationary trend has enhanced the competitiveness of macro-level production prices. Under the excessively depreciated yen, the Japanese currency is currently undervalued by as much as 35%, bringing price competitiveness to its strongest level in nearly half a century. Exports rose by approximately 20% year-on-year in August, with the pace of recovery exceeding even the experience of the Abenomics recovery period. While the widening trade deficit is primarily attributable to rising fossil fuel costs, international crude oil prices have been declining since June. For domestic manufacturing recovery to be sustained under the favorable conditions provided by a weak yen, containing future electricity costs will be the crucial test.

Seeking a Desirable Carbon Tax (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2022.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Energy transition and the Challenges for Japan's Economy" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

RIETI Highlight (Fall 2022) (RIETI) 92 24 - 27 2022.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

Inside and outside of the issue (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2022.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Production is a Shura (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2022.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Deflationary pressure in the Japanese economy hidden by global inflation: Energy policy for a return to domestic production (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2022.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Prime Minister Kishida emphasized that "while prices in Europe and the United States are rising by 7–8%, Japan is maintaining an increase of around 2%," but looking at only one facet of a situation may prevent one from recognizing the risks it conceals. Just as Professor Leontief once described economic analysis as "like reconstructing the blueprint of a complex engine," without the ability to imagine how a complex engine actually moves, latent risks go unfelt and prescriptions go wrong. As Professor Summers warned last spring of the risk of an inflationary spiral in the U.S. economy, U.S. CPI over the twelve months through May rose 6.0% even excluding food and energy, with inflation above 4% on this measure persisting for twelve consecutive months. In Japan, meanwhile, CPI has continued to rise by 0.3–0.4% month-on-month since the start of this year, and with the added effect of yen depreciation, concern has grown over the decline in real incomes due to rising import prices. Japan's inflation, however, is a cost-driven phenomenon — stemming from energy resources and the weak yen — and the capacity of demand expansion to drive price increases remains fragile. What matters here is the distinction between two gauges: the CPI (consumption prices) and the GDP deflator (production prices). Taking a restaurant as an example, the price paid at the till is the consumption price, while the production price measures the price of the value added truly created by that restaurant alone, after deducting the cost of raw materials, energy, rent, and similar inputs. The two can at times move in opposite directions. Even if menu prices rise, if the prices of energy and ingredients rise by more, production prices may actually fall. In the first quarter of this year, U.S. consumption prices rose 6.2% year-on-year while production prices rose even further at 6.8%. The price increases themselves are undesirable, but behind them lies strong demand pulling prices upward. In Japan, meanwhile, consumption prices rose 0.5%, while production prices fell by 0.8%. Japanese producers find themselves unable to pass on rising energy and import costs and are compelled to adapt by lowering their own production prices. Even as the world faces the same nominal rise in crude oil prices, the real burden falls more severely on Japan. Yen depreciation carries both harm — in the form of rising import prices — and benefit, by creating room for domestic producers competing with imported goods to raise their prices. Since the Plaza Accord, tolerance for excessive yen appreciation has been a source of deflationary pressure, compelling wage suppression at home; a sustained weak yen has the potential to reverse that tendency and create room for nominal wages to rise. The current excessive yen depreciation represents an ideal opportunity to sell overseas assets and repatriate capital domestically, but the structural reason this is not happening is the absence of an environment that makes returning to domestic production attractive. Demands for energy conservation that go on without end and without technological grounding, the expansion of renewables that makes higher electricity prices inevitable, the erosion of trust in stable electricity supply — the government, captive to a reckless rush toward carbon neutrality, has lost sight of the foundations on which the Japanese economy rests and of the true role of energy policy. It is precisely Japan's energy-intensive manufacturing industries that boast internationally high productivity. Policies that see only one facet of reality are deepening structural challenges.

Technology and Wage Differentials (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2022.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

「日本経済に望ましい持続的円安」

野村浩二・浜田宏一

『正論』 (産経新聞社) 74 - 87 2022.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Joint Work, Lead author, Corresponding author

Monthly RUEC for Japan's Economy (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2022.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

The Japanese Economy's Vulnerability to Rising Energy Prices: What Half a Century of U.S.-Japan Comparisons Reveal (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2022.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work, Lead author, Last author, Corresponding author

France's economy minister described the surge in crude oil and natural gas prices triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine as having an impact comparable to the first oil shock. The erosion of the resilience to oil price surges that had been built up since the oil shocks was already being flagged as a concern more than ten years ago. In 2009, the European Commission sounded the alarm that a sustained rise in "real unit energy costs" (RUEC) had been observed across major economies since the mid-1990s, with the most severe increase found in Japan. Assessing the impact of energy price surges requires evaluating prices inclusive of secondary energy such as electricity, alongside the "real energy price" — the relative price obtained by deflating by the price of domestically produced goods and services. If domestic output is internationally competitive enough to pass higher costs through to production prices, the impact of a nominal energy price increase can be mitigated. Conversely, where energy prices rise due to domestic factors — such as the reckless promotion of renewables regardless of cost — and companies are unable to raise the prices of goods exposed to international competition, the same nominal price increase inflicts far greater damage. In Japan, where deflationary conditions have persisted, the real impact is more severe. A further consideration is energy productivity. In economies where regulations such as the Energy Conservation Act and subsidy programs have driven the adoption of energy-saving equipment beyond what economic rationality would dictate, cheap energy-saving technologies are already saturated, and the scope for adaptive response to price increases is limited. In the United States, by contrast, where energy-saving investment has not been front-loaded, rising prices have rendered previously uneconomical energy-saving technologies viable, helping to cushion the impact. RUEC is an indicator obtained by dividing the real energy price by energy productivity, and as such serves as a composite measure of resilience that captures this information. Throughout the postwar period, Japan has consistently faced energy prices roughly 1.5 to 3 times higher than those in the United States. On the eve of the high-growth era, Japan's total factor productivity was approximately half that of the United States, meaning that similar products had to be priced at roughly half U.S. levels to win demand in the market. What bridged the gap between high input prices and low output prices was cheap labor: at the time, Japan's hourly wages were no more than 20% of U.S. levels. Subsequently, over the half century through 2010, the Japan-U.S. gap in real energy prices narrowed, driven by the convergence of production prices between the two countries during Japan's high-growth years and by corporate efforts to secure stable and affordable energy supply. At the same time, however, this progress dulled awareness of the underlying problem. After the earthquake disaster, electricity prices in Japan rose due to the shutdown of nuclear plants and the promotion of renewables, while the United States benefited from the shale revolution, causing the Japan-U.S. real energy price gap to widen again. As the real price gap expanded, Japan's advantage in energy productivity also narrowed, and the country is now approaching its most vulnerable position in the postwar economy. Promoting energy conservation domestically beyond the bounds of economic rationality will only invite further hollowing-out and economic stagnation. Expanding renewables remains costly relative to providing electricity of equivalent quality. For Japan's energy transition, a narrow transition pathway must be sought — one that raises the overall efficiency of the economy and restrains the widening of the RUEC gap.

Origin of Electricity Demand (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2022.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Prescriptions for the German and Japanese Economies (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2022.01

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Challenges of the Energy Transition in the Japanese Economy (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun (Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun, Ltd) 2021.12

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Will "big government" energy and environmental policies work? (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2021.12

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Prime Minister Kishida's Council for the Realization of a New Form of Capitalism published an "Emergency Proposal" on November 8th. Its defining feature was its fiscal scale: an economic package of 55.7 trillion yen in fiscal expenditure terms — the largest ever — was approved by the Cabinet, and new government bond issuance for fiscal 2021 is expected to exceed 65 trillion yen. The government has made clear its willingness to accept fiscal deficits. More worthy of attention than the distribution strategy is the shift in the foundations of the growth strategy. In June of this year, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry published its "New Directions in Industrial Policy." The new directions call for a transition away from conventional industrial policy aimed at creating favorable market conditions toward a more powerful industrial policy involving "large-scale, long-term, and planned" fiscal mobilization for "market creation" oriented toward solving medium- and long-term challenges. In energy and environmental policy as well, there are signs of a move toward an even larger role for government than before, with the possibility that levies to promote renewables, costs such as building insulation, and even the increase in energy prices themselves may be offset through subsidies. If direct burdens on consumers and producers are avoided, will the public accept further bond issuance? The case for expansionary fiscal policy as a way out of prolonged economic stagnation has been debated since before the pandemic. MMT advocates sustained fiscal deficits and calls for the permanent deferral of debt, while the New View locates the causes of economic stagnation on the supply side and prescribes investment tax cuts and productivity-enhancing infrastructure investment. What is required of the government is a rigorous examination of the content of expansionary fiscal policy and a readiness to reverse course depending on circumstances. Fiscal policy shifts should not be endorsed without thinking through how funding can be secured when economic conditions change. The pandemic generated broad consensus in favor of accepting fiscal deficits, but its durability is questionable. Professor Summers, a central scholar of the New View, sounded early warnings about the scale of the Biden administration's stimulus package out of concern over inflation, and it can now be said that his argument has been entirely vindicated. There is much noise about the world having shifted to expansionary fiscal policy, but its sustainability remains in doubt. Acceptance of fiscal deficits does not amount to endorsement of a "big government" industrial policy. If the government intervenes to create markets, it risks deepening dependence on public procurement and trapping the private sector in a nest of vested interests. The expansion of subsidy dependence has likely been a major factor in the loss of dynamism among Japanese companies over the past twenty years. Government demand creation may offer companies a temporary respite, but it is fragile and fleeting, and there is no shortage of examples where private enterprises have declined in the wake of the feast. If subsidies are wielded as a magic wand in a "big government" energy and environmental policy, they will rigidify corporate asset structures and business models. Energy transition requires a long time horizon and is subject to enormous uncertainty — both in terms of available technologies and the economic environment. No one today knows what an efficient path to decarbonization looks like for Japan. Even in pursuing expansionary fiscal policy, Japan must not forfeit the flexibility that would allow its economy to adapt to technological and environmental changes along the transition path. Against a scattershot approach to policy, the call for "wise spending" rings hollow.

Psaudo Time Travel (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2021.12

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Six-Fold Pain of the Japanese Economy (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2021.11

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Quantity and Quality of Green Jobs - A Weak Foundation for Green Growth Strategies (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2021.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

In June of this year, the "Green Growth Strategy Accompanying Carbon Neutrality" was unveiled. Its projected employment creation effect, measured as a net figure, is stated as 8.7 million jobs in 2030 and 18 million jobs in 2050. With total employment in 2050 estimated at around 50 million, this would mean one in three workers engaged in green jobs — an enormous number. In November of last year, the UK government presented a plan to create 250,000 jobs by 2030. An independent Green Jobs Taskforce was established, and its report was published in July of this year. The report finds that not all current green jobs are good jobs, and sets out fifteen recommendations for creating high-quality green employment. It emphasizes that long-term investment in human capital is indispensable for quality employment, and calls on the government to present a concrete roadmap for the energy transition. The employment creation figures put forward by the Japanese government are far too large. When the author inquired with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry about the assumptions and methodology behind them, the response was that there were "no plans to make them public." Japan's 2030 target is 4.4 times larger than the UK's and 2.7 times larger in GDP terms — and the UK figure is gross, meaning the net figure would be considerably smaller still. A net job creation figure of 8.7 million goes beyond mere ambition and gives the impression of distorting the information base on which policy is formulated. What is needed in the energy transition toward decarbonization is not a performance of stacking up employment numbers, but a problem-finding role that surfaces the real challenges along the transition pathway. The logic by which green investment would raise productivity is nowhere to be seen. Green investment requires more capital than conventional approaches to produce the same level of output, and will almost certainly damage total factor productivity. Unless competing nations are similarly compelled to undergo the same transition, the competitiveness of Japanese industry will decline, and the value generated by workers will inevitably fall. Whether high-quality green jobs can actually be created depends on the internationally harmonized internalization of carbon emission costs — and the international coordination required to achieve this, still far from realization, remains the greatest obstacle. What is required of the government is not "resolute implementation," but flexible thinking under differing conditions.

Relics of the Green Sahara (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2021.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Reckless Policy for Energy Saving (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2021.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Major Policy Changes Needed to Achieve Balance with Economic Growth" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Forum (Energy Forum Inc.) ( 800 ) 22 - 23 2021.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Interview with the Author - Japan's Economic Growth and Energy" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Forum (Energy Forum Inc.) ( 800 ) 126 - 126 2021.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

How are the factors for energy productivity improvement perceived? (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

IEEI (International Environment and Economy Institute) (IEEI: International Environment and Economy Institute) 2021.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Stagnation of TFP Improvement (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2021.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Growing Concerns about the U.S. Inflation Risk (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2021.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

The massive fiscal stimulus deployed to fill the aggregate demand shortfall caused by the pandemic has received broad support from the IMF, the World Bank, and economists around the world. As a side effect, however, inflationary concerns have been mounting in the United States alongside the recovery in output and a buoyant stock market that has repeatedly set new all-time highs. With vaccination rates high, the mood in the United States is increasingly one of approaching the end of the pandemic, and accumulated purchasing power is poised to be unleashed — a situation in sharp contrast to Japan, where a fresh state of emergency has been declared. In March, President Biden approved 1.9 trillion dollars in fiscal stimulus, bringing the cumulative total to nearly 6 trillion dollars. The previous month, Professor Summers of Harvard University warned in the Washington Post that this stimulus package carried the risk of producing inflation at a level not seen in recent times. Professor Summers, who served as Treasury Secretary under the Clinton administration and is closely associated with the Democratic Party, carries considerable weight, and his concerns have been taken seriously. The basis of his argument lies in the overwhelming scale of the stimulus: whereas the Obama administration's fiscal stimulus during the global financial crisis was sized to fill roughly half of the demand shortfall, the current package amounts to three times the demand that was lost. Professor Summers flagged the risk of inflation at a level not seen in half a century. Professor Ball of Johns Hopkins University and his colleagues adjusted the U.S. Phillips curve by stripping out the effect of temporary layoffs from the unemployment rate and using the weighted median of the consumer price index as the inflation measure. Under this framework, they projected that the fiscal stimulus would reduce unemployment by 1.5 to 3.5 percentage points, pushing inflation to 2.5–3.0% through 2023, and assessed the risk of an inflationary spiral as small provided appropriate monetary policy was implemented. However, the April CPI figures released on May 12th came as a shock to markets. Urban CPI rose 0.8% from the previous quarter, showing a clear accelerating trend, and the twelve-month inflation rate reached 4.2% — the largest increase since September 2008. Fed Vice Chair Clarida continued to view the drivers as transitory, but whether that assessment is correct or whether a delayed policy response is warranted remains deeply uncertain. For long-term inflation containment, the key question is whether the Biden administration's massive infrastructure investment plan of more than 2 trillion dollars can deliver productivity improvements in the U.S. economy. However, the plan includes investments of questionable productivity benefit, and uncertainty is substantial. Investment in the energy transition is one component of this, required on a sustained basis over decades and necessarily coexisting with existing systems during the transition period. Productivity is likely to retreat, or at minimum its improvement will be considerably delayed, and the dampening effect on inflation will be weak. Should the U.S. economy head toward prolonged productivity stagnation, the risk of stagflation — the simultaneous occurrence of inflation and recession — is also present. The path of energy transition in the United States will likely be significantly reshaped by how economic conditions evolve going forward.

