Murakami, Yutaro

写真a

Affiliation

Graduate School of Business Administration (Hiyoshi)

Position

Professor
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Career 【 Display / hide 】

  • 2006.04
    -
    2009.03

    名古屋商科大学　会計ファイナンス学部, 専任講師

  • 2009.04
    -
    2024.09

    慶應義塾大学大学院経営管理研究科, 准教授

  • 2024.10
    -
    Present

    慶應義塾大学大学院経営管理研究科, Professor

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Academic Background 【 Display / hide 】

  • 2000.03

    Sophia University, Faculty of Economics, 経済学科

    University, Graduated

  • 2002.03

    Osaka University, Graduate School, Division of Economics, 日本経済・経営

    Graduate School, Completed, Master's course

  • 2006.03

    Osaka University, Graduate School, Division of Economics, 経済学

    Graduate School, Completed, Doctoral course

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Academic Degrees 【 Display / hide 】

  • 修士（経済学）, Osaka University, 2002.03

  • 博士（経済学）, Osaka University, Coursework, 2006.03

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Research Areas 【 Display / hide 】

  • Humanities & Social Sciences / Accounting

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Papers 【 Display / hide 】

  • Theoretical analysis of non-deductible expenses: Implications for the design of compensation contracts

    Murakami Y., Wakabayashi T.

    Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 45 2024.05

    ISSN  02784254

    　View Summary

    This study analyzes how a tax system, in which expenses associated with business activities are only partially deductible for tax purposes, affects corporate behavior, including the effort level and compensation contracts. Since these activities create firm value and benefit the agent due to the inherent characteristics of consumption goods, the principal faces a trade-off between letting agents work with high-powered incentives and the tax payments resulting from non-deductible expenses. Further, we consider a government's behavior to analyze the case in which the government can flexibly change the non-deductible ratio. We find that the impacts of the corporate tax rate and the agent's preference for activities that incur tax non-deductible expenses depend on whether the non-deductible ratio is flexible. This result partially explains why various countries apply different rules for non-deductible expenses.

  • Under What Conditions Does the Manager Withhold Segment Information?

    Murakami Y., Shiiba A.

    Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 38 ( 4 ) 1009 - 1038 2023.10

    ISSN  0148558X

    　View Summary

    This paper considers how a manager decides to disclose or withhold segment information in a capital market setting. In particular, we develop a multi-period model in which a manager in each period decides how to allocate her effort between two businesses. The profit earned in each segment is determined by the manager’s effort and ability as well as each segment’s market profitability and inherent uncertainty. In this setting, in contrast to the expectation of segment disclosure being withheld due to conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, we identify the conditions under which the manager rationally withholds segment information and achieves higher social welfare. In a setting where the manager is concerned about the current stock price, disclosing more disaggregated information to the stock market does not necessarily lead to more efficient monitoring. The capital market values various segment earnings differently, and in response to this valuation, a rational manager may greatly alter her behavior, leading to inefficient outcomes.

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Papers, etc., Registered in KOARA 【 Display / hide 】

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Research Projects of Competitive Funds, etc. 【 Display / hide 】

  • A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Manager's Career Concerns and Tax Aggressiveness

    2023.04
    -
    2026.03

    基盤研究(C), Principal investigator

  • 損金不算入制度の国際的差異に関する理論的研究

    2020.04
    -
    2023.03

    MEXT,JSPS, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), Principal investigator

  • 租税回避とセグメント情報開示の理論的・実証的研究

    2017.04
    -
    2020.03

    MEXT,JSPS, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), Principal investigator

  • Theoretical and empirical research in corporate income tax and compensation contracts

    2014.04
    -
    2018.03

    MEXT,JSPS, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), Principal investigator

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Courses Taught 【 Display / hide 】

  • TAX PLANNING

    2025

  • SEMINAR IN ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

    2025

  • RESEARCH SEMINAR IN ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

    2025

  • INTENSIVE CORPORATE ANALYSIS

    2025

  • INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH C (EMBA)

    2025

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