Fujiwara-greve, Takako

写真a

Affiliation

Faculty of Economics (Mita)

Position

Professor

Related Websites

Remarks

FUJIWARA-GREVE, TAKAKO

External Links
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Career 【 Display / hide 】

  • 1989.04
    -
    1995.03

    大学助手(経済学部)

  • 1995.04
    -
    2007.03

    大学助教授(経済学部)

  • 1995.10
    -
    1997.09

    大学経済学部学習指導副主任

  • 2001.10
    -
    2002.07

    大学国際センター学習指導主任

  • 2007.04
    -
    Present

    Professor (Dept. of Economics)

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Academic Background 【 Display / hide 】

  • 1986.03

    Keio University, Faculty of Economics

    University, Graduated

  • 1988.03

    Keio University, Graduate School, Division of Economics

    Graduate School, Completed, Master's course

  • 1995.09

    Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, Economic Analysis and Policy

    United States, Graduate School, Completed, Doctoral course

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Academic Degrees 【 Display / hide 】

  • Docter of Philosophy in Business, Stanford University, Dissertation, 1995.09

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Research Areas 【 Display / hide 】

  • Humanities & Social Sciences / Economic theory (Theoretical Economics)

  • Humanities & Social Sciences / Economic theory (Game Theory, Microeconomics)

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Research Keywords 【 Display / hide 】

  • Game Theory

  • Microeconomics

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Research Themes 【 Display / hide 】

  • Farsighted Group Formation, 

    2022.04
    -
    Present

  • Accountable Voting Systems and Economics of Rankings, 

    2018.04
    -
    Present

  • Theoretical and Experimental Research on Large Society Games, 

    2010.04
    -
    Present

  • Voluntary participaton of games and their application to firm reputations, 

    1999
    -
    2006

  • learning in games with bounded rationality, 

    1996
    -
    2005

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Books 【 Display / hide 】

  • Non-Cooperative Game Theory

    Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Springer, 2015.07

  • 非協力ゲーム理論

    GREVE TAKAKO, 東京・知泉書館, 2011.05

  • Public Economics: Theory and Practice

    GREVE TAKAKO, 東洋経済新報社, 2003.04

    Scope: 113-142

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Papers 【 Display / hide 】

  • Farsighted Clustering with Group-Size Effects and Reputations

    Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Toru Hokari

    Dynamic Games and Applications (Springer)  13   610 - 635 2022.09

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Corresponding author, Accepted

  • Algorithms may not learn to play a unique Nash equilibrium

    Fujiwara-Greve T., Nielsen C.K.

    Journal of Computational Social Science (Journal of Computational Social Science)  4 ( 2 ) 839 - 850 2021.11

    ISSN  24322717

    　View Summary

    There is a widespread hope that, in the near future, algorithms become so sophisticated that “solutions” to most problems are found by machines. In this note, we throw some doubts on this expectation by showing the following impossibility result: given a set of finite-memory, finite-iteration algorithms, a continuum of games exist, whose unique and strict Nash equilibrium cannot be reached from a large set of initial states. A Nash equilibrium is a social solution to conflicts of interest, and hence finite algorithms should not be always relied upon for social problems. Our result also shows how to construct games to deceive a given set of algorithms to be trapped in a cycle without a Nash equilibrium.

  • "Asymmetry of Customer Loss and Recovery under Endogenous Partnerships: Theory and Evidence"

    Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Henrich R. Greve, and Stafan Jonsson

    International Economic Review 57 ( 1 ) 3 - 30 2016.02

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted

    　View Summary

    This article is inspired by real-world phenomena that firms lose customers based on imprecise information and take a long time to recover. If consumers are playing an ordinary repeated game with fixed partners, there is no clear reason why recovery happens slowly. However, if consumers are playing an endogenously repeated game, a class of simple efficient equilibria exhibits the asymmetry of fast loss and slow recovery of customers after a bad signal. Exit is systematic, but formation of a new partnership is random. We also give empirical evidence of our equilibria at an individual-firm level.

  • "Efficiency may improve when defectors exist"

    Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, and Nobue Suzuki

    Economic Theory 60 ( 3 ) 423 - 460 2015.08

    Accepted

    　View Summary

    <p>In repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, the C-trigger strategy played by all players is well known to achieve symmetric efficiency when players are sufficiently patient. By contrast, if players are free to quit a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma without information flow to new partners, cooperation from the outset of new partnerships cannot be a part of any symmetric equilibrium. Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (Rev Econ Stud 76:993–1021, 2009) showed that symmetric trust-building strategies can constitute an equilibrium for sufficiently long initial (D, D) (trust-building) periods. However, trust-building periods create social loss of payoffs, and there is a possibility that an asymmetric equilibrium with some players cooperating immediately, while others defect, may be more efficient. We show that there is a “fundamentally asymmetric” locally stable Nash equilibrium consisting of the most cooperative strategy (C-trigger with ending the partnership when betrayed) and the most noncooperative strategy, which plays D and ends the partnership immediately. When the deviation gain is relatively small, the fundamentally asymmetric equilibrium is neutrally stable against equilibrium entrants within trust-building strategies and is more efficient than any Nash equilibrium consisting of non-degenerate trust-building strategies. Our result indicates that behavioral diversity can be stable and beneficial for the society, even if players are free to escape from personalized punishments.</p>