Role of Manufacturing in Japan's Economy (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2021.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Sources of Price Differential (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2021.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Next Growth Champion (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2021.02

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Green Industrial Revolution in UK (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2021.02

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

In November 2020, the UK government announced its "Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution," followed five weeks later, on December 25th, by the Japanese government's "Green Growth Strategy Toward Carbon Neutrality by 2050." While both share a tendency to paint an optimistic picture without clearly articulating the logic that justifies it, the UK's Ten Points — opening with the bold message that "Britain, which led the first Industrial Revolution 200 years ago, will lead the world again" — far surpasses Japan's growth strategy in concreteness and concision. The UK Ten Point Plan, from Prime Minister Johnson's foreword onward, places strong emphasis on Green Recovery, whereas the Japanese government's report does no more than briefly note that "in Europe and the United States..." Japan did not undergo a full lockdown, and the government's primary obligation was to support the unemployed and businesses in sectors such as food and beverage, accommodation, and retail. More than 95% of construction sites across the country continued operating throughout the pandemic, with thorough infection control measures in place. Against this backdrop, support for civil engineering works or research and development — however green — could easily appear opportunistic in Japan, and lacks persuasive force. A second emphasis of the UK Ten Points is job creation. The Green Industrial Revolution is said to generate 250,000 jobs in the UK by 2030, with a breakdown provided: 60,000 in offshore wind, 50,000 each in CCUS and green buildings, 40,000 in zero-emission vehicles, and so on. Yet while the arithmetic behind the figures may be understood, the logic by which they would generate economic growth is nowhere to be seen. Jonathan Ford of the Financial Times points out that "green jobs don't come from nowhere — they replace jobs that existed before." What should be compared is the value created by the jobs before and after, and it has been argued that the economic value generated by green jobs would fall short of the work lost in coal mines and coal-fired power stations. One cannot help but raise an eyebrow at the UK government's use of gross employment figures to dress up the Green Industrial Revolution. Energy transition is painful. The real question is the "net gain," which is difficult to measure. If workers previously confined to low-productivity jobs are able to achieve higher productivity in new businesses, the net gain is positive — but in the UK's case, it appears likely to be negative. On the other hand, if some former workers had been receiving incomes disproportionate to their productivity, or if overinvestment by monopolistic enterprises had generated inefficiencies that contributed to high electricity prices, then energy transition might deliver a positive social gain through lower electricity prices. However, a report by Professor Gordon Hughes of the University of Edinburgh, based on actual cost data from more than 350 onshore and offshore wind farms in the UK, finds that the price of wind-generated electricity has not fallen — it has in fact risen — and that there is no prospect of significant decline over the next five to ten years. If generation costs continue to rise, the odds of success for the Green Industrial Revolution will be correspondingly diminished.

Repeated Optimism

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2021.01

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

SME Business in Society 5.0

Koji Nomura

Risona-re (Resona Research Institute Co., Ltd.) 19 ( 1 ) 7 - 10 2021.01

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work, ISSN 0918-6670

Coherency of Energy Policies

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2020.11

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Expansion of Household Own-account Production of Service due to the COVID-19

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2020.11

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Half a year has passed since the economic damage from the COVID-19 pandemic began in earnest, and the first statistical signs of recovery are beginning to emerge. Japan's economic growth rate in the second quarter of this year came in at minus 10.0%, a somewhat deeper contraction than the minus 8.9% recorded during the global financial crisis. The two crises have, however, affected the Japanese economy in qualitatively different ways, and it is from a comparison of their respective recovery processes that I wish to consider the outlook for future energy consumption. The damage to manufacturing from the pandemic is shorter-lived than that inflicted during the global financial crisis, which was driven by a dramatic collapse in external demand. The export volume index, the industrial materials shipment index, and the durable consumer goods shipment index have all been recovering strongly, and the pace of macro demand recovery is faster than during the financial crisis. For industrial production as a whole, it took approximately twice as long during the financial crisis to achieve the level of recovery seen between May and August this time. The recovery has been led by the automobile manufacturing sector. Production volumes for standard passenger cars, light vehicles, and motorcycles have all roughly doubled, and by providing appropriate working environments amid advancing automation, factories have succeeded in resuming operations without generating clusters of infection. Where demand exists, manufacturing adapts quickly to new production methods that avoid the concentration of people. For services, whose defining characteristic is simultaneous production and consumption, such adaptation is considerably more difficult. The recovery in automobile production was also supported by demand for private car commuting as people sought to avoid using public transportation. Particularly among economically better-off households, there has been a shift away from collectively consumed mobility services such as trains and buses toward "own-account production" — producing those services for oneself. The office, a composite service collectively consumed by employees, has also been partially substituted by own-account production at home. For products such as split-system air conditioners, built-in kitchen systems, electric refrigerators, and electric washing machines, domestic production levels in August of this year have already surpassed the February levels that preceded the full impact of the crisis. Laptop computers were up 25% and fiber optic communication cable products up 19%, as households produce for themselves the composite services that constitute a high-quality working environment. Over the medium to long term, own-account production services will likely coexist alongside the collectively consumed services of the past. Energy consumption in public transportation and offices will not change substantially even as passenger and occupancy density declines. The replacement of old appliances will accelerate the penetration of energy-efficient durable goods, but this will not offset the additional energy consumption from expanded usage. In the near future, households will consume by choosing between own-account production services and high-quality external services. Energy demand remains weak at present, but when macro demand recovers to its former scale, energy consumption will tend to increase. There is no need to lament the expansion of consumption — what is called for is preparedness to ensure stable supply.

Challenges to Develop Society 5.0 for SDGs in Japan

Koji Nomura

Monthly Keidanren 40 - 41 2020.11

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Stagnation due to Low Wages

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2020.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Effective Import Dependency of Electricity

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2020.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Project Report on Measuring Quality-adjusted Price and Quantity of Education Outputs in Japan"

Koji Nomura

Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) Project Report (Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), Cabinet Office) ( 81 ) 2020.08

Rapid communication, short report, research note, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

National Wealth Survey in Mongolia

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2020.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Will Implementation of Future Technologies Reduce Energy Consumption?

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2020.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

In the wake of the decline in energy demand and CO2 emissions caused by the pandemic, calls for a green recovery have grown loud. Yet the fiscal stimulus deployed by advanced economies has been directed primarily at business support and income compensation, with green investment receiving allocations of an entirely different order of magnitude. As economic activity recovers, emissions will likely return to their previous trajectory. Indeed, the dispersal of activity may itself generate a significant expansion in energy consumption. Longer-term prospects depend on the adoption of emerging technologies such as AI, IoT, and 5G — which offer the prospect of substantial improvements in energy efficiency, while also raising significant concerns about the enormous expansion of electricity consumption in data centers, among other issues. Under the vision of "Society 5.0 for SDGs" advanced by Keidanren, a model simulation was conducted to estimate the impact on the Japanese economy of the social implementation of 57 future technologies. The deployment of diverse technologies — including the digitalization of manufacturing processes, telemedicine and care robots, FinTech, InsurTech, and EdTech — is projected to accelerate the economic growth rate through 2030 from the baseline case of 0.8% per annum to 2.6%. This is comparable to the healthy growth trajectory of the United States, whose per capita GDP is currently about 40% larger than Japan's. Japan currently lags the United States significantly in labor productivity. The Japan-U.S. labor productivity gap in 2030 is estimated to remain around 30% in the baseline case, but through the aggressive implementation of future technologies, the gap narrows to just 9%. The realization of Society 5.0 points to a return to a growth trajectory in which Japan catches up with the United States in productivity terms — transcending the three decades of stagnation that defined the Heisei era. Energy productivity improvement through 2030 is projected at an annual rate of 2.2% even in the baseline case, but accelerates to 3.1% under Society 5.0 — a pace comparable to what the Japanese economy achieved in the aftermath of the first oil shock. Yet even with rapid improvements in energy productivity, the acceleration of economic growth through the deployment of future technologies — accompanied by structural changes such as the expansion of digital capital accumulation — is estimated to increase overall energy consumption in aggregate. The increase in energy demand from economic expansion has consistently outweighed the reductions achieved through efficiency improvements, and the coexistence of efficiency gains and quantitative growth in energy consumption is a pattern observed throughout the postwar economy. Technological innovation is driven by latent demand for new goods and services. Energy conservation is one such demand, but its market scale is relatively modest and insufficient to serve as the primary driver; the emergence of new products with appropriately large markets — such as robotics and medical and elderly care — will be accompanied by increased energy consumption.
These projections suggest that the key to addressing energy and environmental challenges lies in the decarbonization of the supply side of secondary energy. Through the operation of next-generation renewable energy, hydrogen-fired power generation, and small modular reactors, a 17.8% reduction in total CO2 emissions from the baseline case is projected for 2030. In recent years, pessimistic views on demand outlook have been heard from energy businesses, but it should not be forgotten that these views are grounded in the experience of an exceptional period of stagnant labor productivity improvement. Strong and sustained improvement in labor productivity can be realized together with expanded inputs of capital and energy. We should look beyond prolonged stagnation and seek a vision of the future in which technological innovation, economic growth, and environmental stewardship are brought into alignment.

Thinking Energy

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2020.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Labor Productivity and Energy

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2020.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Environmental Policy by Voluntary Action and Impacts on Industry Competitiveness

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2020.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

In February 2020, it was reported that the Kure steelworks in Hiroshima Prefecture would be closed. Two blast furnaces operated by Nippon Steel Nisshin would be shut down, with the crude steel processing operations also to be closed by 2023. A major reversal of direction announced just two months after the corporate disclosure speaks to the anguish behind the decision, taken against a backdrop of stagnating global demand caused by the U.S.-China trade conflict. Kure is the third-largest economic city in Hiroshima Prefecture, accounting for approximately 10% of the prefecture's gross domestic product, with a dependence on manufacturing of 48% — far exceeding that of Hiroshima City (17%) and Fukuyama City (31%). The steel industry accounts for 27% of the gross value added by Kure's manufacturing sector, underpinning roughly 12% of the city's GDP. The closure of the steelworks, including its impact on related industries, will likely inflict damage two to three times that scale. Nippon Steel itself is reported to be facing a loss of 440 billion yen, following an impairment charge of 490 billion yen. To compete in global markets, it is necessary to endure such pain in order to raise production efficiency and expand the share of production closer to growing consumption centers. By 2030, Japan's GDP will have shrunk in relative terms to approximately 4% of world output. Putting an end to Japan's prolonged economic stagnation is impossible without transforming into globally competitive enterprises. Government support is indispensable to cushioning the pain for regional economies, but the greatest asset is the human talent cultivated at the steelworks being closed. One can only hope that the steelworkers who remain in the region will found new businesses and drive the local economy forward. The day before the closure was reported, the Low Carbon Society Action Plan Follow-up Committee of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry held discussions on the steel industry's efforts to reduce CO2 emissions. Yet concerns about carbon leakage proved difficult to dispel. As the technical possibilities for higher efficiency and higher utilization rates become increasingly constrained, if the hurdles to be cleared are set high only within Japan, companies will opt for overseas production when making reinvestment decisions. Is the blast furnace closure not, in fact, a decision made under competitive conditions distorted by current energy and environmental policy? Whether the pain being inflicted on industry, regions, and the macro economy is truly necessary must be asked. The EU has constructed a list of industries exposed to the risk of carbon leakage under its emissions trading scheme, granting eligible industries a substantial number of free emissions allowances. Careful measures against leakage are indispensable to avoid inflicting unnecessary pain on the macro economy. Voluntary action as an approach to environmental policy carries a fatal flaw: it obscures the disparity in competitive conditions between domestic and foreign producers. It also carries the risk of concealing the factors behind Japan's low economic growth and presenting domestic emissions reductions as if they were the fruits of environmental policy success or corporate effort. Japan's capacity to identify its national interest from the perspectives of corporate strategy, environmental policy, and economic growth is being put to the test.

