Fujiwara-greve, Takako

写真a

Affiliation

Faculty of Economics （Mita）

Position

Professor

Related Websites

Remarks

FUJIWARA-GREVE, TAKAKO

External Links
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Career 【 Display / hide 】

  • 1989.04
    -
    1995.03

    大学助手(経済学部)

  • 1995.04
    -
    2007.03

    大学助教授(経済学部)

  • 1995.10
    -
    1997.09

    大学経済学部学習指導副主任

  • 2001.10
    -
    2002.07

    大学国際センター学習指導主任

  • 2007.04
    -
    Present

    Professor (Dept. of Economics)

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Academic Background 【 Display / hide 】

  • 1986.03

    Keio University, Faculty of Economics

    University, Graduated

  • 1988.03

    Keio University, Graduate School, Division of Economics

    Graduate School, Completed, Master's course

  • 1995.09

    Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, Economic Analysis and Policy

    United States, Graduate School, Completed, Doctoral course

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Academic Degrees 【 Display / hide 】

  • Docter of Philosophy in Business, Stanford University, Dissertation, 1995.09

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Research Areas 【 Display / hide 】

  • Humanities & Social Sciences / Economic theory (Theoretical Economics)

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Research Keywords 【 Display / hide 】

  • Game Theory

  • Microeconomics

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Research Themes 【 Display / hide 】

  • Theoretical and Experimental Research on Social Games, 

    2010.04
    -
    Present

  • Voluntary participaton of games and their application to firm reputations, 

    1999
    -
    2006

  • learning in games with bounded rationality, 

    1996
    -
    2005

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Books 【 Display / hide 】

  • Non-Cooperative Game Theory

    Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Springer, 2015.07

  • 非協力ゲーム理論

    GREVE TAKAKO, 東京・知泉書館, 2011.05

  • Public Economics: Theory and Practice

    GREVE TAKAKO, 東洋経済新報社, 2003.04

    Scope: 113-142

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Papers 【 Display / hide 】

  • "Asymmetry of Customer Loss and Recovery under Endogenous Partnerships: Theory and Evidence"

    Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Henrich R. Greve, and Stafan Jonsson

    International Economic Review 57 （ 1 ） 3 - 30 2016.02

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted

    　View Summary

    This article is inspired by real-world phenomena that firms lose customers based on imprecise information and take a long time to recover. If consumers are playing an ordinary repeated game with fixed partners, there is no clear reason why recovery happens slowly. However, if consumers are playing an endogenously repeated game, a class of simple efficient equilibria exhibits the asymmetry of fast loss and slow recovery of customers after a bad signal. Exit is systematic, but formation of a new partnership is random. We also give empirical evidence of our equilibria at an individual-firm level.

  • "Efficiency may improve when defectors exist"

    Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, and Nobue Suzuki

    Economic Theory 60 （ 3 ） 423 - 460 2015.08

    Accepted

    　View Summary

    <p>In repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, the C-trigger strategy played by all players is well known to achieve symmetric efficiency when players are sufficiently patient. By contrast, if players are free to quit a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma without information flow to new partners, cooperation from the outset of new partnerships cannot be a part of any symmetric equilibrium. Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (Rev Econ Stud 76:993–1021, 2009) showed that symmetric trust-building strategies can constitute an equilibrium for sufficiently long initial (D, D) (trust-building) periods. However, trust-building periods create social loss of payoffs, and there is a possibility that an asymmetric equilibrium with some players cooperating immediately, while others defect, may be more efficient. We show that there is a “fundamentally asymmetric” locally stable Nash equilibrium consisting of the most cooperative strategy (C-trigger with ending the partnership when betrayed) and the most noncooperative strategy, which plays D and ends the partnership immediately. When the deviation gain is relatively small, the fundamentally asymmetric equilibrium is neutrally stable against equilibrium entrants within trust-building strategies and is more efficient than any Nash equilibrium consisting of non-degenerate trust-building strategies. Our result indicates that behavioral diversity can be stable and beneficial for the society, even if players are free to escape from personalized punishments.</p>

  • "Voluntarily separable repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with reference letters"

    Fujiwara-Greve Takako, Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro, Suzuki Nobue

