Papers - Aoki, Setsuko

International space law on the development of the lunar infrastructures: aiming to facilitate engineering capabilities through better legal frameworks

Setsuko Aoki

JSCE Magazine Civil Engineering  110 ( 5 ) 14 - 15 2025.05

Research paper (scientific journal), Single Work, Corresponding author, Accepted,  ISSN  0021-468x

わが国が参画する視点での宇宙防衛

青木節子

Defense (隊友会)  42 ( 1 ) 56 - 65 2025.01

Research paper (scientific journal), Single Work, Lead author, Last author, Corresponding author,  ISSN  0287-2234

The Lunar Exploration as a Race for International Norm-Creation

Setsuko Aoki

Journal of World Affairs (拓殖大学海外事情研究所)  72 ( 4 ) 26 - 38 2024.07

Research paper (scientific journal), Lead author, Last author, Corresponding author,  ISSN  0453-0950

Space Security and International Law

Setsuko Aoki

International Affairs (日本国際問題研究所)   ( 716 ) 49 - 57 2023.12

Research paper (scientific journal), Single Work, Lead author, Last author, Corresponding author,  ISSN  0452-3377

Japan in the New Lunar Space Race

Saadia M. Pekkanen, Setsuko Aoki, Yumiko Takatori

Space Policy (Elsevier )     2 - 13 2023.08

Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Corresponding author, Accepted

• Access to Document (DOI)
• Access to Document (DOI)

ウクライナ後の核不拡散：非拘束的な国際制度への期待

青木節子

軍縮研究 12 ( １ ) 3 - 13 2023.04

Research paper (scientific journal), Single Work, Lead author, Last author, Corresponding author

Rules on Safety Zones in international Law Applicable to Space Activities

Setsuko Aoki

IISL Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space Paris, France 18-22 September 2022 (Curran Associates)     358 - 370 2023

Research paper (scientific journal), Single Work, Accepted

Nationality of the Space Object as an Indispensable Device for the Exploitation of the Moon and Mars

Setsuko Aoki

Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2021 (Eleven )     67 - 78 2022.11

Research paper (international conference proceedings), Single Work, Lead author, Accepted

Small Satellites, Big Data Uncovering the Invisible in Maritime Security

Saadia Pekkanen, Setsuko Aoki, John Mittleman

International Security (MIT Press)  47 ( 2 ) 177 - 216 2022.09

Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  01622889

中国の台頭と新たな宇宙抑止の可能性

青木節子

ディフェンス (隊友会)  40 ( 1 ) 112 - 124 2021.10

Research paper (other academic),  ISSN  0287-2234

Remote Sensing Data Act of Japan: Comparison with Other Japanese National Space Acts and Foreign Remote Sensing Acts

Setsuko Aoki

Journal of the Remote Sensing Society of Japan (RSSJ)  41 ( 2 ) 321 - 323 2021.05

Research paper (scientific journal), Single Work,  ISSN  0289-7911

Nationality for Spacecraft? Revisited: Nationality to be Found

Setsuko Aoki

Journal of Space Law  44 ( 2 ) 373 - 404 2021.03

Research paper (scientific journal)

宇宙物体の「国籍」

青木節子

国際法研究 (信山社)   ( 9 ) 1 - 21 2021.03

Research paper (scientific journal),  ISSN  2188-7098

世界の宇宙ビジネス法(16)サイバーセキュリティと宇宙ビジネス

青木節子

国際商事法務 (国際商事法研究所)  48 ( 5 ) 633 - 636 2020.05

Research paper (scientific journal), Single Work,  ISSN  0287-7511

Identifying the Scope of the Applicable International Law Rules towards Malicious Cyber Activities against Space Assets

Setsuko Aoki

Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2018 (Eleven )     687 - 699 2019.11

Research paper (international conference proceedings), Accepted

宇宙ガバナンスの現在

青木節子

International Affairs (日本国際問題研究所)   ( 684 ) 15 - 24 2019.09

Research paper (scientific journal), Single Work,  ISSN  1881-0500

Domestic legal conditions for space activities in Asia

Aoki S.

AJIL Unbound (AJIL Unbound)  113   103 - 108 2019

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he American Society of International Law and Setsuko Aoki © 2019. This essay compares the national space legislation of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), outlining the reasons behind the legislation and then explaining what it authorizes, the jurisdiction it asserts, and the conditions it imposes on nongovernmental space activities. The essay also compares the compensation available to victims in case of damages and governmental indemnification payments to protect victims and the space launch industry in Japan and the ROK. Differences in industry policies and dates of enactment help to account for variations among these states. However, the comparative analysis suggests that the domestic legal conditions across Asia’s three spacefaring nations are similar to those found worldwide. The essay focuses on China, Japan, and the ROK because they are Asia’s most advanced space powers, equipped with their own launch sites, launch vehicles, and domestic satellites. India draws a lot of policy attention, but I exclude it from the analysis because India does not yet have national acts or ministerial licensing measures.1 I also exclude the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). While technologically capable, the DPRK has been prohibited from engaging in “any launch using ballistic missile technology” since 2009, when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1874 in the wake of the DPRK’s second nuclear test. Considering the various sanctions that are in place, the DPRK probably also cannot lawfully procure the launch of its satellites from a foreign launch provider.2.

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An Enabler or a Barrier? "NewSpace" and Japan's Two National Space Acts of 2016

AOKI SETSUKO

Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2017 (Eleven)     507 - 522 2018.09

Single Work, Accepted

月の有人探査と日本の役割

AOKI SETSUKO

Viewpoint  ( 374 ) 125 - 127 2018.02

Single Work

Identifying the scope of the applicable international law rules towards malicious cyber activities against space assets

Aoki S.

Proceedings of the International Astronautical Congress, IAC (Proceedings of the International Astronautical Congress, IAC)  2018-October 2018

ISSN  00741795

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© 2018 by the International Astronautical Federation (IAF). All rights reserved. This article studies five category of malicious cyber activities against space assets in order to assess to what extent the existing international telecommunications law and space law address them and identify which rules are lacking to effectively solve such incidents. Five category of such activities include to jam, hijack, hack, spoof, and rob the control of telemetry, tracking and control (T&C) of a satellite, a kind of anti-satellite (ASAT). More specifically, he following five cases are studied: (i) Iranian intentional jamming of the Eutelsat satellite solved in the ITU/RRB; (ii)a terrorist organization, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam hijacking an Intelsat-12 satellite solved by diplomatic negotiations between the Sri Lankan and US Governments using law enforcement under ITU regime; (iii) allegedly Chinese hacking of US NOAA's information systems; (iv) Iranian spoofing of the NPT/GPS signals to guide a US/CIA's RQ-170 UAV into the Iranian territory; and (v) allegedly Chinese taking control of US NASA's Landsat-7. Tentative conclusions are that it can be said that international telecommunication laws including those under the ITU provide necessary legal mechanisms on which reasonable solutions is attained when “harmful interference” is conducted by a nongovernmental entity. To better solve the conflicts between States in this regard, emerging space law norms relating to TCBM and the pursuit of the consultation in case of the “potentially harmful interference” may help. The remaining and thorny issues include that cases (iii), (iv) and (v) which need careful examinations of the UN treaties on outer space including Articles VI and IX of the Outer Space Treaty, and customary international law of responsibility.