Market Design of Art in Japan

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2020.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"2019 Project Report on Measuring Industry-Level Productivity Account in JSNA"

Koji Nomura

Economic & Social Research, ESRI, Cabinet Office (Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University) 2020.03

Rapid communication, short report, research note, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

Deflation and Increasing Vulnerability to Energy Price Fluctuations

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2020.02

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Wholesale and Retail Service Price Indices in Japan: Retrospective Measurement from 1955"

Koji Nomura

RIETI Nontechnical Summary (RIETI) 2020.02

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"How Can Measurement of Benchmark Production Systems be Improved? – The Structure of Secondary Products by Main Activity based on the Survey on Diversification of Sales in Japan"

Koji Nomura

RIETI Nontechnical Summary (RIETI) 2020.02

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Low Economic Growth and Quality of Investment

Koji Nomura

Wave (Denki Shimbun) (The Denki Shimbun) 2020.01

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Another Loss of Personnel due to Fukushima Nuclear Accident - Degradation on GDP Estimates

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2019.12

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

In economics statistics classes, students sometimes ask whether Abenomics led to an overestimation of GDP, but the reality is that if anything, GDP has been underestimated. There is a debate around Japan's input-output tables — the foundation of Japan's GDP statistics — arguing that this "Galapagos-style mammoth statistical framework should be simplified to match European and American standards," but this argument rests on a serious misunderstanding. An input-output table is a matrix describing the production and demand structure of an economy as a whole, constructed through intensive statistical surveys in a benchmark year conducted every five years. Japan's input-output tables are sometimes criticized as "Galapagos" for their granular classification of 520 commodities by 400 industries, but in fact the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) uses an even finer classification running to 5,000 commodities — albeit unpublished. The disaggregation of input-output tables is not a hobby pursuit; its purpose is to approximate the technical relationships between products and industries. At the level of granularity represented by products such as heavy fuel oil and coke, the industries that use them can be identified with greater precision, and a design that makes use of such complementary information is indispensable for describing the economy as a whole without internal contradictions. If one imagines how difficult it is to measure a nation's total GDP, the challenges of statistical construction become clear: declining survey response rates, missing or inconsistent answers, and the increasingly diversified business activities of corporations all compound the difficulty. The foundation of GDP statistical construction is an understanding of productive structure, and the central role in Japan's input-output tables has been played by the Input-Output Division (IO Division) of the Economic Analysis Office within the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. The successive heads of the division have maintained a high level of professional commitment — refusing to take potentially error-laden figures at face value, sensing discrepancies between the statistics and actual economic conditions, and engaging in dynamic quality management. With the advance of outsourcing to the private sector, however, only perfunctory quality control devoid of passion remains, and the pursuit of structural changes in the survey population has been lost. The nuclear accident then delivered the decisive blow. Personnel within the ministry were mobilized for accident response, and invaluable statistical expertise was lost. The IO Division no longer exists as such; it has been absorbed into a Survey and Analysis Support Office, where it is grouped together with dissemination, public relations, and website management functions. This means that the "guardian" of Japan's input-output tables is being lost. Even if there are discrepancies in the levels of the benchmark year, GDP statistics for subsequent years are estimated by linking to that base, so the problem goes unexamined — a Pandora's box, in effect. Preliminary estimates suggest that in recent years production has been underestimated across various sectors, with figures likely missing by as much as 10 trillion yen in commerce and 5 trillion yen in manufacturing. A mature opposition party, rather than simply crying "fabrication," should be questioning the adequacy of GDP measurement itself. Under a framework of private-sector utilization focused solely on checking procurement documents for deficiencies, no passion can be cultivated, and the quality of the information infrastructure built by one's predecessors cannot be maintained. What is needed once again is a distinctly human way of working — thinking for oneself, using AI as a complement, and finding genuine enjoyment in the discovery of problems.

Development of Hydropower Plants by Yukichi and Momosuke Fukuzawa

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2019.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

The Oi Dam and power station on the Kiso River system were completed by Momosuke Fukuzawa at the end of 1924. This great undertaking — achieved by harnessing imported American technology and capital to tame the torrential Kiso River, long deemed "impossible to control" — continues to create enduring value nearly a century later. Yukichi Fukuzawa, Momosuke's father-in-law, introduced the advances in hydropower technology being made in Britain and Germany in his work "Jitsugyo-ron" (On Business, 1893), illuminating a path by which Japan might develop its productive industries. He observed that Japan's "swift currents and waterfalls, a heaven-sent treasure," could be transformed into productive assets, and presciently identified the utilization of electricity — then "in the midst of its development" — as "a matter of truly paramount importance for an industrializing society." Just as Sam Schurr called electricity the "mediator of technological progress," electrical energy was indispensable to the productivity improvements and economic growth of the twentieth century — and Fukuzawa had already seen this essence a hundred years before. Fukuzawa's assessment was not mere optimism but was grounded in analysis. He reasoned that nations without access to hydropower and dependent solely on coal-fired generation could not hope to compete on price with mountain countries endowed with the natural force of swift rivers and waterfalls, foreseeing that hydroelectric power could be substantially cheaper than alternative means of generation and could make a major contribution to improving Japan's international competitiveness. Momosuke was a singular entrepreneur who translated insight into action. Alongside hydropower development, he established a specialty steel manufacturing company using electric arc furnaces as a means of utilizing surplus power, and constructed transmission lines to the Kansai region — a vision that extended to the public benefit of society as a whole. From the Meiji era through the early Taisho period, the emergence of large-scale electricity consumers transformed the structure of power supply through the market, shifting from small-scale, fragmented supply responding to dispersed lighting demand toward the pursuit of economies of scale in large-scale generation and bulk transmission to consumption centers. There are two kinds of infrastructure formation. The first is that which is called for once bottlenecks in the economic and social system have become conspicuous. The second is the "business-creating" type — one that envisions a future capable of dramatically improving the prosperity and efficiency of economic society even before direct demand has materialized, making new private enterprise possible. The latter is far more difficult, and cannot be achieved without the fortunate convergence of superior insight, entrepreneurial spirit, and historical circumstance. How would Fukuzawa and Momosuke view today's Japanese electricity market? Was electricity liberalization induced by structural changes in demand or technology? Does the promotion of solar power through the feed-in tariff system for renewable energy encourage the utilization of untapped resources in which Japan holds an advantage, and thereby improve the international competitiveness of its industries? One imagines that Fukuzawa would point to the weakness of logical justification in both cases and argue against reckless haste, while Momosuke would show not the slightest interest in entering the new power retail or mega-solar business. The rapid accumulation of high-cost solar generation has not become business-creating infrastructure, and has left the public with liabilities exceeding the value it will generate in the future. Where, one wonders, would Momosuke's gaze turn today?

”Energy Productivity Improvement and Invisible Structural Changes”

Koji Nomura

RIETI コラム (RIETI) 2019.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

Energy Productivity Improvement and Invisible Structural Changes

Koji Nomura

RIETI Column (RIETI) 2019.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

Economic impacts of non-nuclear power policy in South Korea

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2019.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Over the past thirty years, the Korean economy has achieved the upgrading of its manufacturing sector and improvements in productivity by drawing on affordable electricity supply as a source of competitiveness. The foundation for this has been an energy policy centered on nuclear power and coal-fired generation. Nuclear power, which began commercial operation in 1978, expanded rapidly, reaching a generation share of 53% by 1987. With nuclear and coal together accounting for more than 70% of electricity demand, industrial electricity prices fell to roughly half those of Japan — a substantial competitive advantage. In the 1970s there was no significant gap between Japanese and Korean electricity prices, but the rapid expansion of nuclear power brought Korean prices down to half Japan's level by 1987. Against this backdrop of affordable electricity, the Korean economy has exhibited two defining characteristics. The first is a rapid structural transformation from light industry to machinery manufacturing; the second is the swift improvement in macro-level productivity that accompanied it. In the early 1980s, Korea's total factor productivity was only about 60% of Japan's, but rapid catching-up narrowed the gap to roughly 15% by 2011. Affordable electricity supply was the cornerstone of the productivity improvements needed to raise per capita income to the next level. From 2011 onward, however, a turning point arrived. The Moon Jae-in administration pursued policies of phasing out nuclear power and coal, advancing the closure of aging coal-fired plants and scrapping plans for new reactor construction. Nuclear plant utilization rates fell from over 90% to 66% in 2018, and the industrial electricity price gap between Japan and Korea narrowed to 30–40%. Korea Electric Power Corporation swung to an operating loss, and the productivity gap between Japan and Korea, after peaking in 2011, has begun to widen again toward nearly 20%. This situation mirrors Japan's own experience twenty years ago. A reckless energy transition undertaken against a backdrop of rising cost burdens on coal-fired generation due to air pollution countermeasures, and the advancing challenge of Chinese competitors, will significantly undermine Korea's medium- and long-term growth capacity. Japan-Korea cooperation on shared challenges — including strengthened nuclear safety measures, the nuclear fuel cycle, and final disposal — may well be the path toward guiding the Asian economy to prosperity.

Borrowed Technology and Unintended Energy Productivity Improvement

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2019.02

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

The government is aiming, with an eye to 2030, to achieve energy conservation at the pace Japan realized in the aftermath of the oil shocks. Yet ambitious energy-saving targets do not necessarily imply their own feasibility. As other instruments — declining nuclear dependence, the scaling back of coal-fired generation, and surging electricity prices driven by the push for renewables — have reached an impasse, energy conservation has returned as the central policy challenge. There are expectations that energy saving will enhance corporate competitiveness and drive economic growth, but that was the story of an era when cheaply available technologies were abundant. Today, the costs required to achieve further energy savings frequently exceed the savings in capital and labor they generate. Subsidy-driven promotion is expedient for both government and industry, but it lowers the social return on investment. The purpose of this paper is to draw lessons from historical experience for the efficient pursuit of energy conservation. In the years from 1973 to 1990 following the first oil shock, Japan's energy productivity improved at a remarkable annual rate of 3.1%, a period known as the "golden age" of energy conservation. This figure, however, contains distortions inherent in macro-level measurement. Because energy-intensive industries such as steel and chemicals contracted relative to the rest of the economy after the oil shocks, energy conservation tends to be understated for the high-growth era and overstated for the golden age. According to the author's estimates corrected for industrial structural change, the true rate of energy conservation improvement during the high-growth era is revised upward to 2.0% per annum, compared to the apparent rate of 1.4%. This reflects what economist Gerschenkron identified as "borrowed technology" — technological progress enjoyed unintentionally through investment in imported machinery and equipment from abroad — and represents "unintentional" energy conservation. Conversely, the true rate of improvement during the golden age is halved to 1.5% per annum from the apparent 3.1%, and a comparison of the periods before and after the oil shocks reveals that "unintentional" energy conservation in fact exceeded "intentional" conservation. From 1990 to 2008, the apparent rate of energy conservation improvement slowed sharply to 0.8% per annum, with three quarters of that slowdown explained by the relative contraction of energy-intensive industries. The true rate of conservation improvement, after correction, was a mere 0.1% per annum. Despite the strengthening of energy-saving measures including the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, and despite surging crude oil prices, virtually no real progress in energy conservation was achieved. Over the same period, the United States kept its slowdown in conservation improvement limited and narrowed the productivity gap with Japan. The first lesson is that the pace of energy conservation is constrained far more by the availability of cheaply usable technologies than by rising energy prices. In the early stages of growth, energy conservation is naturally embedded through production expansion and capital reinvestment. The effect of energy price increases in inducing conservation is, however, already limited, and pricing energy consumption and CO2 emissions may prove to be an inefficient policy instrument. The second lesson is that even without policy-driven "front-loading" of energy conservation, when the time for capital reinvestment arrives, available energy-saving technologies will be embodied in new machinery and incorporated as a matter of course. As the Japan-U.S. comparison demonstrates, even when Japan takes the lead in adopting the latest high-cost technologies, once those technologies become cheaper, they will naturally diffuse through reinvestment in other countries. Within twenty years, machinery reaching the end of its economic service life will be replaced by capital goods embodying energy-efficient technology. The pursuit of energy conservation now has a history of nearly half a century, and the race has become one of diminishing returns. The value of expending large resources for a modest lead is limited, and the contribution to global greenhouse gas reduction remains marginal. High energy cost burdens also serve as a guarantee of high returns in research and development of future technologies. What is now required is a fundamental reframing of the time horizon for energy conservation promotion — shifting from a year-by-year perspective to one measured in decades.

"2018 Project Report on Measuring Quality-adjusted Price and Quantity of Education Outputs in Japan"

Koji Nomura

Economic & Social Research, ESRI, Cabinet Office (Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University) 2019.02

Rapid communication, short report, research note, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

日本の国民経済計算体系（Japanese System of National Accounts： JSNA）では、「統計改革の基本方針」（平成28年12月経済財政諮問会議決定）および「統計改革推進会議最終取りまとめ」（平成29年5月統計改革推進会議決定）などに基づき、教育サービスの精度改善および国際的な比較可能性の向上を目的として、教育の質の変化を反映した産出指数（quality-adjusted quantity index）および価格指数（quality-adjusted price index）の開発が求められている。本調査研究ではそのために必要な新たなデータベースを構築した上で、産出数量法、投入法、そしてハイブリッド法といったさまざまなアプローチに基づく試算をおこない、教育サービスの望ましい数量と価格の測定量を模索することを目的としている。

Bhutanese Economic Growth Led by Hydropower

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2018.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

This article examines Bhutan’s hydropower-led growth model and evaluates its sustainability and underlying economic risks. Bhutan has achieved rapid economic growth while relying almost entirely on renewable energy, and has often been regarded as a model of green growth. Hydropower development plays a central role in this model, generating substantial export revenues through electricity sales to India and forming a major source of government income. However, the construction of productivity statistics and subsequent analysis reveal that hydropower-driven growth does not necessarily translate into improvements in overall economic efficiency. Although labor productivity has increased significantly, this growth has largely been driven by massive capital accumulation, while improvements in total factor productivity (TFP) remain negligible. Moreover, hydropower construction generates limited domestic employment, and the capital-intensive investment structure has led to distortions in resource allocation. Additional structural vulnerabilities arise from Bhutan’s heavy dependence on electricity exports to India, the peg of its currency to the Indian rupee, rising construction costs, and environmental uncertainties such as changes in Himalayan water flows. While Bhutan’s hydropower-led development strategy has delivered rapid economic growth in the short term, it also exposes the economy to long-term risks related to capital inefficiency and a lack of industrial diversification.

What is Required for Realizing Innovation?

Koji Nomura

Monthly Energy Forum (Energy Forum Inc.) 2018.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

What should be Japan’s future energy mix?

Koji Nomura

The Japan News (The Yomiuri Shimbun) 2018.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Japan's Electricity Mix

Koji Nomura

Yomiuri Shimbun (The Yomiuri Shimbun) 2018.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

What Did Japan's FIT Bring About?

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2018.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"With this much power being generated on a sunny day, electricity prices should come down, shouldn't they?" — the smiling remark of a student reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the FIT system (Feed-in Tariff for renewable energy). Sunlight pouring down may be a gift of nature, but converting it into electricity requires equipment installed under the FIT scheme, and the costs of that equipment are imposed on electricity consumers. Even though solar panel module prices were expected to fall over time, the decision to accelerate their deployment has produced a hefty bill that will be passed to current and future consumers. What has the FIT system, introduced in October 2012, actually delivered for the Japanese economy? Before the system was introduced, the government estimated that total purchase payments in its fifth year of operation would amount to around 500 billion yen annually. By fiscal 2017, that figure had expanded to 2.7 trillion yen, and is projected to reach 3.1 trillion yen in the current fiscal year — already equivalent to two thirds of the nation's entire general road construction budget. In the government's projections drawn up in 2015, the restart of nuclear plants was expected to reduce generation costs by around 4 trillion yen per year, providing the financial basis for promoting renewables and achieving a low-carbon, diversified energy mix without raising electricity prices. That anticipated funding base, however, is already close to running dry. Moreover, the FIT system has done nothing to strengthen the competitiveness of domestic solar panel manufacturers: the domestic content rate for solar cells and modules, which stood at around 80% before the system's introduction, plummeted to roughly 30% shortly afterward, and high import dependency has remained essentially unchanged to this day. Did the demand created by the FIT contribute to a fall in solar panel prices? In 2008, The Economist offered a scathing critique of Germany's FIT promotion. Despite being one of the countries in the world with the least solar irradiation, Germany's aggressive pursuit of the FIT drove up silicon prices, making adoption more difficult in countries with far greater solar resources. After Germany strengthened its FIT in 2004, silicon prices rose by nearly double, and the retail price of solar modules — which had been falling at an annual rate of around 4% — turned upward in 2004. When Japan introduced its FIT in 2012, the rapid surge in Japanese demand came to the rescue of Chinese manufacturers sitting on large surplus production capacity, and export prices to Japan actually rose. In the first quarter of 2013, Japan's import prices shifted to an annualized increase of 15%. Conversely, when the direction of amendments to the FIT law became clear in the third quarter of 2016, import prices recorded a sharp annualized decline of 50%. Setting high purchase prices exerts an upward pull on market prices, and what is needed for healthy market formation is not hasty deployment but sustained, measured demand expansion. The cost of renewables is increasingly dependent on domestic services such as construction and distribution rather than equipment itself, and high service prices reflect Japanese consumer preferences — meaning that even if other countries come to enjoy cheaper renewables, their conditions are not comparable to Japan's. The government has been shifting its focus toward the use of storage batteries, hydrogen storage, and related technologies, but it must not forget that the attractive future scenarios being sketched rest on a foundation of very substantial cost burdens already accumulated.

