Papers - Tamada, Yasunari

Mediating Internal Competition for Resources

Suraj Prasad, Yasunari Tamada

Journal of Industrial Economics 72 ( 1 ) 157 - 192 2024

Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted

• Access to Document (DOI)

Disclosure of Contract Clauses and Career Concerns

Yasunari Tamada

Economics Bulletin (Economics Bulletin)  39 ( 3 ) 1968 - 1978 2019.09

Research paper (scientific journal), Single Work, Accepted,  ISSN  1545-2921

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© 2020, Economics Bulletin. In this study, we analyze a simple moral hazard model in which a risk-neutral agent has career concerns and is protected by limited liability. The agent cares about both career concerns and explicit incentives given by the principal. We consider the following two cases: (i) when the explicit contract is unobservable for the labor market, and (ii) when the principal discloses contract. If the explicit compensation contract is unobservable, the labor market needs to update its belief regarding the agent type on the basis of the realized outcome and the inference of the agent's effort choice. However, if the principal discloses contract clauses, the labor market knows how much effort is planned to be induced. The principal, then, can influence the market's belief through the observable contract. By disclosing contract clauses, the principal can induce a higher level of effort from the agent because she can control career concern incentives directly as well as monetary incentives.

Reputation versus information: The delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns

Yasunari Tamada, Tsung-Sheng Tsai

Journal of Public Economic Theory (Journal of Public Economic Theory)  20 ( 3 ) 367 - 389 2018.06

Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted,  ISSN  10973923

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© 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. We analyze the delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns. Both the principal and the agent can be either good or biased; the good players prefer the correct decision, while the biased ones prefer a high action even though it may be wrong. An evaluator who forms the principal's reputation may or may not be able to observe who makes the decision. When the evaluator cannot observe the allocation of authority, the principal shares the credit and blame with the agent. Although delegation can improve the quality of decision making because the agent has better information, it may also hurt the good principal's reputation because the high action may be taken by the biased agent while the blame will be shared when it is wrong. Thus, the good principal has a tendency to keep too much authority to maintain her reputation. By contrast, when the evaluator can observe the allocation of authority, delegation becomes a signaling device for the good type of principal to differentiate herself from the biased one. This results in an excessive allocation of authority toward the agent.

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Optimal Delegation with Self-Interested Agents and Information Acquisition

Shungo Omiya, Yasunari Tamada, Tsung-Sheng Tsai

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 137   54 - 71 2017.05

Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted

Delegating the Decision-making Authority to Terminate a Sequential Project

Yasunari Tamada, Tsung-Sheng Tsai

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 99   178-194 2014.03

Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted

Optimal Organization in a Sequential Investment Problem with the Principal's Cancellation Option

Yasunari Tamada, Tsung-Sheng Tsai

International Journal of Industrial Organization 25   631-641 2007

Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted

Solvability of linear equations and its economic consequences

Kunio Kawamata, Toru Maruyama, Yasunari Tamada

Journal of Nonlinear and Convex Analysis 21 ( 6 ) 1317 - 1325 2020

Joint Work,  ISSN  13454773

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© 2020 Yokohama Publications. All rights reserved. Based upon the solvability theorem of the system of linear equations we will establish the Kuhn-Fourier theorem and the Farkas-Minkowski lemma and related results. Our analyses are elementary and self-contained and perhaps the most basic way to deal with the problem. This will also clarify and simplify the nature of the former analyses based on linear inequalities. Then for applications we give simple proofs of the duality theorem for the linear programming and the minimax theorem in game theory based upon our results.

Direct and Indirect Connection, the Shapley Value, and Network Formation

TAMADA YASUNARI

Advances in Mathematical Economics 8   315 - 348 2006

Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work, Accepted

ネットワークの形成と安定性

川又邦雄，玉田康成，山田隆太

三田学会雑誌 98 ( 1 ) 15 - 31 2005

Joint Work

直接的コネクションと間接的コネクションから形成されるネットワークの安定性

川又邦雄，玉田康成

三田学会雑誌 98 ( 3 ) 393 - 404 2005

Research paper (scientific journal), Joint Work

通時的な投資をともなう研究開発における最適な組織形態

TAMADA YASUNARI

三田学会雑誌 97 ( 1 ) 75-89 2004

Research paper (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

Cournot Oligopoly with Network Formation

Kunio Kawamata, Yasunari Tamada

経済の数理解析，数理解析研究所講究録 1391   249 - 266 2004

Research paper (conference, symposium, etc.), Joint Work, Accepted

Network Formation in the Work Partnering

Kunio Kawamata, Yasunari Tamada

Waseda Economic Papers 42   113 - 121 2003

Research paper (bulletin of university, research institution), Joint Work, Accepted

研究開発投資のインセンティブと垂直的統合

TAMADA YASUNARI

三田学会雑誌 89 ( 4 ) 615-644 1997

Research paper (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work

需要不確実性と垂直的統合

TAMADA YASUNARI

三田学会雑誌 88 ( 3 ) 416-443 1995

Research paper (bulletin of university, research institution), Single Work