    Games and Economic Behavior 74 （ 2 ） 504 - 516 2012.03

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  0899-8256

    　View Summary

    <p>We consider the voluntarily separable repeated Prisoner's Dilemma model in which players randomly meet and form pairs to repeatedly play Prisoner's Dilemma only by mutual agreement. While the literature has dealt with the case of no information flow across partnerships, we consider the case in which players can issue a "reference letter" to verify at least that the partnership entered the cooperation phase. We show that such reference letters can be voluntarily provided by the partners even at some cost, and that the sheer existence of a letter shortens the trust-building periods and thus improves social efficiency. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.</p>

  • "Undeserved Loss: the Spread of Legitimacy Loss to Innocent Organizations in Response to Reporated Corporate Deviance"

    Stefan Jonsson, Henrich Greve, and Takako Fujiwara-Greve

    Administrative Science Quarterly （Cornell University)  54 （ 2 ） 195-228 2009.07

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted

  • "Voluntarily separable repeated Prisoner's Dilemma"

    Fujiwara-Greve Takako, Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro

    Review of Economic Studies 76 （ 3 ） 993 - 1021 2009

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work,  ISSN  0034-6527

    　View Summary

    <p>Ordinary repeated games do not apply to real societies where one can cheat and escape from partners. We formulate a model of endogenous relationships that a player can unilaterally end and start with a randomly assigned new partner with no information flow. Focusing on two-person, two-action Prisoner's Dilemma, we show that the endogenous duration of partnerships generates a significantly different evolutionary stability structure from ordinary random matching games. Monomorphic equilibria require initial trust building, while a polymorphic equilibrium includes earlier cooperators than any strategy in monomorphic equilibria and is thus more efficient. This is due to the non-linearity of average payoffs. © 2009 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.</p>

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Papers, etc., Registered in KOARA 【 Display / hide 】

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Presentations 【 Display / hide 】

  • Tolerance and Behavioral Diversity

    FUJIWARA-GREVE TAKAKO

    SAET Meeting (Academia Sinica, Taiwan) , 

    2018.06
    , 

    Oral presentation (general), Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory

  • Tolerance and Behavioral Diversity

    FUJIWARA-GREVE TAKAKO

    Dynamic Models in Economics: Workshop on Game Theory (Institute for Mathematical Sciences, National University of Singapore) , 

    2018.06
    , 

    Oral presentation (invited, special), Institute for Mathematical Sciences, National University of Singapore

  • Tolerance and Behavioral Diversity

    FUJIWARA-GREVE TAKAKO

    The 2018 Arne Ryde conference and mini course on Learning, Evolution and Games (Lund University, Sweden) , 

    2018.06
    , 

    Oral presentation (invited, special), Arne Ryde Foundation

  • Exit Option Can Make Cooperation Easier

    FUJIWARA-GREVE TAKAKO

    The Second Asia-Pacific Industrial Organisation Conference (APIOC 2017) (University of Auckland, New Zealand) , 

    2017.12
    , 

    Oral presentation (invited, special), ASIA-PACIFIC Industrial Organisation Society

  • Long-term Cooperation and Diverse Behavior Patterns under Voluntary Partnerships

    FUJIWARA-GREVE TAKAKO

    European Meeting of the Econometric Society (ISCTE - IUL and the University of Lisbon) , 

    2017.08
    , 

    Oral presentation (general), Econometric Society

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Research Projects of Competitive Funds, etc. 【 Display / hide 】

  • Theory and Experiment of Social Games: Voluntary Cooperation, Diverse Strategies, and International Comparison

    2017.04
    -
    2021.03

    JSPS, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Research grant, Principal investigator

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Courses Taught 【 Display / hide 】

  • TOPICS IN MICROECONOMICS

    2022

  • SEMINAR: MICROECONOMICS

    2022

  • SEMINAR: MATHEMATICS FOR ECONOMICS

    2022

  • RESEARCH SEMINAR D

    2022

  • RESEARCH SEMINAR C

    2022

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Social Activities 【 Display / hide 】

  • Associate member, Science Council of Japan

    2014.10
    -
    Present
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Memberships in Academic Societies 【 Display / hide 】

  • American Economic Association, 

    1997.09
    -
    Present

  • Econometric Society, 

    1995.09
    -
    Present

  • Japanese Economic Association, 

    1993.07
    -
    Present
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Committee Experiences 【 Display / hide 】

  • 2014.06
    -
    2016.06

    総務理事, 日本経済学会

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