Energy Productivity and Industrial Changes

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2018.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

The EU has placed Efficiency First — improving energy efficiency as the top priority — at the core of its energy policy, targeting a reduction in energy consumption of 27–30% compared to a business-as-usual scenario by 2030. Germany has set an ambitious target of reducing energy consumption by 50% by 2050 (relative to 2008) alongside a major push for renewables, claiming this will in fact strengthen industrial competitiveness and contribute to economic growth. Germany's target corresponds to an average annual reduction in energy consumption of around 1.5% from 2015 onward, requiring a sustained average annual improvement in energy productivity of around 2.5% — roughly one percentage point above recent actual performance. The term "energy conservation," born in the era of the oil shocks, carried from the outset a character in which efficiency improvement was difficult and dependence on reductions in activity levels was inherent. During Japan's high-growth era, vigorous capital accumulation embodying energy-saving technologies produced substantial improvements in energy productivity, but once the catch-up process was complete, further efficiency gains came to require greater inputs of labor and capital. Improving productivity in the single dimension of energy thus imposes a burden in the form of declining labor and capital productivity, and when energy conservation is pursued excessively, the latter burden can exceed the former, reducing overall productivity. A second problem is the fallacy of composition. Improving energy productivity reduces energy demand, which through lower market prices, enhanced competitiveness, and new production expansion tends to push up aggregate energy consumption — the rebound effect known as the Jevons paradox. In recent years, some EU countries have shown a declining trend in energy consumption itself, but the underlying causes require careful examination. Energy productivity as observed at the macro level is a measure that incorporates changes in productive structure. Germany achieved an efficiency improvement of 1.5% per annum between 2000 and 2015, but when measured with industrial structural change controlled for, true energy productivity improvement falls to just 0.4% per annum. This means that more than two thirds of the apparently observed improvement in energy productivity is explained by structural changes such as the contraction of energy-intensive industries and the expansion of the service sector — not by improvements in energy intensity at the level of individual firms or production processes. The conditions in which cheap energy-saving opportunities remain abundant can no longer be assumed, and the marginal cost of reducing consumption by one additional unit is indeed rising. Over this period, German households bore a disproportionately large share of the costs of renewable energy promotion and faced rapidly rising electricity prices, while electricity-intensive companies were exempted from these burdens. Whether such preferential treatment constitutes an acceptable level playing field relative to countries such as Italy that have no such exemptions, and whether energy-intensive industries can be expected to pursue conservation when their electricity prices are in fact falling, raises serious questions about the internal consistency of current energy policy.

Towards Revision of GDP - Measurement of Qualities in Education and Medical Care Services

Koji Nomura and Shigeru Sugihara

Economic & Social Research, ESRI, Cabinet Office 2017.12

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (other), Joint Work

Energy Transitions in Germany and Japan

Koji Nomura

Energy Policy Report (Energy Forum Inc.) 2017.11

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

At the start of this year, I visited the Takahama Nuclear Power Plant. Achieving the government's target of a 20–22% share of nuclear power generation by 2030 requires the restart of plants with enhanced safety measures and the extension of their operating periods, but at the time of my visit the plant had been shut down by a provisional injunction from the Otsu District Court following its restart. The rise in electricity prices and supply uncertainty since the earthquake disaster have been factors suppressing domestic investment and shifting electricity-intensive production overseas, and restoring affordable and stable electricity supply would improve investment opportunities in regional economies. Around the same time, I visited Berlin. The meetings of the Japan-Germany Energy Transition Council were charged with enthusiasm for the Energiewende — the great transformation — aimed at raising the share of renewables, already expanded to over 30%, to 50% by 2030 and 100% by 2050. The driving forces behind this are the decision to phase out nuclear power by 2022 in the wake of the Fukushima accident, and the challenge by citizens to build a decentralized system in opposition to monopolistic utilities. Germany's electricity-intensive companies benefit from wholesale electricity prices made cheaper by the large-scale introduction of renewables, with exemptions from the surcharges, while the overall cost increase falls heavily on household electricity bills. Yet criticism of the status quo falls flat before German researchers. One senses a positive resolve that the challenges should be overcome through the research and development they necessitate and through the expansion of market mechanisms. The promotion of renewables has reportedly become a new arena of challenge for retirees in their later years, and through collaboration with younger generations it has begun to function as a catalyst for value creation. Even the taxi driver on the way back smiled and said, "After seeing Fukushima, Germany decided to phase out nuclear — we knew we'd have to bear some burden." The economic trajectories of Japan and Germany in recent years stand in sharp contrast. Since 2000, Germany's average annual growth rate has exceeded Japan's by roughly 0.4 percentage points, with half of that strong performance supported by expanding external demand. The IMF has estimated that the euro undervalues Germany's effective exchange rate by 10–20%, which — drawing an analogy to Japan — is equivalent to maintaining price competitiveness over the long term through a yen depreciation to around 125 yen to the dollar. Japan, by contrast, has seen the return on domestic investment continue to languish, and the gap in productivity relative to leading economies has widened. The expansion of inefficient investment, such as in high-cost renewables, raises serious concerns about depressing future returns, and a virtuous cycle is needed — one in which investment opportunities with high returns are selected and linked to the creation of new investment opportunities. Affordable and stable electricity supply is an indispensable foundation for growth. The respective challenges of Japan and Germany in energy transition reflect differences in their economic environments. For Germany, where labor-management coordination has held down wages, it is desirable to seek a form of transition that expands domestic demand even if returns are modest. Japan's current circumstances, however, are unlikely to permit the same approach.

Productivity Measurement and International Comparison

Koji Nomura

Economic Seminar (Nihon Hyoron Sha) 2017.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

"Are Japan's Wholesale and Retail Prices Higher than Those in the United States? Estimation of margin rates using microdata from the Census of Commerce"

Koji Nomura and Kozo Miyagawa

RIETI Nontechnical Summary (RIETI) 2017.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Benchmark Revision of GDP in JSNA (6)For the Next Benchmark Revision

Koji Nomura

Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Inc.) 2016.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Benchmark Revision of GDP in JSNA (5)Capital Services

Koji Nomura

Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Inc.) 2016.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Benchmark Revision of GDP in JSNA (4)Labor Share

Koji Nomura

Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Inc.) 2016.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Benchmark Revision of GDP in JSNA (3)Military Equipment

Koji Nomura

Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Inc.) 2016.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Benchmark Revision of GDP in JSNA (2)Capitalization of R&D

Koji Nomura

Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Inc.) 2016.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Benchmark Revision of GDP in JSNA (1)JSNA based on the 2008 SNA

Koji Nomura

Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Inc.) 2016.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Electricity Price under the Electricity Deregulation in Japan

Koji Nomura

Yaku (Kansai Electric Power) 2016.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

On Revision of Japan's Feed-in-Tariff Law

Koji Nomura

Monthly Keidanren (Keidanren) 2016.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

「危机后的亚洲生产率走势」

Koji Nomura

China External Environment Monitor (中国社会科学院) 2016.01

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

Productivity Trends in Asia after the Global Crisis

Koji Nomura

VoxEU CEPR's Policy Portal (VoxEU) 2015.12

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

「世界金融危機後のアジア経済における生産性の動向」

Koji Nomura

RIETI コラム (RIETI) 2015.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

「日米間産業競争力の半世紀－1955-2012年の価格水準指数と生産性ギャップの分析」

Koji Nomura

『RIETI Highlight (Fall 2015) 』 (RIETI) 2015.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

Trade Agreements and Trans-Pacific Competition

Dale W. Jorgenson, Koji Nomura, and Jon D. Samuels

VoxEU CEPR's Policy Portal (VoxEU) 2015.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Joint Work

"Japan's Electricity Mix in 2030" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura

Showa Keizai (Showa Keizai Kai) 66 ( 5 ) 51-56 2015.05

Other, Single Work

「2030年の電源構成－過大な省エネは国民負担」（経済教室）

野村浩二

Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Inc.) 2015.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

「アベノミクス「２本の矢」の効力を削ぐ国富流出原発停止でＧＤＰ０・７％の国内需要が喪失」

野村浩二

『エネルギーフォーラム』 (エネルギーフォーラム社) 2014.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

「辺境の気概を感じとることができるか」

野村浩二

『三田評論』 (慶應義塾大学出版会) 2013.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (other), Single Work

「グリーン分野に着目した経済成長促進策の評価など聞く」

野村浩二

週刊経団連タイムス (経団連) ( 3135 ) 2013.06

Lecture material (seminar, tutorial, course, lecture, etc.), Single Work, Lead author

「エネルギー政策転換の費用負担と経済成長」

Koji Nomura

『月刊経団連』 (経団連) 2012.11

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

「話そう”エネルギーと環境のみらい”ー有識者の声」

野村浩二

国家戦略室 2012.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (other), Single Work

A Look at Asian Productivity in the Last Decade

Koji Nomura

APO News (Asian Productivity Organization) 2011.05

Internal/External technical report, pre-print, etc., Single Work

The 2009 edition of the APO Productivity Databook was released at the 51st Governing Body Meeting in Colombo (see page 1). Following the publication of internationally harmonized productivity data in the first edition in 2008, the new volume features wider coverage of economic growth and productivity analyses. The national experts met in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in May 2008 to be briefed on the APO methodology and reach a consensus on its use under the guidance of Chief Expert Professor Koji Nomura of Keio University, Tokyo. The national experts concentrated on collecting national data in line with the methodology, and these data were carefully verified by the research team to enable thorough analyses for compilation in the APO Productivity Databook 2009.
Some of the new features in the 2009 edition include the use of the most recent purchasing power parity estimates revised by the International Comparison Program of the World Bank in 2008. Labor productivity in the previous edition was only defined as output per worker, while the 2009 edition simultaneously attempted to compute labor productivity based on output per hour worked when the data were available. Furthermore, total factor productivity (TFP) was computed for some countries for which the national accounts contained solid data on capital formation which could be used for estimating capital services, such as the Republic of China, Republic of Korea, and Japan, and compared with TFP growth in reference countries. New analysis on final demand makes it possible to compare the output compositions in the region. In addition, real income comparisons enable a more realistic analysis of national purchasing power than simply comparing GDP, which is the basic indicator for assessing the standard level of production in an economy.
After the Introduction, the 2009 edition is divided into an overview of the analytical results and main chapters entitled Economic Growth of the Asian Countries and Region, Decomposition of GDP Growth by Expenditure Category, Real Income and Terms of Trade, and Productivity Performance and Industry Performance. Each chapter explains how the data are interpreted. The constructed data are also listed in more than 50 pages of tables after the Appendix for the convenience of readers wishing to carry out their own productivity analyses. Other tables in the main text of the APO Productivity Databook 2009 make it easy for readers to make comparative analyses of various productivity indicators across countries and regions.
The APO Productivity Databook 2009 is the tangible result of efforts coordinated by the APO Secretariat's Research and Planning Department and a team of productivity specialists at the Keio Economic Observatory of Keio University, headed by Prof. Nomura and including Eunice Y.M. Lau and Hideyuki Mizobuchi. Without their dedicated efforts and those of the national experts of APO member countries, the volume could not have been completed. The APO will continue research to improve the quality of the data and methodology of productivity analyses in future volumes. The more complete harmonized productivity dataset envisioned will cover not only labor productivity but also TFP since it is one of the most all-encompassing measures of economic growth and development in the highly technology-intensive, globalized economy.

