研究者詳細 - 栗野　盛光

論文 - 栗野　盛光

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Job Rotation or Specialization? A Dynamic Matching Model Analysis

Morimitsu Kurino, Yoshinori Kurokawa

Review of Economic Design 28 243 - 273 2024年

研究論文（学術雑誌）, 共著, 筆頭著者, 査読有り

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Coordinating Electric Vehicles: Impacts on Mobility-Service and Electricity Markets

Ando H., Kon N., Kurino M., Takahara I.

Proceedings - 2024 IEEE International Conference on Big Data, BigData 2024 3838 - 3846 2024年

This study explores the dual role of electric vehicles (EVs) in mobility service and electricity markets through vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology, enabling EVs to stabilize energy systems by trading electricity with the grid. Building upon Kelso and Crawford's [4] algorithm, we develop an EV-proposing price-adjustment process to determine matchings between EVs and either riders or charging stations, along with their corresponding transaction prices. We demonstrate that the proposed algorithm produces stable outcomes in both markets. Furthermore, to assess the impact of V2G-enabled EVs, simulations were conducted within a virtual transportation network. The results show that electricity-coordinating EVs play a more significant role in stabilizing the electricity market and, when the station battery levels are low, generate a higher total surplus compared to scenarios without such coordination. In other situations, managing the roles of EVs is essential to maximize welfare.

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Lower Alertness entails More Cooperation: Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma and Coordination Games

Toshio Kokubo, Nobuhito Kon, Morimitsu Kurino, Wakuo Saito, Natsumi Shimada, and Masashi Yanagisawa

2023 IEEE International Conference on Big Data 3185 - 3193 2023年

研究論文（国際会議プロシーディングス）, 共著, 査読有り

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交換移植制度におけるドミナントマッチングの適用可能性

臼井颯汰, 栗野盛光, 大藤剛宏, 繁野麻衣子

日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会和文論文誌 65 1 - 21 2022年

研究論文（学術雑誌）, 共著, 査読有り

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How to avoid black markets for appointments with online booking systems

Rustamdjan Hakimov, C-Philipp Heller, Dorothea Kübler, Morimitsu Kurino

American Economic Review （American Economic Association） 111 （ 7 ） 2127 - 2151 2021年07月

研究論文（学術雑誌）, 共著, 査読有り, ISSN 1944-7981

Allocating appointment slots is presented as a new application for market design. Online booking systems are commonly used by public authorities to allocate appointments for visa interviews, driver's licenses, passport renewals, etc. We document that black markets for appointments have developed in many parts of the world. Scalpers book the appointments that are offered for free and sell the slots to appointment seekers. We model the existing first-come-first-served booking system and propose an alternative batch system. The batch system collects applications for slots over a certain time period and then randomly allocates slots to applicants. The theory predicts and lab experiments confirm that scalpers profitably book and sell slots under the current system with sufficiently high demand, but that they are not active in the proposed batch system. We discuss practical issues for the implementation of the batch system and its applicability to other markets with scalping.

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車両速度の情報開示におけるドライバー意思決定問題実験

栗野盛光,島田夏美

応用経済学研究 14 1 - 25 2021年

研究論文（学術雑誌）, 共著, 査読有り

Credibility, efficiency, and stability: a theory of dynamic matching markets

Kurino M.

Japanese Economic Review 71 （ 1 ） 135 - 165 2020年01月

研究論文（学術雑誌）, 単著, 査読有り, ISSN 13524739

© 2019, Japanese Economic Association. We introduce a dynamic framework to analyze two-sided matching interactions that occur repeatedly over time, such as teacher–student matching or hospital–intern markets in Britain. We propose a dynamic concept of credible group stability and show that implementing a men-optimal stable matching in each period is credibly group-stable. The result holds for a women-optimal stable matching. A credibly group-stable dynamic matching is individually rational and immune to any defensible group deviations with an appropriate definition of defensibility. We obtain several policy implications for market design. Moreover, a sufficient condition for Pareto efficiency is given for finitely repeated markets.

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待機児童問題解消のための助成金の設計

栗野盛光,野田寛人,高原勇,綿引由美

応用地域学研究 2020 （ 24 ） 1 - 17 2020年

研究論文（学術雑誌）, 共著, 査読有り

Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility

Kesten O., Kurino M.

Games and Economic Behavior 117 120 - 143 2019年09月

研究論文（学術雑誌）, 共著, 査読有り, ISSN 08998256

© 2019 Elsevier Inc. In one-sided matching/assignment problems, an important debate centers around whether it is possible to improve upon the Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) via alternative strategy-proof mechanisms. In unrestricted preference domains, no strategy-proof mechanism Pareto improves upon DA whether students have outside options or not. When standard exogenous outside options, e.g., private school, do not necessarily exist, we show that endogenous outside options, i.e., problem-specific schools that could always accept a deviating student, arise and the impossibility of obtaining a strategy-proof improvements over DA prevails. It is, however, possible to construct natural subdomains allowing for positive results, where some students' preferences are in part induced by an exogenous hierarchy of quality tiers. We then identify maximal domains on which it is possible to improve upon DA without sacrificing strategy-proofness. This result may help better assess the underpinnings of the three-way tension among efficiency, individual rationality/stability, and strategy-proofness in matching problems.

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College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized

Hafalir I., Hakimov R., Kübler D., Kurino M.

Journal of Economic Theory （Journal of Economic Theory） 176 886 - 934 2018年

研究論文（学術雑誌）, 共著, 査読有り, ISSN 00220531

© 2018 Elsevier Inc. We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. Many predictions of the theory are supported by a lab experiment designed to test the theory, yet we find a number of differences that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to the equilibrium benchmark.