  • "Voluntarily separable repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with reference letters"

    Fujiwara-Greve Takako, Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro, Suzuki Nobue

    Games and Economic Behavior 74 ( 2 ) 504 - 516 2012.03

    Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  0899-8256

    　View Summary

    <p>We consider the voluntarily separable repeated Prisoner's Dilemma model in which players randomly meet and form pairs to repeatedly play Prisoner's Dilemma only by mutual agreement. While the literature has dealt with the case of no information flow across partnerships, we consider the case in which players can issue a "reference letter" to verify at least that the partnership entered the cooperation phase. We show that such reference letters can be voluntarily provided by the partners even at some cost, and that the sheer existence of a letter shortens the trust-building periods and thus improves social efficiency. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.</p>

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Papers, etc., Registered in KOARA 【 Display / hide 】

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Presentations 【 Display / hide 】

  • Tolerance and Behavioral Diversity

    FUJIWARA-GREVE TAKAKO

    SAET Meeting (Academia Sinica, Taiwan) , 

    2018.06
    , 

    Oral presentation (general), Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory

  • Tolerance and Behavioral Diversity

    FUJIWARA-GREVE TAKAKO

    Dynamic Models in Economics: Workshop on Game Theory (Institute for Mathematical Sciences, National University of Singapore) , 

    2018.06
    , 

    Oral presentation (invited, special), Institute for Mathematical Sciences, National University of Singapore

  • Tolerance and Behavioral Diversity

    FUJIWARA-GREVE TAKAKO

    The 2018 Arne Ryde conference and mini course on Learning, Evolution and Games (Lund University, Sweden) , 

    2018.06
    , 

    Oral presentation (invited, special), Arne Ryde Foundation

  • Exit Option Can Make Cooperation Easier

    FUJIWARA-GREVE TAKAKO

    The Second Asia-Pacific Industrial Organisation Conference (APIOC 2017) (University of Auckland, New Zealand) , 

    2017.12
    , 

    Oral presentation (invited, special), ASIA-PACIFIC Industrial Organisation Society

  • Long-term Cooperation and Diverse Behavior Patterns under Voluntary Partnerships

    FUJIWARA-GREVE TAKAKO

    European Meeting of the Econometric Society (ISCTE - IUL and the University of Lisbon) , 

    2017.08
    , 

    Oral presentation (general), Econometric Society

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Research Projects of Competitive Funds, etc. 【 Display / hide 】

  • A Study of Collective Evaluation: Utilization of Information, Exclusion of Biases, and Promotion of Adequate Competition

    2024.04
    -
    2029.03

    基盤研究(B), Principal investigator

  • Theory and Experiment of Social Games: Voluntary Cooperation, Diverse Strategies, and International Comparison

    2017.04
    -
    2021.03

    JSPS, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Research grant, Principal investigator

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Awards 【 Display / hide 】

  • Graeme Woodbridge Prize

    Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Yosuke Yasuda, 2022.12, Asia-Pacific Industrial Organization Society, Inspecting Cartels over Time: With and without Leniency Program

    Type of Award： Award from international society, conference, symposium, etc.

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Courses Taught 【 Display / hide 】

  • TOPICS IN MICROECONOMICS

    2025

  • SEMINAR: MICROECONOMICS

    2025

  • SEMINAR: MATHEMATICS FOR ECONOMICS

    2025

  • SEMINAR IN SPECIAL TOPICS B

    2025

  • SEMINAR IN SPECIAL TOPICS A

    2025

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Social Activities 【 Display / hide 】

  • Associate member, Science Council of Japan

    2014.10
    -
    Present
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Memberships in Academic Societies 【 Display / hide 】

  • Game Theory Society, 

    2000.04
    -
    Present

  • American Economic Association, 

    1997.09
    -
    Present

  • Econometric Society, 

    1995.09
    -
    Present

  • Japanese Economic Association, 

    1993.07
    -
    Present
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Committee Experiences 【 Display / hide 】

  • 2020.06
    -
    Present

    監事, 日本経済学会

  • 2014.06
    -
    2016.06

    総務理事, 日本経済学会

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