「技術革新を促す政府の役割－グリーン・イノベーションに向け多様性ある技術政策の導入を」（日経BP ECOマネジメント）

Koji Nomura

(日経BP) 2010.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

イノベーションの実現にはコスト負担が必要
漢から清朝に至る二千年にわたる中国陶磁の歴史は、基幹産業におけるイノベーションを色濃く反映している。興味深いのは、後世が前世の品質を単純に上回っていくような単線的な歴史ではない点だ。卓抜した作品群が現在に遺された背景には膨大な数の失敗作や試作品があったことを、後世に発見された窯跡が物語っている。イノベーションの実現のためには研究開発というコスト負担が必要であったことは、現在と何ら変わらない。またイノベーションが実現した背景には、陶磁器の品質が適切に評価され開発のための費用負担が社会的に受容されるような、安定した治世が不可欠であったに違いない。社会が必要とするイノベーションを推進するために政府は何ができるだろうか。
技術開発での市場の失敗と政府の失敗
技術開発へと政府が介入する根拠は伝統的に次のように考えられている。技術開発にはコスト負担が必要だが成果は不確実であり、そのリスクを一企業で負うことはできないかもしれない。また運よく成功しても成果である技術知識が容易に模倣されスピルオーバーしてしまえば、企業の私的利益は社会全体が受ける利益よりも小さくなる。そのとき個々の企業による研究開発費の合計は社会的に望ましい水準を下回り、そこに政府の役割がある。
しかし研究開発の不確実性の前には政府も失敗する。現在その萌芽を見るどの分野を支援すべきか、政府が望ましい研究開発の投資先を知っていると仮定することは市場メカニズムへの信頼以上に頼りないかもしれない。政府による対策が裏目に出た事例は多く、家電エコポイント制度もその一つだ。制度導入のわずか10カ月後に登場した新製品では年間消費電力が40〜48%も改善されており、環境・エネルギー政策の観点からは補助金を出してまで普及を促進するのではなく、もう少しの間購入を控えるような情報提供を行うべきであった。
不確実性のもとでの技術政策
大気中からCO2を回収する装置のコストは現在1t当たり200ドル程度だが、大量生産されるようになれば30ドル程度にまで低下するという研究がある。一方、日本が単独に国内対策として90年比25%削減を実施するとした場合、CO2 1t当たりおよそ500ドルもの限界削減費用が必要と多くのモデルで推計されている。温暖化対策を目的とする限り、極端な省エネ・新エネ技術の開発へと突き進むことの合理性はさまざまな対策のコスト比較から明らかに疑問だ。
エネルギー・環境技術開発の促進、とくにその基礎研究における政府の役割は大きい。しかし求められるのは、一国のみの規制強化によってコストレスにイノベーションが誘発される可能性に淡い期待を抱くことでもなく、太陽光発電など一部の分野へと大きく賭けに出ることでもない。偏った投資をしてしまえば将来の資源配分の変更に大きな障害となる。必要なのはまず国際的に調和をもって受け入れる適切な炭素排出の社会的費用の水準を企業に提示し、多様な技術開発の可能性の芽を事前に摘み取ってしまうことのないような技術政策をデザインすることだ。特定技術分野への事前的な直接・間接の補助金政策ではなく、分野を絞らず事後的に得られる報奨金のような経済的インセンティブを付与する制度の構築がひとつの技術政策として考えられる。温暖化対策では途上国や後世への技術のスピルオーバーこそが地球益であり、世界全体で多様なイノベーションを導く環境づくりが求められている。

「環境と経済、両立への現実的な狭い道－環境プラント輸出は海外クレジットの負担を緩和するか」（日経BP ECOマネジメント）

Koji Nomura

(日経BP) 2010.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

成長戦略からみた環境対策
菅内閣の「新成長戦略」では「グリーン・イノベーション」が第1に位置付けられているが、鳩山前内閣の成長戦略と内容は一言一句同じである。グリーン・イノベーションの理解にはバランス感覚が必要で、それは2020年といった短中期ではなく長期の視点に対応している。競争力戦略や経済成長という軸でみれば、温暖化対策が成長に貢献する要素はあるとはいえ影響度のあまり大きくはない一部に過ぎない。米国政府の報告書では生産性向上・労働政策・エネルギー温暖化対策がそれぞれ別建ての章で並列して扱われており、競争力戦略として主として論じられているのは基礎研究や研究開発への投資の重要性であり、そこにグリーン・イノベーションの文字が躍ることはない。
進行する海外生産シフト
民主党政権は国内対策による25%削減でもGDPは増加するという分析を国民に提示したが、協調が必要なのかそうでなくとも単独でプラスなのか、国民は混乱せざるをえない。こうした不安定なメッセージは現実に影響を与え始めており、鉄鋼メーカーに続き自動車メーカーも海外への生産シフトを進めている。日本自動車工業会はその要因として高い法人税率・労働者派遣法見直しの動き・CO2の25%削減の3点を挙げている。最大の懸念は国内の雇用喪失だが、政府が示した雇用創出効果の試算は対策に必要な設備を国内で生産すると仮定して積み上げただけであり、25%国内削減に伴う雇用喪失は考慮の外となっている。
環境プラント輸出による負担緩和
仙谷内閣官房長官や直嶋経済産業大臣がアジア諸国への原子力発電や高効率石炭火力発電など環境プラント輸出へのトップセールスに力を注いでいるのは、温暖化対策への積極的な貢献と持続的な成長との両立を可能にする現実的な狭き道の模索であろう。
KEOモデルによる試算では、国際価格50ドルとして90年比25%削減を国内10%削減＋海外クレジット購入15%で実現するケース（1）において、GDPロスは1.3%弱、クレジット購入負担はおよそ1兆円となる。環境プラント輸出が1.3兆円ほどに達するところでは海外クレジット購入のための国内負担を相殺し、国内10%削減のみのGDPロスと同等な水準となる。国内削減を90年比15%に増加し残り10%を海外クレジット購入で実現するケース（2）では、GDPロスは2.2%となり、0.9兆円ほどの環境プラント輸出増加で海外クレジット購入のための負担はほぼ相殺される。しかし環境プラント輸出を2.0兆円まで増加させてもGDPロスは2%を上回っており、既にエネルギー効率を高める努力をしてきた日本経済にとって現実的ではないだろう。
模索されるべき現実的な両立
国内で政策的に需要を創出しようとしても持続しない。一国のみの規制強化が広範なイノベーションを促進するなどは望み薄であり、新成長戦略において求められるのは逆転の発想ではなく冷静なそろばん勘定だ。環境と経済の両立においてイノベーションの促進は大きなカギだが、より長期の視点からの政策手段を考えるべきである。2020年という短中期では、成長著しいアジア諸国の経済発展を支えながら低炭素化へと貢献することで、地球温暖化問題への日本の積極的な参加と同時に国内で経済的に受け入れ可能な負担の範囲を探るべきではないだろうか。

「CO2削減目標：影響の検証－規制の国際調和カギに」（経済教室）

Koji Nomura

Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Inc.) 2010.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

「温暖化対策」（オピニオン金曜討論）

野村浩二

『産経新聞』 (産経新聞社) 2010.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

「蜃気楼へのロードマップ－中期目標の政策評価プロセスはなぜ退歩したのか？」（日経BP ECOマネジメント）

Koji Nomura

(日経BP) 2010.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

第八回「蜃気楼へのロードマップ」要約
国際協調なき一国突出の危険性
COP15で拘束力のある国際合意に至らなかったことを受け、今後の排出権価格は弱含みが予想される。しかし対策がどのような政策手段によるとしても、温室効果ガスの排出に対して国際的に調和のとれた適切な価格付けは不可欠だ。一国が突出した国内対策を実施することは当該国のためにならないどころか、世界の排出量削減にもならない。市場構造をより現実的にモデル化すればカーボン・リーケージ率は50〜130%にもなるという研究もあり、先進工業国における排出量削減が世界全体としてむしろ排出量を「増加」させる危惧すら指摘されている。
政策評価プロセスの「起承転結」
日本の中期目標の政策評価は、2008年末から政権交代を挟む1年半に検討の場を変えて3度おこなわれるという稀有な事例となった。「起」となる麻生政権下のワーキンググループ（WG）では内閣官房の官僚と各研究機関の研究者間で非公式な集中的議論が24回重ねられた。前提条件をそろえ削減目標の水準や外生条件を変えながらモデルの予測値を調べるという相互チェックが機能しており、議論は出身省庁を感じさせないほどに対策による影響を探るという一点に向けられていた。
失われた調整機能
「承」となるタスクフォースでは、研究機関による事前会合はほとんどないまま追加的なシナリオが突然に提示された。参加機関はWG時と同じで試算結果にほとんど変化がなかったが、例外は国立環境研究所の経済モデルであった。WGでは9.1%下落するとされていた実質可処分所得の減少がタスクフォースでは3.4%減へ、実質GDPの減少もWGの6.0%からタスクフォースでは3.2%へと大幅に改訂されているが、いずれも根拠は明確ではない。研究機関間の事前議論が全くないまま公開の場で試算値が示され、政治のターゲットに縛られることで官僚の調整機能は失われた。これは政治主導の負の側面である。
閉ざされた議論への退歩
「転」として検討の場は環境省へと移り、ロードマップ検討会が開催された。大阪大学の伴教授のモデルによってWGやタスクフォースとは大きく異なる経済的影響が示されたが、その試算は最終回の検討会で突然に提出され議論はごくわずかであった。多様な研究者による相互批判が不可欠であるのに、それは逆に閉ざされてしまった。
ロードマップのwin-winシナリオには2つの課題がある。第一に、国際協調なきままの日本単独の突出した目標による価格競争力への負の影響が適切に描写されていない可能性だ。第二に、追加的なイノベーションを実現するための費用が必要とされず実証的根拠もないまま外生的に与えられているだけという点だ。コストレスなエネルギー効率の上昇を「仮定」すれば経済的影響が小さくて済むのは当然であり、それは同義反復に過ぎない。
win-winを描くモデルの正しい理解
IPCC第4次評価報告書で紹介されている温暖化対策が世界経済成長にプラスの効果を持つというモデルは、一国だけの突出した目標ではなく国際的に協調ある温暖化対策を評価したものだ。IMCPの比較研究自体も、win-winを描くモデルは楽観的な技術進歩の「可能性」を描くことを目的としたものであり、現実の影響度を測るには極端な描写に過ぎると評価対象から外している。国際協調なきままの突出した一国の削減目標が環境と経済のwin-winを実現するという環境省ロードマップの姿には、大きな疑問符が付いたままである。

「求められる政策手段の効率性－固定価格買い取り制度の拡充は日本経済に何をもたらすか」（日経BP ECOマネジメント）

Koji Nomura

(日経BP) 2010.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

第七回「求められる政策手段の効率性」要約
環境と経済の両立は見い出されたか
小沢環境大臣が示した「地球温暖化対策に係る中長期ロードマップ」試案では、国内対策25%削減を実行しても2020年のGDP下落はわずか0.4%にとどまり、技術進歩が実現すればむしろ0.4%増加するという経済評価が示された。しかしタスクフォースでの議論を集約すれば、国内対策による90年比25%削減は日本のGDPに3.1〜5.6%の下落をもたらすほどの難しいターゲットであり、負担軽減のためには海外クレジット購入とのバランス検討が有効である。研究者間の相互チェックのもとでは安易な解はないことが明らかになった。これ自体はひとつの成果といえる。
ロードマップで提示された経済評価が環境と経済の両立する解答を与えているかは疑わしい。具体性を欠いたまま楽観的な技術進歩を仮定し、日本の需要増加は国内生産のみを誘発するとし、省エネ投資はエネルギー消費節約と同時に生産能力も拡大させるような仮定のもとで評価しているだけのようである。
間接的な補助金政策の復権
タスクフォースにおける90年比25%削減の経済的影響（3.1〜5.6%のGDPロス）は、もっとも効率的な手段による削減を想定したものだ。現実の負担は採用される政策手段に大きく依存し、エコポイントやFIT政策など必ずしも効率的な政策が採用されるわけではない。
現在、太陽光の発電コストは1kWh当たり48円であり、LNG火力発電（7.5円）の6.4倍、家庭用電力販売価格（24円）の2倍にあたる。FIT政策はこうした価格差を考慮しながら再生可能エネルギーによる電力を高値で買い取り、その費用を広く電力消費者全体に負担させる仕組みだ。電力消費者にとって追加負担は電力料金に含まれて実感が薄く将来に先送りされ、一部の企業には直接の恩恵を与えるため積極的な推進派も生まれる。政府は補助金捻出も増税の説明も不要という調整コストの低い政策だが、実質的には間接的な補助金政策であり、その復権には警戒が必要だ。
フィード・イン・タリフ政策の非効率性
未来資源研究所のFischer氏とNewell氏による研究では、温暖化対策として取りうる6つの政策手段を比較評価している。もっとも効率的な「炭素への直接的な価格付け」を経済厚生ロス1.0として基準化すると、再生可能エネルギーの生産への補助金政策では2.4倍、FIT政策に相当する再生可能エネルギーの利用割合基準では2.0倍のロスをもたらす。FIT政策は電力価格の上昇と需要抑制に寄与する点で補助金政策よりは効率的だが、炭素税と比べれば温暖化対策として効率の悪い政策手段だ。日本では太陽光発電への傾斜がさらに非効率性を拡大させる。
ドイツの経験が示す将来負担
ドイツのFIT政策によって電力消費者が負う長期債務は太陽光発電のため6.8兆円、風力発電のため2.6兆円にのぼる。ライン・ヴェストファーレン経済研究所の報告書は、2005年のEUETS創設以来、FIT政策による再生可能エネルギー支援はもはや温室効果ガスの追加的な削減にすら繋がっていないと指摘する。ドイツの電力部門での削減はEUETSの枠組みの中で他国の削減を緩和させるだけとなり、政策間のコーディネーションを欠くことで単にコストの高い政策を導入しただけに終わっている。また再生可能エネルギー分野での雇用創出効果は認められるものの、長期的にみると雇用誘発はマイナスになるという。将来の雇用を前倒しして現在の一時的な雇用を創出しただけに過ぎないのである。
日本での過剰投資への警戒
FIT政策は将来に負担を先送りしながら現在の投資需要を喚起し、将来の雇用を犠牲にしながら現在の一時的な雇用を創出する。見かけ上、環境と経済が両立するwin-winの関係を与えるように錯覚させるのである。制度を設計しながらも、できるだけ早く「やめる」仕組み作りが重要であるという感覚が、現在の政府に残されているだろうか。安易な期待を膨張させ過剰な投資を導くことのないよう、バランス感覚を持った政策運営が求められる。

Minus 6% - Its Impact on GDP

野村浩二

Economist (Mainichi Shimbun Sha) 2010.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

