藤原 一平 (フジワラ イッペイ)

Fujiwara Ippei

写真a

所属(所属キャンパス)

経済学部 (三田)

職名

教授

HP

特記事項

藤原一平

経歴 【 表示 / 非表示

  • 1993年04月
    -
    2011年09月

    日本銀行

  • 2011年10月
    -
    継続中

    オーストラリア国立大学, クロフォード行政大学院, 准教授(2011~2013年)、教授(2013年~)

学歴 【 表示 / 非表示

  • 1986年04月
    -
    1989年03月

    早稲田大学高等学院

    その他, 卒業

  • 1989年04月
    -
    1993年03月

    早稲田大学, 政治経済学部, 政治学科

    大学, 卒業

  • 1998年10月
    -
    2000年07月

    オックスフォード大学, 経済学部

    大学院, 修了, 修士

  • 2002年04月
    -
    2005年03月

    大阪大学, 経済学部

    大学院, 修了, 博士

  • 2008年10月
    -
    2010年07月

    オックスフォード大学, 経済学部

    大学院, 修了, 博士

学位 【 表示 / 非表示

  • 政治学士, 早稲田大学, 課程, 1993年03月

  • Master of Philosophy in Economics, University of Oxford (St. Antony's College), 2000年07月

  • 応用経済学部博士, 大阪大学, 課程, 2005年03月

  • Doctor of Philosophy in Economics, University of Oxford (Nuffield College), 課程, 2010年07月

 

研究分野 【 表示 / 非表示

  • 理論経済学

  • 経済政策

  • 金融・ファイナンス

研究キーワード 【 表示 / 非表示

  • マクロ経済学

  • 国際金融論

 

論文 【 表示 / 非表示

  • Dealing with Time Inconsistency: Inflation Targeting versus Exchange Rate Targeting

    Davis J., Fujiwara I., Wang J.

    Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (Journal of Money, Credit and Banking)  50 ( 7 ) 1369 - 1399 2018年10月

    ISSN  00222879

     概要を見る

    © 2018 The Ohio State University Adopting a single instead of multiple targets can be an effective way to overcome the classic time-inconsistency problem. The choice of a single mandate depends on the trade openness and the credibility. Reduced-form empirical results show as central banks become less credible, they are more likely to adopt a pegged exchange rate, and the tendency to peg depends on trade openness. In a model with “loose commitment,” as credibility falls, either an inflation target or a pegged exchange rate is more likely to be adopted. A relatively closed (highly open) economy would adopt an inflation target (exchange rate peg).

  • The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a new Keynesian model with private information

    Waki Y., Dennis R., Fujiwara I.

    Theoretical Economics (Theoretical Economics)  13 ( 3 ) 1319 - 1367 2018年09月

    ISSN  19336837

     概要を見る

    Copyright © 2018 The Authors. This paper considers the optimal degree of monetary discretion when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions over time, and the central bank takes these restrictions and the new Keynesian Phillips curve as constraints. By solving a dynamic mechanism design problem, we find that it is optimal to grant “constrained discretion” to the central bank by imposing both upper and lower bounds on permissible inflation, and that these bounds should be set in a history-dependent way. The optimal degree of discretion varies over time with the severity of the time-inconsistency problem, and although no discretion is optimal when the time-inconsistency problem is very severe, it is a transient phenomenon and some discretion is granted eventually.

  • Comment on “Why Has Japan Failed to Escape from Deflation?”

    Fujiwara Ippei

    Asian Economic Policy Review 13 ( 1 ) 42 - 43 2018年01月

    ISSN  1832-8105

  • Optimal monetary policy in open economies revisited

    Fujiwara Ippei, Wang Jiao

    Journal of International Economics 108   300 - 314 2017年09月

    ISSN  0022-1996

     概要を見る

    <p>This paper revisits optimal monetary policy in open economies, in particular, focusing on the noncooperative policy game under local currency pricing in a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We first derive the quadratic loss functions which noncooperative policy makers aim to minimize. Then, we show that noncooperative policy makers face extra trade-offs regarding stabilizing real marginal costs induced by deviations from the law of one price under local currency pricing, and that optimal monetary policy seeks to stabilize CPI inflation rates and more so under noncooperation than it does under cooperation. As a result of the increased number of stabilizing objectives, welfare gains from cooperation emerge even when two countries face only technology shocks. Still, gains from cooperation are not large, implying that frictions other than nominal rigidities are necessary to strongly recommend cooperation as an important policy framework to increase global welfare.</p>

  • Financial frictions and policy cooperation

    Fujiwara Ippei, Teranishi Yuki

    Journal of International Economics 104   19 - 43 2017年01月

    ISSN  0022-1996

     概要を見る

    <p>Do financial frictions call for cross-border policy cooperation? This paper investigates the implications of financial frictions in the form of staggered loan contracts supplied by monopolistic banks, for monetary policy. Using the linear quadratic (LQ) framework, we show that policy cooperation yields long-run gains in addition to gains from stabilizing inefficient fluctuations over the business cycle, as usually found in models with price rigidities. The Ramsey optimal steady states differ between cooperation and noncooperation. Such gains from cooperation arise irrespective of capital account liberalization.</p>

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総説・解説等 【 表示 / 非表示

競争的資金等の研究課題 【 表示 / 非表示

  • 国際流動性としての政府債務と国際間政策協調

    2018年04月
    -
    2021年03月

    文部科学省・日本学術振興会, 科学研究費助成事業, 藤原 一平, 基盤研究(A), 補助金,  代表

その他 【 表示 / 非表示

  •  内容を見る

    Editor, Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, 2012-

  •  内容を見る

    Associate Editor, Japan and the World Economy, 2009-

  •  内容を見る

    Research Associate, Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute, FRB Dallas, 2010-

  •  内容を見る

    Deputy Director, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Australian National University, 2011-

  •  内容を見る

    Fellow, Euro Area Business Cycle Network, 2010-

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担当授業科目 【 表示 / 非表示

  • マクロ経済学演習

    2019年度

  • 研究会d

    2019年度

  • 研究会c

    2019年度

  • 研究会b

    2019年度

  • 研究会a

    2019年度

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