「２５％削減の経済負担」

Koji Nomura

Economic Seminar (Nihon Hyoron Sha) 2010.02

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

「環境に過大な期待を寄せる新成長戦略－温暖化対策と交差する成長戦略：太陽電池で成長を牽引できるか？」（日経BP ECOマネジメント）

Koji Nomura

(日経BP) 2010.01

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

環境エネルギー政策と成長戦略の交差
2009年初め、鉄鋼大手4社が2020年までに海外生産能力を現在の約4倍に引き上げると発表した。国内市場の成熟や円高傾向に加え、鳩山政権の1990年比25%削減という中期目標もその決断の一要因であっただろう。2009年末に閣議決定された「新成長戦略」では、「グリーン・イノベーションによる環境・エネルギー大国戦略」が成長分野の第一に掲げられた。しかし重要なのは、再生可能エネルギーへの資源配分の傾斜を環境・エネルギー政策の手段としてではなく、2020年に向けた成長戦略として位置づけていた点だ。こうした成長戦略としての期待の膨張は、25%削減の前提条件であった「主要国の意欲的な目標の合意」を希薄化させてしまっているようにすら感じられる。
世界で拡大する太陽光発電市場
温暖化タスクフォースの検討では、1990年比25%削減を国内対策のみで実施するとき日本の実質GDPは3.1〜5.6%下落すると推計されている。そこでは国内での再生可能エネルギー拡大は考慮されているが、世界的な需要拡大による日本の輸出への効果は組み込まれていない。IEAの「World Energy Outlook 2009」によれば、世界の太陽光発電能力は2007年の9GWから2030年には244GWまで拡大し、450ppm安定化シナリオではさらに403GWへと拡張する見込みだ。現在、日本の太陽電池出荷量の79%が輸出に依存しており、世界市場の拡大が日本の輸出を誘発するとすれば、どれほどのプラス効果をもたらすか。
日本経済へのインパクト試算
一般均衡モデルによる試算では、現状の輸出シェアを維持する楽観的なケース（1）において、2020年の実質GDP押し上げ効果は0.30〜0.39%にとどまる。より現実的なケースとして、DRAMでの日本企業の経験（2002年には世界シェアが78%から12%へと激減）と同程度のシェア低下を想定したケース（2）では、押し上げ効果は2020年で0.20〜0.26%まで低下する。さらに年率10%ほどの太陽電池価格低下を考慮した名目値では、現状の輸出額の2倍程度に過ぎない。いかに積極的な世界需要拡大シナリオのもとで市場シェアを維持できたとしても、太陽電池輸出によるGDP押し上げ効果は、国内対策による25%削減のGDPロス（3.1〜5.6%）を相殺するには遠く及ばない。
ドイツのフィード・イン・タリフ政策の教訓
FIT政策の成功事例として挙げられるドイツだが、経済成長への効果は別の話だ。2007年に太陽電池メーカーのトップに躍り出たQセルズは、2009年に累積売上高が前期比41%減という大幅赤字に転落し、株価はピーク比90%近く下落してバブルがはじけた。太陽電池の生産は相対的に高いドイツの賃金を支えられず、同社は早くもマレーシアでの工場建設へと舵を切っていた。ドイツ経済全体としても、2009年の実質GDP成長率は四半期ごとに前年同期比マイナス6.7%、5.8%、4.8%と歴史的な低迷を記録しており、フランスや震源地の米国のおよそ2倍の落ち込みとなっている。積極的なグリーン投資が新たな競争力と成長のパスを提供するグリーン成長を、現在のドイツ経済が謳歌しているわけではないことは明らかだ。
過大な期待がもたらす過剰投資への警戒
日本では再生可能エネルギー、とくに太陽光発電へと資源配分の傾斜が始まりつつある。エネルギーセキュリティ・温暖化対策・成長戦略という異なる政策目標からの視線が重なり、過大な期待が過剰な投資を導く懸念は大きい。将来世代が享受できる太陽光発電からの便益を加算しても、高い投資コストを反映した償却費用を下回ってしまう恐れがある。成長戦略としても温暖化対策としても、太陽光発電ほどに高価ではない対策は数多い。日本の再生可能エネルギーへの投資をどこまで進めるべきか、便益と費用の冷静な評価が求められている。

「国民負担の理解と選択のための視点」

野村浩二

福井俊彦編『地球温暖化対策中期目標の解説』 (ぎょうせい) 2009.12

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (other), Single Work

「マイナス25％の再試算結果の評価」

野村浩二

エネルギーフォーラム (エネルギーフォーラム社) 2009.12

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

「ポーター仮説の呪縛からの解放－野心的な温暖化対策は国内企業の競争力を高めるのか？」（日経BP ECOマネジメント）

Koji Nomura

(日経BP) 2009.12

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

25%削減をめぐる対立する二つの見解
鳩山政権の1990年比25%削減という野心的な目標に対し、産業界はコスト増加と競争力低下を懸念し、エネルギー経済分野の分析者は工場の海外移転による国内雇用の喪失を危惧していた。一方でこれとは全く対立する見解もあった。野心的な国内目標の設定が、リーディング・セクターの育成や技術開発の促進を通じて競争力ある産業構造への変革をもたらし、新たな雇用創出も可能にするという主張だ。重要なのは、この見解が特定企業への恩恵にとどまらず、経済全体としてむしろプラスであると期待していた点である。
この対立は経済学的な考え方の相違に基づいている。GHG排出規制では企業はより安価な代替的生産手段を選ぶことになるが、もしその手段が最初から安価であれば始めから選択されていたはずであり、規制はコスト増をもたらして競争力を減退させる。これが伝統的な考え方だ。失業や遊休設備が存在する現実の経済では需要拡大が短期的に経済成長を牽引するケインズ効果もあるが、国内対策25%削減のような野心的な制約のもとではそれは部分的な相殺に過ぎない。
ポーター仮説とは何か
1990年代初め、ハーバード大学のポーター教授は「厳格な環境規制の強化がむしろ当該国の企業競争力を高める」と主張した。規制の強化が企業内部の非効率性に光を当て、効率改善を可能とするイノベーションを誘発するからだというのがその論拠だ。この主張は「ポーター仮説」として知られるようになった。
仮説が成立するような状況が存在しうることは感覚的に理解できる。企業が低廉化した新技術の存在を知らなかったり、合理的でない行動をしているとすれば、規制強化はwin-winを実現するかもしれない。しかし経済学的には、現実の経済に「宝の山」が手付かずのまま放置されていると期待するよりは、そこにはリスクや取引費用が隠れているだけと見る方が自然だ。太陽光発電設備の購入でも、将来の転居時における残存価値の未評価や将来の価格下落への期待など、補助金があってもなお購入を躊躇させる理由は数多く存在する。
ポーター仮説への懐疑と実証的検証
ポーター仮説に対しては、理論的・実証的な経済分析によって国内外で多くの批判がある。スウェーデンのBrännlund教授らによる実証分析では、1990年から2004年の企業レベルのデータにおいて、ゴム・プラスチック業以外のすべての部門でCO2課税が生産性上昇を通じてコストを低下させた証拠は見出せないとしてポーター仮説を棄却している。高い炭素税はエネルギー効率を向上させるが、資本生産性の低下などがその効果を打ち消してしまうのだ。世界で最初に明示的な炭素税を導入したスウェーデンの長期データでも、規制強化が製造業の全要素生産性を上昇させる証拠は見出されなかった。同論文の結論は「コストフリーな環境政策はたぶんないだろう」というものだ。
野心的な中期目標を掲げない米国
COP15において米国は2005年比17%削減（1990年比ではマイナス3%程度）を表明した。オバマ大統領はグリーン・ニューディールによる雇用創出を雄弁に語ってきたが、その米国がより野心的な中期目標を掲げないのは、短期的な景気浮揚策と国民負担を重視した現実的な中期目標とを十分に識別しているからではないだろうか。
Brännlund教授らの結論のひとつは「環境政策のコスト計算においてポーター効果を事前に考慮すべきではない」というものだ。事後的に存在したとしてもそれは法則ではなく例外であり、政策構築プロセスにおいて事前に競争力向上効果を織り込むことは危険である。温暖化対策の推進においても、実証分析に基づくポーター仮説への批判から目をそむけるべきではない。

「動き出す民主党マニフェスト-負担軽減考えた制度設計が課題」（日経BP ECOマネジメント）

Koji Nomura

(日経BP) 2009.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

第四回「動き出す民主党マニフェスト」要約
京都議定書からの教訓
2009年9月、民主党の鳩山由紀夫代表は2020年における温室効果ガス排出量を1990年比25%削減とする目標を表明した。民主党マニフェストにはキャップ・アンド・トレード方式による国内排出量取引市場の創設や地球温暖化対策税の導入も盛り込まれており、一方では地方財政や特定産業への過度な負担とならないよう留意した制度設計を行うとしている。
この目標のインパクトを理解するために、15年ほど時計の針を戻してみたい。京都議定書での1990年比マイナス6%という目標が設定された当時、経済モデルによるシミュレーションはその達成が相当に困難であることを示していた。原子力発電所の増設がほとんど実現不可能になっていく中で、目標達成は厳しいというのがモデルの結論であった。社会が目標を共有すれば想定外の技術進歩が起きるのではという期待もあったが、現実には2005年時点でプラス7.8%となった。景気後退による経済成長率の低下や原油価格高騰という想定外の要因があったにもかかわらず、目標達成は困難だったのである。
国内対策としての25%削減の経済的影響
麻生前首相の中期目標「1990年比マイナス8%」でさえ国内対策としての実現は相当に困難であることは明白だった。民主党の目標はさらに大胆な25%削減である。これを国内対策のみで実施しようとした場合、2020年における限界削減費用は1tCO2あたり6万〜10万円と試算される。欧米が受け入れようとしている限界削減費用がせいぜい数千円であることを考えれば、まず持続不可能な炭素の内外価格差である。実質GDPは3.2〜6.6%の低下が見込まれ、GDPの1%低下は雇用者報酬の100万人分に相応することから、国内対策による25%削減は300万〜600万人の雇用者の所得機会を消失させることになる。家計の実質可処分所得の下落は1世帯あたり年額22万〜77万円と幅があり、KEOモデルによる試算では77万円である。
海外クレジット利用を組み合わせた場合の負担
国内対策による25%削減は現実的な政策ではないが、国内対策と海外クレジット利用を組み合わせれば費用負担は大きく軽減される。KEOモデルによる試算では、炭素価格88ドルを上限に国内対策を実施し、残りを海外クレジット購入で賄うシナリオ（b-2）では、削減量の83%を海外から購入するために2.9兆円の負担を必要とするが、それを含めても実質GDPの低下は0.5%にとどまる。家計負担は1世帯あたり年額12.7万円となり、麻生前首相の中期目標を国内対策のみで達成する場合の17.2万円を下回る。
さらに炭素価格を30ドルとした場合（b-3）では、実質GDPの減少は0.2%と限定的となり、家計の負担額も年間3.2万円まで低下する。これは90年比25%削減を実現できる、家計負担の最も少ない方法であろう。果たして3.5億tCO2もの海外クレジットの購入が可能か、有効なモニタリングができるかなど検討すべき課題も多いが、米国のワックスマン・マーキー法案では15ドル程度で10億tCO2を超える海外オフセットが想定されている。
冷静な国益の議論を
多額の国富流出を懸念する声もあるが、国内対策による負担でも競争力低下による輸出減少や所得低下として潜在的に国富を失うという意味では相違はない。先進国が同様の負担を覚悟し途上国を巻き込むことができれば、化石エネルギーの需要拡大を抑え原油価格の安定化にも寄与するだろう。現在、日本の原油輸入額は年間16兆円にもなる。もし10%の価格低下があれば、排出枠の1兆円の購入にはお釣りが来る。民主党案の提示を受け、日本は今一度、国益を冷静に見つめるべき時にある。海外排出枠の購入に対する国民の理解を得るためにも、改めて国民に問い直される必要があるだろう。

「中期目標の国内対策と国民負担」（日経BP ECOマネジメント）

Koji Nomura

(日経BP) 2009.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

第三回「中期目標の国内対策と国民負担」要約
「国内対策」と「国民負担」は切り離して考えるべき
日本経済は依然として国民所得の95%を国内生産に依存している。この事実を軽視して国内生産をないがしろにすれば、いずれより深刻な停滞を招くことになる。政府が検討した6つの選択肢のうち、国内対策のあり方を考えるベンチマークとなるのは「先進国全体として1990年比25%削減」とする第2シナリオであった。
温暖化防止という国際的な公益を実現するための負担のあり方を考える際、効率と公正を切り離したうえで2段階のアプローチが有益である。第一段階として、世界全体の排出目標を設定したうえで炭素の国際価格を一律に設定することで、産業の競争条件を国際的に等しく保ちながら削減の総費用を世界で最小化できる。第二段階として、削減費用の負担を各国で再配分する。先進国がコストを負担してでも途上国での削減を推進することが望ましく、なぜなら先進国内でさらなる対策を行うよりもはるかにコスト負担を少なくできるからである。
海外クレジット利用によるマクロ経済への影響
中期目標検討委員会において第2シナリオの試算を行った地球環境産業技術研究機構（RITE）は、必要な国際炭素価格をCO2換算1tあたり88ドルと算定し、日本の国内対策として「2005年比マイナス6%」の実施が必要とした。一方、国立環境研究所は166ドル・「同マイナス10%」と、2倍近くの乖離が生じ、第2シナリオは世論調査の段階で姿を消してしまった。
KEOモデルによる試算では、日本が国内対策を炭素価格88ドルまでとし、それを上回る削減量は海外クレジット購入（1tあたり88ドル）で達成するシナリオを検討した。その結果、クレジット購入に1.0兆円の負担を要するものの、実質GDPと家計消費支出の下落率はそれぞれ0.3%と1.2%にとどまり、国内対策のみの場合（0.6%・2.3%）と比べてマクロ経済への負担はおよそ半分に低下する。
海外クレジット利用によって家計負担は大幅に減少
KEOモデルでは、中期目標を国内対策のみで達成する場合の家計負担は1世帯あたり年額17.2万円（光熱費3.3万円・ガソリン代1.5万円の負担増を含む）と試算される。海外クレジット利用を組み合わせた場合、家計の負担総額は9.8万円減少し、偶然にも政府の公表値である7.6万円と一致する。そのうち海外クレジット購入のための直接・間接負担は2.3万円（負担総額の約30%）であり、残る5.3万円が国内対策による家計負担となる。
国民に示されるべきだったもう一つの選択肢
中期目標を国内対策のみで達成するか、海外クレジット購入を組み合わせて達成するかは、家計の負担において決定的な差をもたらす。一国全体では0.9兆円もの海外への所得移転を伴うとしても、家計の負担が半分以下になるのであれば、国民は後者を選んでいたかもしれない。政府は世論調査において「真水」の国内対策のみではなく、両論を併記した選択肢を国民に与えるべきであった。国際交渉の戦略的配慮は、国民による負担の理解に先行するものではない。
2020年に現実がどうなるかといえば、企業は国際的な炭素価格を見ながら、それを超えるコストの対策を自発的に行うことを躊躇するだろう。結果として中期目標の達成は海外クレジットの購入によって賄われる可能性が高く、それは京都議定書での経験の反復になる。しかし国民負担の観点からみれば、その帰結は「真水」の計画よりもずっと負担の小さいものになる。むしろ注意すべきは政府による非効率な補助金政策や公共投資の拡大であり、そうした対策費用はモデルの試算値をはるかに超えてしまうだろう。

「中期目標による負担額試算は妥当か」（日経BP ECOマネジメント）

Koji Nomura

(日経BP) 2009.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

第二回「中期目標による負担額試算は妥当か」要約
麻生首相の中期目標発表とその意味
2009年6月10日、麻生太郎首相は日本のGHG中期目標を「2005年比マイナス15%（1990年比マイナス8%）」と発表した。政府内で調整してきた「1990年比マイナス7%」にさらに1%の削減努力を上乗せしたものだ。首相はこの追加1%のために10兆円が必要と強調したが、これは削減コストが1tあたり10万円を超えることを意味する。当時、欧州の排出権市場価格は日本円で2000円を下回っており、日本は海外比50倍以上のコストを要する国内対策へ踏み出したことになる。排出権はすでに貿易財であり、コストに耐えられない製造業が生産を海外へシフトさせる可能性を考えれば、この50倍もの内外価格差を長期にわたって維持することは事実上不可能である。
政府の家計負担試算への批判と反論
中期目標と同時に家計負担額を提示したことは評価に値する。国民が政策の方向性を選択するために不可欠な情報だからだ。しかしその後、「試算はネガティブな側面のみを計算している」「産業構造が不変と仮定して負担を意図的に大きく見積もっている」といった批判が相次いだ。これらは全くの誤解である。経済モデルは環境対策のマイナス面だけを取り出して評価することはほぼ不可能であり、省エネ投資の拡大や価格競争力の向上といったプラス効果も当然に織り込まれている。負担の議論を「脅し」と切り捨てるべきではなく、むしろ負担を示さない議論のほうがはるかに危険である。
家計負担の解釈における三つの混乱
政府の負担額算定には複数の混乱がある。第一に、光熱費のみが示されてガソリン代が含まれていない点だ。代替交通手段の少ない地方ではガソリン代の負担増こそが深刻であり、KEOモデルの試算では年額1.8万円ほどの負担増となる。
第二は「実質所得の変化」の意味に関する混乱だ。実質可処分所得の減少は、名目所得・光熱費・ガソリン代・エネルギー消費量・その他消費財価格の変化という5つの効果に分解できる。政府が「収入の減少」と「光熱費の増加」を単純に加算したことは二重計上に等しく、実質可処分所得の減少のみが家計負担の本体に相応する。
第三は、モデルごとに可処分所得の定義が異なる点だ。特に日本経済研究センターのモデルは、炭素削減コストをすべて家計に還流した後の姿を可処分所得としているため、実際の負担感とかけ離れた楽観的な数値となっている。世論調査ではこの最小推計値が採用されていた。KEOモデルによる試算では家計負担は年額17.2万円と、政府公表値の7.6万円を大きく上回る。
米国との比較と「真水」議論の問題点
米国のリーバーマン・ウォーナー法案の評価では、日本と同程度の削減目標を国内対策のみで実施した場合、米国でも1世帯あたり年額10万円超の家計負担が試算されている。しかし国内外クレジットの利用上限を外すと、米国の家計負担は年額約2万円程度にまで縮小する。日本でも同様であり、国内対策のみでは年額17.2万円の負担が、海外での削減を活用すれば10分の1以下になる可能性がある。
最も問題なのは、政府の世論調査において「国内対策のみ（真水）」という選択肢しか国民に示されなかった点だ。海外クレジットを購入するというもう一つの重要な選択肢が提示されなかったことは、政策議論の透明性として大きな欠落であり、国民が負担の全体像を理解した上で選択できる機会が失われた。

「温暖化対策がもたらす日本経済へのインパクト」（日経BP ECOマネジメント）

Koji Nomura

(日経BP) 2009.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

背景と政策の枠組み
世界的な「グリーン・ニューディール」の潮流の中、環境危機と経済危機を同時に克服しようとする気運が高まっていた。日本でも2050年までに温室効果ガス（GHG）を現状比60〜80%削減する「長期目標」が掲げられ、その通過点となる中期目標の設定が政府内で議論されていた。政府は1990年比プラス4%からマイナス25%まで6つの選択肢を用意し、国立環境研究所・日本経済研究センター・KEOモデルなど複数の研究機関に経済的影響の分析を委託した。
経済モデルが示す厳しい試算結果
各機関の分析が示したストーリーは共通している。CO2削減を強化するほど、温室効果ガスを追加的に1単位削減するコスト（限界削減費用）が逓増し、エネルギー価格が上昇する。産業部門では省エネ投資が誘発され、家計では省エネ機器への買い替えが促進されるため、需要拡大というプラス効果はある。しかし一方で、生産コストの上昇と輸出競争力の低下が産業の生産水準を押し下げ、所得の減少と家計消費の後退を招く。総合的には経済へのマイナスの影響が避けられないというのが、各モデルに共通する結論だった。
具体的な数字としては、2020年の実質GDPが「最大導入ケース（1990年比マイナス7%）」でマイナス0.5%、「1990年比マイナス15%」でマイナス2.1%、「1990年比マイナス25%」でマイナス5.6%と試算された。失業率はそれぞれ約0.3%、0.8%、1.9ポイントの悪化が見込まれ、家計の実質可処分所得は年間15万円（月1.2万円）から最大77万円（月6.4万円）もの減少という厳しい未来図が描かれた。CO2削減を強化すればするほど限界削減費用は増大し、エネルギーを大量に消費する業種への打撃は大きく、雇用や国民所得にも深刻な影響が及ぶ構図である。
「新産業創出」への期待の限界
こうした試算に対し、「環境対策から生まれる新産業の発展が織り込まれていないのではないか」という批判もあった。確かに、既存技術の普及とその生産誘発効果はモデルに組み込まれているが、想像もつかない全く新しい産業は反映されていない。しかし著者はこれに慎重な見方を示す。過去の歴史を振り返っても、わずか10年という短いスパンで開発から生産・量産化まで進み、経済全体に多大な影響を与えるほどの市場を築いた新産業の例はほとんど存在しない。現在から11年後の2020年という中期の時間軸においては、全く未知の新産業が突如として確立される可能性は極めて低く、グリーン・ニューディールに多大な期待を抱くことは難しいと結論づけている。
モデル間の差異と共通の底線
各機関のモデルは構造や前提条件が異なることから、項目によっては分析結果に差異が生じた。楽観的な見解を示した機関もある。しかし重要なのは、いずれのモデルも「経済に無視しえないマイナスの影響を与える」という一点では一致していることだ。また、2020年における限界削減費用については、技術モデルと経済モデルの間で結果が1.5倍程度の範囲に収まっており、ある種の整合性が確認された。
根拠に基づく政治決断への期待
かつて京都議定書を締結した際、日本はマイナス6%という削減目標を、コスト評価の十分な分析なしに引き受けてしまった。欧州が8%、米国が7%なら日本は6%といった具合に、実現可能性の根拠や国民負担への意識が希薄なまま数字だけを受け取った形だった。その結果、2007年度の排出量はプラス9%と目標を大きく超過した。今回、複数の研究機関が短期間のうちに集中的なモデル分析を行ったことは、「エビデンス・ベースド・ポリシー（根拠に基づく政策）」の実践として高く評価される。関係者によれば、政権交代の可能性も視野に「合理的な根拠のあるストーリーを描いておかなければならない」という必要性から、このような手間のかかる分析プロセスが設けられたという。きっかけがいかなるものであれ、モデル分析を通じて環境対策コストへの認識が政治家たちに培われたことは、非常に大きな意味を持つ取り組みであったと著者は評価している。

"Think sustainable development" (Reading Productivity and Economic Trends)

Eunice Lau and Koji Nomura

APO News (Asian Productivity Organization) 2008.12

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (other), Joint Work

Asia has been a fast-growing region. During 2000–2005, the Asian economy (including PR China) grew at 6.0% on average per year, compared with 2.5% in the USA and 1.6% in the EU15. Within the region, the performance was dominated by PR China, which achieved spectacular growth of 8.3% and 9.1% on average per annum in the periods of 1995–2000 and 2000–2005, respectively. Together with its size, it contributed to over 50% of the region's growth in both periods (see the accompanying chart). The pressure that the region's fast growth has put on the world's resources and the environment is well documented. Is this fast pace of growth sustainable?
Sustainability is the question of our ability to maintain the current level of well-being in the future. Currently, conventional economic statistics are simply inadequate to illuminate the issue, and GDP as a welfare measure is questionable. GDP is fundamentally an aggregate measure of production within a country. Key factors that have significant bearing on individual well-being, such as income inequality, household disposable income, environmental degradation, and changes in wealth, are omitted. The gap between our welfare concerns today and what we are measuring is so sizable that GDP measures alone are deemed inappropriate when sustainable development is considered. Currently, the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, set up by the French President, attempts to find how the inadequacies of GDP measures can be feasibly addressed (see http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr).
Among others, GDP net of depreciation has been put forward as a better welfare measure than GDP because allowances set aside for replenishing the capital stock are not available for consumption and in turn do not contribute to the current level of well-being. The same concept is useful in thinking sustainability, with capital stock extended to include natural resources, physical capital, and human and social capital. The World Bank operationalizes the concept of "net adjusted savings" (NAS) as net saving (i.e., GDP minus consumption minus depreciation) plus education expenditures minus the consumption of natural resources and the monetary evaluations of damages resulting from CO2 emissions. Based on International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates in CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion (2007), CO2 emissions in Asia (including PR China) grew at an average 7.8% annually during 2000–2005, compared with an economic growth rate of 6.0%. Part of the environmental cost of PR China's fast growth is reflected in the staggering acceleration in its CO2 emissions from an average increase of 0.3% per annum during 1995–2000 to 10.2% a year during 2000–2005.
In gauging sustainability, the NAS approach has two major limitations. First, it is not equipped to analyze the impact of any irreversible events in the natural world. Second, any meaningful sustainability measures need to balance future risks against the uncertainty of future advancements, resource discoveries, and preferences of future generations.
Given our current knowledge, it is high time that sustainability concerns were more explicitly incorporated into national economic policy frameworks. Building a workable, coherent intellectual and statistical framework is an important step toward this goal.

"The evolving role of the service sector" (Reading Productivity and Economic Trends)

Eunice Lau and Koji Nomura

APO News (Asian Productivity Organization) 2008.11

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (other), Joint Work

Traditionally, technological advances tend to favor manufacturing more than services, resulting in the former sector being the engine of productivity growth in an economy. Services, in contrast, have been perceived as the technologically stagnant sector. If its relative claim on resources in the economy is rising, overall productivity growth will be dragged down to the rate prevailing in the stagnant sector. When this so-called Baumol's disease takes root, economic growth is doomed to decline.
In recent years, however, a cure for Baumol's disease has started surfacing in empirical evidence, which points to the emerging capability of some service industries to capitalize on information and communication technologies (ICT) and achieve productivity growth. J.E. Triplett and B.P. Bosworth (FRBNY Economic Policy Review, September 2003) declared that, "Baumol's disease has been cured." This assertion was based on their findings that in the USA, labor productivity growth in the service industry equaled the economywide average in the latter half of the 1990s, driven by an unprecedented surge in total factor productivity growth. In short, services are no longer the sick industries in terms of productivity growth.
The pervasive nature of ICT has meant that its impact is not reserved for manufacturing but also can transform service industries. ICT is also seen as a disruptive technology, productivity assimilation of which often requires a major overhaul of business practices. The role of ICT in service industries is twofold. First, it provides an enabling technological platform to create and launch new service products. As ICT fundamentally improves the efficiency of data and information processing, its effective exploitation not only leads to an expansion of product possibilities but also creates new business formats and new industries selling service functionality. Second, by providing a cost-effective, time-efficient, borderless medium to store, present, and transmit information, ICT networks together with digitalization have helped make information and knowledge more marketable and breach the physical barrier of national boundaries. If supported by trade liberalization efforts, the international market offers these IT-using service industries new business opportunities and scope to reap economies of scale, which are unavailable to traditional services.
The service sector accounts for the biggest share of total value added in Asian countries, independent of their stage of development (Table 8, APO Productivity Databook 2008). The accompanying figure shows contributions of the service sector to labor productivity growth during 2000–2005, which were particularly prominent in India, accounting for just under 90%. At 5.8% on average per year, services were the sector with the highest labor productivity growth in India. This is consistent with the well-documented economic surge of India in the 1990s via its IT-based high-tech information services, which flourish on human rather than physical capital. By providing new ways to compete, modern ICT has allowed India to take an unusual path in economic development, bypassing a stage when manufacturing steers. Rather than being a laggard sector, service industries can be a leading sector driving productivity growth and development if ICT can be successfully assimilated and exploited.

"The process of technology assimilation" (Reading Productivity and Economic Trends)

Eunice Lau and Koji Nomura

APO News (Asian Productivity Organization) 2008.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (other), Joint Work

Technological transfer plays a key role in economic development. Part of the technological advancement is embodied in capital goods, which can be acquired through investment. But how to master the embodied technology to yield its full productivity potential in the host country is largely tacit and requires learning by doing. This process of technology assimilation can be slow, disruptive, and costly. How successful a country can be in this respect depends on its social and technological capabilities. Empirically, assimilation rates vary across countries, resulting in diverse development experience and outcomes.
As mentioned previously in this column, the Asian miracle was credited largely to input accumulation rather than to total factor productivity growth. Focusing on level comparisons of Asian and US manufacturing for the period 1963–1997, Marcel P. Timmer (Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 2002; 16: 50–72) observed that labor productivity levels achieved by the Republic of China and Republic of Korea in 1997, even after a period of capital intensification, were lower than what the USA had achieved at similar levels of capital intensity. In other words, capital accumulation might have created the potential but was itself not a sufficient condition for performance; the same amount of capital was used more productively in the USA in the late 1980s than in the Republic of Korea and Republic of China in the 1990s. Although capital intensity was not covered in the APO Productivity Databook 2008, the accompanying chart shows that labor productivity at the whole economy level in the Republic of China was 79% that of the USA in 2005, whereas the Republic of Korea's in 2005 was 85% and 55% of the US 1975 and 2005 levels, respectively.
The USA's superior assimilation ability was also apparent in comparisons with Europe. The divergent productivity performance in the latter half of the 1990s was largely attributed to the failure of Europe to reap productivity gains from ICT investments compared with the USA. Empirical evidence therefore suggests that soft investment in organizational change, managerial skills, and human capital is required to complement the accumulation effort.
Given the diminishing possibilities for further productivity improvements with a particular technology, sustained growth must involve the continual introduction of new technology, new goods, and new activities. However, the pace of the climb up the technological ladder can be too fast if insufficient time is allowed for the assimilation process and learning costs are too high to be beneficial to productivity growth. On the other hand, countries can also be stagnant in productivity growth with the existing technology when the pace of technological change is too slow and new opportunities are not created. The right balance is difficult to judge a priori, and different industry sectors even within a country can display diverse capabilities in adopting new technologies and pushing the frontier. In general, flexibility of a country in resource allocation and factor markets with a well-educated workforce will be conducive to the process.

"Setting agriculture in order—an important step toward development"(Reading Productivity and Economic Trends)

Eunice Lau and Koji Nomura

APO News (Asian Productivity Organization) 2008.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (other), Joint Work

Asia is a diverse region with countries at different stages of economic development. Part of this diversity is reflected in the national industrial composition. Economic data suggest that the more an economy relies on its agricultural sector, the lower its per capita GDP. Although the actual path of economic development may vary, an effective redeployment of resources from the agricultural sector appears to be an element common to a country's development outcome.
The accompanying chart shows national industrial composition of total value added in 2005 (Figure 13 in the APO Productivity Databook 2008). The share of agriculture ranged from 44.8% in Lao PDR to 1.4% in Japan. The data suggest a negative correlation between the size of the agricultural sector and the relative per capita GDP against the USA. That is, the lowest income group tends to have the largest agricultural sector, whereas the top group has the smallest.
Agricultural employment in Asia accounted for 45% of total employment in 2005, compared with 1.1% for the USA. In Asia, agriculture generally has a higher employment share than its corresponding value-added share, implying that the sector's labor productivity level lags behind that of the wider economy. In 2005, per-worker value added in agriculture was only 31% of that in the nonagricultural sector on average. Assuming other things being equal, this difference in the industrial structure alone, i.e., the relatively less productive sector having a much greater weight, explains 10–20% of Asia's 84% labor productivity shortfall against the USA.
In the context of long-term trends, this snapshot of cross-country comparisons in 2005 reflects regional progress rather than weakness. Despite the widespread variations, nearly all countries studied are making concerted efforts to shift resources from agriculture, and most experienced positive labor productivity growth between 2000 and 2005, ranging from 1.1% in Japan to 5.8% in Malaysia (Table 11 in the APO Productivity Databook 2008). The trend of a long-term relative decline of agriculture is unmistakable.
It is perhaps no coincidence that the Green Revolution and rural reforms preceded economic reforms and the subsequent takeoff in China and India in the 1980s (see for example, Sachs, J., The End of Poverty, 2005). The boost in rural income was significant when agriculture's share in total employment was around 70% in both countries in the 1970s. The subsequent emergence of high-performing new sectors (particularly manufacturing in China and IT services in India) held the key to the productive absorption of resources displaced from agriculture and spurred overall growth. By 2005, agriculture's employment share had fallen to 53.7% and 44.8% in India and China, respectively. However, the corresponding value-added share of 18.3% and 12.6% still suggests significant slack in agriculture in these two economies, despite their rapid economic growth. Underemployment, and informal production and employment, are suspected to be prevalent in agriculture in these fast-transforming Asian economies. Given the size of the sector, their impact on economic measurement could be significant.

"The role of structural shifts in productivity enhancement" (Reading Productivity and Economic Trends)

Eunice Lau and Koji Nomura

APO News (Asian Productivity Organization) 2008.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (other), Joint Work

Productivity gains from structural shifts could be highly significant in economic development. More specifically, it has been argued that the rapid shift of capital and labor into the "modern sector" of higher labor productivity played a pivotal role in the Asian Miracle by preventing a decline in the return on capital despite the sustained high investment ratios in these high-performing economies (see, for example, Nelson, R. and Pack, H., The Asian Miracle and Modern Growth Theory, Economic Journal, 1999; 109: 416–436).
Since the 1960s, a handful of East Asian economies, notably Singapore, the Republic of China, Hong Kong, and the Republic of Korea, have managed to set themselves off on a path of impressive growth. With their real per capita GDP growing at a pace of 4–5% per year on average, these economies outperformed other comparable developing countries in the 1960s and stand out as the only region that has managed to catch up to the living standards of the advanced countries. The accompanying figure (Figure 5 in the APO Productivity Databook 2008) shows how these economies rapidly closed the per capita income gap with the USA from 1975, against the background of little progress made by the region as a whole. Because of its potential policy significance, what has been the recipe for the Asian Miracle has been a subject of vigorous academic debate.
Among other views, narrowing the "idea gap" was put forward as an explanation by Paul Romer (Idea Gaps and Object Gaps in Economic Development, Journal of Monetary Economics, 1993; 32: 543–573). He argued that underlying the success of the East Asian economies was their ability to adopt existing technologies from the advanced economies. If true, this represented a less costly approach to economic development than the accumulation view whereby the road to prosperity is through savings and investment, in other words, forgone current consumption, which many poor countries cannot easily afford.
Empirical evidence, however, has lent little support for this view. East Asia's rapid growth has been found to be largely driven by factor accumulation, with total factor productivity (TFP) growth accounting for only one-fourth of the region's growth in labor productivity between 1960 and 1994 (Collins, S. and Bosworth, B., Economic Growth in East Asia: Accumulation versus Assimilation, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1996; 2: 135–203). The main lessons from East Asia's success therefore are not about which policies best promote TFP growth. Rather, the focus should be on how to achieve and sustain high rates of savings and investment, defying the law of diminishing returns.
With an investment ratio of over 20% of GDP, Nelson and Pack (1999) argued that the success of the fast-growing Asian economies lay in their extraordinary ability to absorb and assimilate technologies superior to their own at a rapid pace sustained over a long period without slowing. This process involved uncertainty and economic risk in an essential way. To sow the seeds of success, a favorable policy environment was first required to nurture learning, innovation, and entrepreneurship. Subsequently, it was the shift of resources into the more modern, capital-intensive technologies through aggressive entrepreneurship and progressive learning that held the key to sustaining high rates of return on capital and in turn investment, which drove growth. In other words, the observed dramatic shift in the product mix and firm size in these Asian economies should be seen as an integral part of their success story which ran far deeper than simply factor accumulation.

"Why labor productivity matters" (Reading Productivity and Economic Trends)

Eunice Lau and Koji Nomura

APO News (Asian Productivity Organization) 2008.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (other), Joint Work

"For the fact is that the key both to long-term economic growth and to sustained differences in economic performance between countries seems to be the ability to get more for less—to have output grow faster than input." Paul Krugman (International Affairs, 1995; 71(4): 717–732)Productivity is one of the main economic performance indicators that government policymakers often monitor. In simple terms, productivity measures units of output per unit of input. As resource constraints are prevalent in all economies in one form or another, whatever the income level, the capability of an economy to drive productivity growth, i.e., output growing faster than input, is seen as cardinal for ensuring future prosperity.In 2005, GDP per capita (adjusted for purchasing power parity [PPP]) of APO member countries as a whole was only around 15% of that of the USA. Despite rapid economic growth of the group in recent years, the gap persists. The accompanying chart shows that for most APO countries, the substantial per-capita GDP gaps with the USA are predominantly explained by their relatively poor labor productivity performance. This is why identifying the sources of labor productivity growth is crucial to a country's development efforts.There are different techniques for productivity analysis. The APO Productivity Databook uses the growth accounting framework, the international standard for compiling productivity estimates. In this approach, economic growth is decomposed into contributions of input growth and total factor productivity (TFP) growth. Within the same framework, labor productivity growth can be traced back to its sources in capital deepening, improvement in labor quality, and TFP growth. Although full analysis of these sources was not performed in the Databook 2008 (the current plan is that sources of productivity growth will be analyzed at least for some countries in Databook 2009) as theoretically established channels of labor productivity growth, they highlight areas where potential policy levers could be applied to raise labor productivity.Another perspective is the industry origins of productivity growth, which offer insight into the dynamics of an economy and the sectors contributing most to the productivity drive. Furthermore, productivity growth for the whole economy can be decomposed into the intrasectoral effect (productivity gains within the industry sectors) and the intersectoral effect (the change in the resource allocation of production). The latter is positive when high-performance industry is growing relative to other sectors in the economy.Empirical evidence of the "Asian Miracle" has suggested that input growth (especially capital accumulation) was behind the success story of Asian Tigers, i.e., Hong Kong, Singapore, Republic of Korea, and Republic of China, that experienced more than a four-fold increase in per capita income over the 35-year period from the mid-1960s. Labor productivity growth was largely explained by capital deepening with TFP growth playing a surprisingly small role in its success. The lessons to be learned are therefore why those countries can mobilize input better than other countries and how they can achieve and sustain high rates of saving and investment. Nelson and Pack (Economic Journal, 1999; 109(457): 416–436) highlighted that among other factors, the possibility to shift into highly productive sectors is a crucial element of this productive assimilation of factor inputs.

"International comparisons of productivity: a panoramic view for decision making" (Reading Productivity and Economic Trends)

Eunice Lau and Koji Nomura

APO News (Asian Productivity Organization) 2008.06

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (other), Joint Work

We are faced with economic decisions every day, whether as consumers, workers, entrepreneurs, or government policymakers. Generally, the better the information we have, the better are our decisions and in turn their outcomes. We may be well aware of our immediate surroundings but a panoramic view often requires some research effort. When we broaden our view, we may discover options and possibilities that we did not even know existed, relevant lessons to be learned from others' experience of our actions or inaction, and benchmark performances to aspire to.
As a key indicator of economic performance, productivity analysis is useful in focusing on issues at hand. In particular, when a country is catching up with the world leaders in GDP per capita, significant productivity growth is an essential element in the process. A good understanding of the key drivers and dynamics of productivity growth is therefore beneficial to a country's development efforts.
Some APO member countries may already have their own programs of productivity analysis, but such programs may not sufficiently take into account the regional and global contexts. This is a gap that the APO Productivity Databook seeks to fill to complement national programs. Through international comparisons, widespread global or regional economic trends can be distinguished from factors unique to individual economies, and benchmark performances can be identified and analyzed to focus on potential adaptations. In this manner, international comparisons highlight the ways countries are able to learn from and cooperate with each other.
In the APO Productivity Databook 2008, a new analytical framework was developed to enable cross-country comparisons for the first time in this series. Furthermore, to provide a more complete regional and global perspective, the economic performances of APO member countries were compared with those of the People's Republic of China, USA, and EU15 for reference. Countries are ranked according to their GDP and per capita GDP. To reflect their diversity, countries covered in the publication were divided into groups based on relative per capita GDP and how fast they were catching up with the USA, the world leader. Regional economic growth was dissected into country origins. Changes in per capita GDP were traced back to the causal components, i.e., labor productivity and the labor utilization rate. To understand further the dynamics of an economy, we analyzed the industry origins of each country's economic growth and labor productivity.
This monthly column in the APO News will present the findings from the analyses contained in the APO Productivity Databook 2008 in bite-sized form, focusing on one specific topic each month and expanding on its implications where possible. International comparisons of productivity, however, are not a precise science but fraught with measurement difficulties and issues. Although the APO Productivity Databook 2008 represents an important milestone in APO productivity research efforts, there is still room for improvement. More specifically, the work of the APO Productivity Databook project team continues in two broad directions: 1) more thorough data investigation and harmonization to improve cross-country data comparability and in turn the quality of the results; and 2) an expanded scope of the analytical framework for completeness. Admittedly, a "perfect" data set is an unattainable dream. Nevertheless, improved knowledge of the underlying statistics should enable us to judge data limitations better and in turn to interpret the results with greater confidence. The medium-term goal is to build an APO productivity database comparable with other international databases in terms of quality, opening up the possibility for the majority of countries in the Asia-Pacific to be included in future international studies of productivity performance.

"International Comparison of Productivity and Analysis of Competitiveness in Pacific Rim Countries" (in Japanese)

Koji Nomura, Dale W. Jorgenson, Masahiro Kuroda, and Kazushige Shimpo

Academic Frontier Research Result Report 2008 (G-SEC, Keio University) 22 - 23 2008.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (bulletin of university, research institution), Joint Work

Backed by the price competitiveness of the manufacturing sector, it was only some 20 years ago that more than a few economists held the expectation that the Japanese economy would soon surpass the United States in per-capita GDP or labor productivity. In the last decade of the 20th century, the United States achieved improvements in labor productivity through capital deepening in both IT hardware and software, as well as through technological progress itself, and succeeded in the industrialization of information technology. At present, measured against the market economy as a whole, Japan's labor productivity is estimated to lag behind that of the United States by approximately 30%. This project has worked to construct an internationally comparable productivity database and to examine national accounts frameworks that enhance such comparability, with the aim of analyzing the factors behind this competitive disadvantage and its industrial sources.

PDF1

「周回遅れの統計精度」（経済教室）

野村浩二

Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Inc.) 2008.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Single Work

「米国市場の知らない"Made in Japan"」

野村浩二

『三田評論』 (慶應義塾大学出版会) 2005.08

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (other), Single Work

書評　藤川清史著『グローバル経済の産業連関分析』

野村浩二

『イノベーション＆IOテクニーク』 (環太平洋産業連関分析学会) 1999.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (scientific journal), Single Work

「日本の潜在成長力」（経済教室）

黒田昌裕, 野村浩二

Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Inc.) 1999.01

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Joint Work

「実証経済分析と統計資料（10）生産者行動の計量モデル」

黒田昌裕, 野村浩二

『統計』 (日本統計協会) 1998.05

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Joint Work

「実証経済分析と統計資料（9）生産関数の計測」

黒田昌裕, 野村浩二

『統計』 (日本統計協会) 1998.04

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Joint Work

「加工統計作成の観点からみた一次統計の問題点」

黒田昌裕, 野村浩二

『ECO-FORUM』 (統計研究会) 1998.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Joint Work

「実証経済分析と統計資料（8）生産者内部均衡図式」

黒田昌裕, 野村浩二

『統計』 (日本統計協会) 1998.03

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Joint Work

「実証経済分析と統計資料（7）要素相対価格と投入構造」

黒田昌裕, 野村浩二

『統計』 (日本統計協会) 1998.02

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Joint Work

「実証経済分析と統計資料（6）労働投入と雇用係数」

黒田昌裕, 野村浩二

『統計』 (日本統計協会) 1998.01

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Joint Work

「実証経済分析と統計資料（5）資本ストックの推計」

黒田昌裕, 野村浩二

『統計』 (日本統計協会) 1997.12

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Joint Work

「実証経済分析と統計資料（4）固定資本マトリックスと統計資料」

黒田昌裕, 野村浩二

『統計』 (日本統計協会) 1997.11

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Joint Work

「実証経済分析と統計資料（3）資本概念と統計資料」

黒田昌裕, 野村浩二

『統計』 (日本統計協会) 1997.10

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Joint Work

「実証経済分析と統計資料（2）経験科学としての経済学」

黒田昌裕, 野村浩二

『統計』 (日本統計協会) 1997.09

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Joint Work

「実証経済分析と統計資料（1）生産関数の計測と生産関連統計」

黒田昌裕, 野村浩二

『統計』 (日本統計協会) 1997.07

Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media), Joint Work

　 Previous page - Next page 　